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                                     Abstract 
 
This thesis is an ethnography of the making of a smart city initiative called 
Open Programmable Harbour City (OPHC). The aim of OPHC is to build a 
programmable testbed to enable everyone to experiment with their smart 
city applications. This original research aims to address three gaps in the 
current smart cities literature. It first seeks to understand the actual 
innovation processes of this smart city initiative. It then takes a unique angle 
to investigate the roles of vision in the innovation processes. It also focuses 
on citizen participation in the OPHC project. In order to interpret the data, 
the research went through an iterative-inductive process to assemble a 
theoretical framework. This framework draws on conceptual tools from two 
intellectual sources: Transition Studies (the socio-technical perspective) and 
the Sociology of Expectation. The researcher conducted 49 main participant 
observations in and beyond Harbour City; 24 formal interviews and 19 key 
informal interviews over 17 months to collect data.  
 
The data reveals three stages (emergence, implementation, and diffusion) in 
the innovation process of OPHC. The results show that OPHC did not 
emerge in a vacuum. Instead, it is a configuration of people, artefacts, and 
expectations that survived in the selection environment at the niche level. 
This configuration was relabelled as a smart city project. At the local level, 
the implementation of OPHC was formed of loosely coordinated parallel 
niche experimentations. At the global level, the diffusion of OPHC was 
mainly about spreading its vision. The diffusion produced some dynamic 
results in both vertical and horizontal directions. Apart from understanding 
the mechanisms of the innovation process, this research also pays attention 
to roles of citizens and vision in the innovation process. It suggested that 
citizens had a limited role in making smart cities. The vision plays dynamics 
and sometime paradoxical roles in the innovation process. Overall, the thesis 
makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to current smart cities 
literature, and open many doors for future explorations. 
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 The Chief Manager of OPHC, from July (2014) to June (2016). 
 
Ruby 
A civil servant from Harbour City Council. 
 
Susan 
A world leading optical network Professor from the Harbour City University 





OPHC engineering team 
A group of 2 to 4 engineers lead by David. They in charge of implementing and designing 
OPHC programmable testbed 
. 
OPHC business team 
A small team response to promote OPHC and align partners, including Chris and Rufus. 
 
Data Dome team 
A group of actors lead the Data Dome innovation, including Peggy, Jim and Henry. 
 
Citizen Sensing team 
A group of actors lead the Citizen Sensing innovation, mainly including Camila, Stein, 
Judy, Lucy, Maria. 
 
Vertical Diffusion team 
A group of actors spread OPHC to general global smart cities audience, mainly including 
Chris, Ruby, Peggy, David, and Susan. 
 
Horizontal Diffusion team 
A group of actors spread OPHC to another local smart city niche in Delta City, mainly 












A creative digital centre in Harbour City and a local host partner of OPHC. 
 
Harbour City University 
A university in Harbour City and one party of OPHC joint venture. 
 
Harbour City Council 
The local council in Harbour City and one party of OPHC joint venture. 
 
Science Museum 
A science education centre in Harbour City and a local host partner of OPHC. 
 
Straw House 






A city-scale programmable infrastructure of OPHC. 
 
Data Dome 
The first application of OPHC, a data visualization device.  
 
Toad 
A Citizen Sensing application co-produced by Straw House and local communities in 






A middle-size city located in England (UK). 
 
Delta City 




(Note: Above, I have only listed the key actors of this research. The full list of actors in each episode 











Active Node: A “Node” is a network communication terminology describing the physical 
point for network traffic conjunctions. “Active” indicates “programmable”. In this research, 
an “active node” means a network node that can be programmed.  
 
City OS: This is a piece of software designed by Light Speed. It is the software part of the 
OPHC programmable infrastructure. It aims to orchestra heterogeneous networks and 
resources in a city. 
 
Network Emulator: This is a technique to test the performance of a real application over a 
virtual network. It can increase the experimentation and scale-up capacity of a network.  
 
RF Mesh Network: This is a Radio Frequency Mesh network. A type of communication 
network that is made up of radio nodes and these nodes can be organised in a mesh topology. 
 
Software Defined Network (SDN): This is a network communication terminology. For 
each network component, it decouples the hardware from its own control plane, and uses a 
centralized control plane to manage the behaviour of components in a network. Such 
separation can enable the network programmability in a more efficient and easier manner. It 
also addressed the challenge of managing components from different infrastructure 
providers that offer different standards. 
 
 
(Note: Above, I have only highlighted the key technological terminologies of this research. More 













Chris stands on the stage of a smart cities conference in Delta City (China). Today1, he will 
give a speech about Open Programmable Harbour City (OPHC). OPHC is a newly launched 
smart city project in Harbour City (UK). Since Chris took up the role as a Chief Manager of 
OPHC, he has travelled around the world to talk about OPHC, and this is the second time 
within 6 months he is in China. China is frequently mentioned in the smart cities literature, 
mainly due to its rapid urbanisation and opportunities for smart cities businesses. Despite his 
jet-lag, Chris confidently stands in front of his audience. His voice calm and persuasive, like 
a missionary or prophet of the future. He tells the audience that OPHC is a joint venture 
smart city project in Harbour City. The vision of the project is to build the world’s first city-
scale programmable infrastructure which will enable a wide range of local and global people 
to experiment with their own smart cities solutions. This vision stands out in the current 
smart cities movement because it does not aim to deliver a whole package of smart city 
solutions to people. Instead, it aims to provide a platform for people to experiment with their 
own smart solutions. The key technological enabler behind it is the promising networking 
technology Software Defined Network (SDN), which has the potential to bring revolutionary 
change to the current networking industry. Apart from its technological vision, OPHC also 
put citizens at the core of its principle. This is evidenced in the many roles that OPHC has 
allocated for citizens. For example, it has promised to open its testbed for everyone to 
                                                     






conduct experiments. It has already transformed a Planetarium show space into a Data Dome 
for local citizens to view and interact with their urban data. Moreover, it also cooperates with 
a local community organisation, Straw House, to co-produce the Citizen Sensing application 
with local communities. 
 
Why is Chris giving a speech in Delta City? What is the Open Programmable Harbour City 
(OPHC)? How did it come into being? Who drives the project? Is it an already built smart 
city or merely a vision? What is programmable infrastructure? What is state-of-the-art SDN? 
Who will actually use the infrastructure? What is Data Dome? What is the Citizen Sensing 
application? Who is Straw House? To what extent can citizens participate in the innovation 
process? Will Delta City audiences accept the vision that Chris is trying to sell to them? 
Readers might already have a thousand questions in their heads. This thesis presents 
ethnographic research about OPHC. It will present the detailed process of OPHC’s 
emergence, implementation, and diffusion. As the stories unfold, you will not only find 
answers for the above questions, but also a deeper understanding about the making of an 
actual smart city. You will not only know the characteristics, mechanisms, and challenges 
of building a smart city, but also have fresh insights into the role of vision and citizens in the 
innovation process. You will not only feel innovators’ pulses, hopes, and ambitions in 
building a smart city, but also see the challenges of realising their ambitions, learn which 
dreams crashed, see expectation becoming hype and understand why OPHC is a failure, but 
not a failure. 
 
1.2 Why this research matters 
 
This is a timely piece of original research in the midst of the current smart city movement. 
Readers might be disappointed if they expect to find conventional smart cities arguments in 
this thesis, for example, that smart cities are imposed by technology corporations and are 
characterised by a lack of citizens’ voices (Townsend, 2013). This way of building smart 
cities has generated a lot of concern: for instance, concerns that citizens in many proposed 
smart city visions are simply marketing devices, that the innovations are mainly intended for 
urban entrepreneurs (Holland, 2014); that the smart city is another form of neo-liberal urban 
utopian ideology (Kitchin, 2015); that smart cities might generate issues of surveillance, 
control, and privacy (Vanolo, 2013). However, what we lack in current smart city research 




role for citizens in the processes. This research specifically addresses these gaps by providing 
ethnographic research about a local smart city initiative in the making and exploring citizen 
participation opportunities in detail. Moreover, this research pays special attention to the role 
of vision in the innovation process. This is an aspect that is often neglected by much smart 
cities literature. Most current smart cities research treats vision as an object of critique. This 
way of looking at vision blinds them from looking at what vision does in an innovation 
process. This is an original piece of research which traces the roles of vision in an actual 
smart city innovation process. It shows readers that vision is not an external factor of 
innovation, but an actor in the innovation process.  
 
This research seeks to make both empirical and theoretical contributions to current smart 
cities literature. Empirically, this research provides first-hand empirical data about the 
innovation process of a smart city project; a detailed picture of citizen engagement, and the 
roles of vision in the innovation process. This level of detailed understanding can only be 
achieved through ethnographic research. Theoretically, this research creatively assembles 
conceptual tools from two intellectual sources: the social-technical perspective of Transition 
Studies and the Sociology of Expectation (SOE). They demonstrate their strengths to help 
understand the dynamic and messy innovation process of OPHC. For example, it will 
describe the messy emergence of OPHC, its dynamic implementation and diffusion process, 
and the role of vision in the process. The empirical and theoretical aspects of this research 
might be of interest for smart city researchers to look at. They might benefit from reading 
the first-hand, detailed, empirical data and find the theoretical framework inspiring. Scholars 
from Transition Studies and the Sociology of Expectation (SOE) might also be interested in 
reading this research. Both theoretical frameworks are based on historical cases and have 
often been applied to analyses of completed historical innovations. This research applies 
both frameworks in a real-time, multi-cultural context, and in the context of smart cities 
innovation, and in return, research might contribute to further developing both theoretical 
frameworks. For example, this research argues that vision/expectation is an actor in an 
innovation process. It suggests that hype comes at different speeds at different levels. It finds 
that proximity of expectation is another type of proximity that influence the diffusion of an 
innovation from one niche to another niche (See more in Chapter 8).  
 
This research is not only for academic readers. I hope that this thesis will also be of an interest 




I noticed when observing the innovation process, many OPHC innovators joined the project 
at difference stages and in response to specific parts of the OPHC. They often knew little 
about the history of OPHC and the overall innovation process. By reading this research, they 
could gain a better understanding of the innovation that they were involved in and be more 
reflective about their own innovation activities. Smart cities innovators beyond Harbour 
City, might also find this research interesting to read, perhaps finding the case of OPHC 
informative and could learn lessons from it. For example, lesson might be that it is necessary 
to pay attention to coordination issues in the innovation process; the importance of having a 
more intentional configuration of citizens; building a more realistic view of the open 
innovation model; and acknowledging that vision can play dynamic and paradoxical roles in 
an innovation process. For example, vision can attract attentions as well as damage a 
project’s reputations.  
 
This research might also be of interest for ordinary citizens to read. It is too often the case 
that citizens have no idea about smart cities innovations in their own city and are unfamiliar 
with the new term ‘smart cities’. The story style of this ethnographic research aims to make 
the content accessible for ordinary citizens to read. It hopes to open the black-box of ‘smart 
cities’ for them. Through reading this research, citizens might learn more about what ‘smart 
cities’ mean and build some basic understanding of popular smart technologies. Moreover, 
this research encourages citizens to reflect on the roles that proposed smart cities could 
potentially assign them. Are they roles they want? If not, how can they bravely negotiate 
roles they do want in smart cities innovation processes? And how can they stake a claim in 
their future, and design a future city according to their hearts?  
 
1.3 Navigating the thesis 
 
This thesis can be divided into two parts: Part I and Part II. Part I consists of three chapters: 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4. Part I provides the research context, methodology, and 
theoretical frameworks. Part II has three empirical chapters (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and 
Chapter 7) and a conclusion chapter (Chapter 8). The three empirical chapters contain stories 
and analysis from selected fieldwork data which responds to different stages, aspects, and 
scales in the innovation process of OPHC. They illustrate the emergence, implementation, 




Below, I provide an overview of each chapter. 
 
Part I 
Chapter 2 reviews a wide range of literature on ‘smart cities’, such as the emergence of the 
‘smart cities’ phenomenon and current research about ‘smart cities’. This chapter has two 
goals. First, it intends to build an informed picture about ‘smart cities’. Second, it highlights 
three knowledge gaps (innovation process, citizen participations, and the roles of vision) in 
current ‘smart cities’ literature that this research would like to address.  
 
Chapter 3 is a methodology chapter. It illustrates the process of how this research was carried 
out, such as the process of sampling, data collection, configuring theoretical frameworks, 
and data analysis. It also addresses important decisions that I made about the research, 
including choosing the philosophic positioning, ethnographic approach, ethical concerns. In 
the end, it reflects on my personal positioning in relation to the research process.  
 
Chapter 4 provides readers with an overview of theoretical framework for this research. The 
theoretical framework consists of two parts: the socio-technical perspective of Transition 
Studies and the Sociology of Expectation (SOE). How this framework was selected is 
discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter takes a step further and reviews key conceptual tools 
from both intellectual resources in detail. It aims to provides readers with an overall picture 
of the key conceptual tools of this research in its original theoretical context.  
 
Part II 
Chapter 5 shows how OPHC emerged in Harbour City. The story unfolds chronologically in 
five sub-sections with relevant conceptual tools applied (configuration, multi-level 
perspective (MLP), and prospective structure) to make sense of its emergence. This chapter 
shows that OPHC’s birth was not in a vacuum. Instead, it was a configuration of people, 
artefacts, and expectations that survived in the selection environment at the niche level. This 
configuration was then relabelled as a smart city innovation.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates the innovation process of OPHC in Harbour City. Three detailed 
ethnographic sites studies make up Chapter 6. This includes the site of programmable 
infrastructure, the site Data Dome, and the site of Citizen Sensing application. It integrates 




(SOE) to understand mechanisms and challenges in the implementation process.  
 
Chapter 7 studied the diffusion process of OPHC beyond Harbour City. The diffusion of 
OPHC happened in two directions: vertical diffusion (diffusing OPHC to general global 
smart city niche) and horizontal diffusion (diffusing OPHC to another local smart city niche 
in Delta City). It applied conceptual tools from Strategic Niche Management (SNM) and the 
Sociology of Expectation (SOE) to understand both diffusion processes. It reveals 
mechanisms, challenges, and paradox phenomenon in the diffusion process.   
 
Chapter 8 is the final chapter of this thesis. It first reflects the smart city innovation of OPHC. 
It then summarises findings from three empirical chapters in response to three research 
questions. This is followed by reflection on the limitations of the research and a 
consideration of future empirical and theoretical research directions. Finally, this thesis ends 








Mapping the Development and Research 
Landscape of ‘Smart Cities’ 
 
This chapter aims to locate this research in the wider ‘smart cities’ context. It starts by 
presenting an informed picture of ‘smart cities’; introducing the phenomena of ‘smart cities’, 
in particular the emergence of the concept, its worldwide adaptation, and the still vague 
attempts at definitions. It then reviews the current research on ‘smart cities’, such as the 
conceptual critique of ‘smart cities’, and the recent empirical turn in the field. After 
reviewing the ‘smart cities’ literature, this chapter further identifies the three gaps in the 
current ‘smart cities’ literature that this research aims to contribute to. The first gap is a need 
to have more in-depth empirical study on the innovation process of a local smart city project. 
The second gap is a lack of understanding about the role of vision in a smart city innovation 
process. The third gap is the need to have a more detailed understanding of citizen 
participation at a project level. The chapter finishes with three foreshadowed questions 
(Malinowski, 1922) designed according to the three gaps identified to guide the research.  
 
2.1 ‘Future Cities’ and ‘Smart Cities’ 
 
Human beings have been thinking, planning, and building cities of the future since ancient 
times (Fainstein, 2014; Moir et al., 2014). Cities generally are “futuristic”. City discourses 
typically draw on future discourses. In English-language literature, there have been at least 
four waves of future city discourses that can be identified in the last hundred years (Moir et 
al., 2014). The first wave happened during the interwar period. At that time, modernist 






industrialisation. The most representative example is Le Corbusier’s (1971) The City of 
Tomorrow. After the Second World War, future city discourses focused on remedying the 
cities that were destroyed by warfare. In the 1980s, influenced by economic globalisation, 
future cities became sites intended to support the new cycle of global trade. From 1990 
onwards, the rise of the telecommunications and information technology brought new 
thinking and imagination about the urban future. Today, due to rapid demographic shifts and 
urbanisation, the world is witnessing a new wave of the ‘future city’ movement. According 
to a UN estimate, by 2030, 70% of the world population will live in cities (WHO, 2014; 
Un.org, 2001). In this movement, cities feature urgent economic, environmental, and social 
problems that need to be addressed by future-oriented solutions (Gabrys, 2014). 
 
There are many ideas about how to build future cities in current public discourses and the 
academic literature. Research into future city terminology provides us with some insights 
about the future city landscape. de Jong et al.’s (2015) study of future city policy discourses 
finds that the ‘sustainable city’ has been the most frequently occurring concept of the future 
city in academic literatures since 1996. The term ‘digital city’ took off in the early 2000s, 
but it was replaced by a rocketing interest in ‘smart cities’ in 2009. The ‘smart cities’ idea 
has gained steady attention in recent years and has surpassed the ‘sustainable city’ in the 
frequency of academic usage since 2012. The terms ‘resilient city’ and ‘low carbon city’ 
emerged in 2009 as a result of the global climate debate but neither term has been widely 
adopted as a future city category. Moir et al.’s (2014) research reveals a very similar usage 
pattern of future city terminologies. Their study further notes that ‘future cities’ and the 
‘future of cities’ combined are the third most commonly used terms after ‘sustainable cities’ 
and ‘smart cities’. The term ‘future cities’ overtook the term ‘future of cities’ from 2009 
onwards, but the former has a more limited focus on the technological dimension (Ibid:15). 
So, we can conclude that the term ‘smart city’ or ‘techno-centric future city’ dominate 
today’s policy and research literature. 
 
Of course, the idea that cities could be transformed by technologies is not new. But, the 
specific connotations of the idea have changed over time. For example, in the 1960s, 
information technology and cybernetic thinking started to have an impact on the way people 
thought about and imagined their future cities (Crompton, 2012; Forrester, 1969). At that 
time, avant-garde architects from both West and East dreamed and experimented with 




movement (Crompton, 2012) which embraced high-tech innovation and pop culture to 
design the imaginary cities of tomorrow. While the latter could be found in the Japanese 
metabolisms movement which incorporated traditional Japanese architectural ideas into the 
Modernist idiom. From the 1980s onward, network cities and computable cities began to 
appear regularly in urban development plans (Castells, 1989; Mitchell, 1995; Batty, 1997; 
Graham and Marvin, 2001). Many ideas of technological cities emerged during this period, 
such as the ‘wired city’ (Dutton, 1987), ‘information city’ (Castells, 1996), ‘cyber city’ 
(Graham and Marvin, 1999), ‘digital city’ (Ishida and Isbister, 2000), ‘ubiquitous city’ 
(Weiser, 1996; Anthopoulos and Fitsilis, 2010), and the ‘intelligent city’ (Komninos, 2013). 
As we can see from these examples, each term conceptualises the relationship between ICT 
and the city differently. This is mainly because they were inspired by the particular 
technological breakthroughs (e.g. telematics, the World Wide Web, broadband, and web 2.0, 
etc.) of their time (Carvalho, 2014). The most recent term, ‘smart city’, is another reinvention 
of this idea which is influenced by a series of recent IT developments, such as wireless 
networks, enhanced broadband connectivity, cloud-based solutions, smart-devices, real-time 
data, and the Internet of Things 2  (IoT), and many others (Saunders and Baeck, 2015; 
Carvalho, 2014).  
 
2.2 ‘Smart Cities’: its emergence, diffusion, and definitions 
 
2.2.1 The emergence of ‘Smart Cities’ 
 
Where does the idea ‘smart cities’ originally come from? Holland (2008) and Vanolo (2013) 
suggest that the concept of ‘smart cities’ has grown in connection with two academic 
literatures. One was the New Urbanism literature which started in the US in the early 1980s. 
The movement raised criticisms of the urban development model based on the usage of cars 
and urban sprawl. It suggested that quality of life could be improved through reducing 
overbuilding and land consumption. Many smart cities indicators we refer to nowadays (e.g. 
liveability, walkability, and sustainability) can be traced back to this movement (Konomi 
and Roussos, 2017). The second intellectual source is the intelligent city debate; a debate 
triggered by the phenomenon that many cities around the world have increased their budgets 
in ICT infrastructure, innovation, and e-governance (Crivello, 2014: 912).  
                                                     
2 This is a computing concept describing an idea that physical objects are connected to the Internet and 




Both expert discourses might contribute to the early idea of ‘smart cities’, however, the 
current ‘smart cities’ discourses have mainly been developed outside academic circles by 
multinational companies, such as IBM, Cisco, and Siemens. These technology corporations 
are the early advocators of ‘smart cities’. Their arguments are based on the probability that 
some of the newly emerged technological solutions (e.g. IoT, Cloud Computing) might bring 
a better future for cities. As private stakeholders, these companies suggest that they have the 
capacity to make it possible for people to experiment with new ways of living, working, and 
moving (Crivello, 2014). Amongst these private sector smart city advocates, IBM was one 
of the earliest smart city promotors. In late 2008, the then CEO of IBM announced a smart 
city vision as part of IBM’s Smarter Planet initiative. The vision suggested that investing in 
digital systems in cities was a way to improve a city’s management and lower the chance of 
economic decline (Wiig, 2015). Vanolo (2014) links IBM’s announcement of its smart city 
vision in 2008 to the economic crisis the same year. He argues that it might be not a 
coincidence that smart city discourses seem to go hand in hand with the economic crisis in 
2008 because, at that time, cities were facing severe financing cuts and smart technology 
was regarded as a good solution for cities in crisis (Ibid). 
 
2.2.2 The diffusion of ‘Smart Cities’ 
 
The ‘smart cities’ concept has become popular in Europe in recent years. This is mainly due 
to its association with large research funding (Vanolo, 2014). One good example is the 
European Horizon 2020 project. Within the project, there are many engineering research 
themes that relate to ‘smart cities’. For instance, there is a research theme called Future 
Internet and Smart City. It ties future internet research with the concept of smart cities. It 
suggests that smart city development could be a catalyst for Future Internet research because 
a smart city must rely on a good internet infrastructure. In return, the advanced applications 
coming out of the Future Internet research could benefit European citizens (Paskaleva, 
2011).  At the time of writing, there are hundreds of smart cities initiatives across Europe. 
The largest number of smart city initiatives can be found in the UK, Spain, and Italy (Bennett 
et al., 2016). Each country has different reasons to adopt ‘Smart City’ ideas. For example, in 
the UK, the national government suggests that there is a huge potential for the UK to take a 
lead in the current ‘smart cities’ movement. This will be beneficial both at home and abroad. 
At home, smart technology is presumed to bring better urban services to citizens in the UK. 




services. This might bring export opportunities for the UK. According to one estimate global 
smart city market solutions are expected to reach $400 billion by 2020. The UK government 
encourages domestic public and private sectors to work together to get 10 per cent of that 
value (Saint, 2014). In order to support smart city development in the UK, the government 
provides financial support for smart city investment. For example, the Research Council UK 
provides £95 million for smart city research. The UK government’s national agency 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB) spent £50 million over 5 years to establish a Future City 
Catapult centre (Bennett et al., 2016). In 2012, the TSB also launched a Future Cities 
Demonstration Competition (FCDC) to unlock the promise of the smart city (Buck and 
While, 2015). In response to the national call, many local governments generated their own 
local smart city initiatives. According to Caprotti et al.’s (2016) survey, a third of local 
authorities in the UK with a population of over 100,000 have clear smart city initiatives 
(Cowley et al., 2017). Amongst them, several cities demonstrated strong commitments to 
‘smart cities’, including London, Milton Keynes, Manchester, Glasgow, Bristol, and 
Peterborough (Ibid, 2017).  
 
The smart city is not just a Euro-American phenomenon. In Asia, countries like South Korea, 
Japan, China, Singapore, India, and many others have also generated smart cities initiatives. 
The largest numbers of ‘smart cities’ plans in Asia can be found in India and China. 
According to the estimates, there are almost 300 ‘smart city’ pilots currently under plan in 
both countries (Saunders and Baeck, 2015). Singapore and South Korea are pioneers of 
experimenting ‘smart cities’. The idea of smart cities’ is not new for either country because 
they both have a long-term preoccupation with introducing the latest technologies into urban 
development. In the case of Singapore, its journey towards “smartness” started in the 1980s. 
At that time, the Singapore government set up the National Computer Board (NCB) to 
computerise the government ministries and developed export orientated IT industries. In the 
1990s, Singapore sought to upgrade its workforce and shifted to a more value-added 
economy. NCB released an important document called: A vision of an Intelligent Island: IT 
2000 masterplan. In the report, it clearly stated the ambition of transforming the country to 
an “intelligent island” where technologies would be regarded as a means to enhance national 
competitiveness and the life of citizens (Mahizhnan, 1999; Hollands, 2008). The 
technological initiatives at that time included, increasing broadband speeds, integrating IT 
into the civil service, and developing the world’s first Electronic Road Pricing System 




envisioned Singapore’s future would benefit from information communication. The plan 
announced an ambitious goal to become the first country in the world to harness information 
communication. iN2015 had contributed to building the backbone infrastructure for big data 
analytics, the Internet of Things, and many other components of a smart city. In 2014, 
Singapore launched the “Smart Nation” initiative. This initiative sought to use advanced 
technologies to drive its economic growth and improve citizens’ lives (Saunders and Baeck, 
2015). Due to Singapore’s long-time exploration in the area of integrating technologies into 
urban development, when the ‘smart cities’ idea became popular in the world, Singapore 
naturally became a pioneer in the field. For South Korea, its smart city journey started from 
the Asian Financial crisis in 1997. The crisis urged the South Korean government to upgrade 
its economic paradigm from manufacturing to service (Shwayri, 2013). The South Korean 
government regarded urban development as a way to attract foreign investment and 
expertise. The ‘ubiquitous city’ idea was embraced by the South Korean government as a 
consequence of this thinking. The most famous example is Songdo City, which is a start-up 
city built from scratch. The Songdo City vision is associated with the idea of moving the 
South Korean economy from too much dependence on manufacturing to international 
logistics (Shin, 2016). Five years later buildings were rising above the landfill in Songdo, 
Cisco joined the Songdo project with $47 million investment and promised to wire Songdo 
from top to bottom (Strickland, 2011). So, South Korea’s adaptation of the smart city was 
associated with its need to upgrade its economic paradigms. The ‘ubiquitous city’ concept 
was the initial concept to pick up on and describe this type of urban development and the 
concept was later replaced by the popular concept ‘smart cities’.   
 
There are also smart cities projects in Africa and Latin America. The most frequently 
mentioned example is Rio de Janeiro’s smart city development. Rio’s smart city project was 
triggered by a flood in 2010 which killed 50 people. The mayor, Paes, called in a team of 
IBM engineers to design a disaster management system (Townsend, 2013). Going beyond 
the project to deal with the flood, IBM further recommended to build a system that make the 
city’s weather, geological, and civil defence agencies to work together (Lindsay, 2010). As 
a result, IBM and Oracle developed the famous Rio operations centre which became the 
heart of Rio’s smart city. The mission of the operations centre is to consolidate data from 
various urban systems for real-time data visualisation, monitoring, and analysis. It is the first 
operations centre in the world to integrate crisis management solutions and multiple 




immediate response to events (Durani, 2017).  
 
2.2.3 The definition of ‘Smart Cities’ 
 
The concept of ‘smart cities’ is widespread worldwide, however, the definition of a smart 
city remains vague. It is very difficult to have a universally agreed definition about ‘smart 
cities’. This is partly due to different people and regions having different purposes and 
priorities when they pick up the term ‘smart city’. Moir et al. (2014: 12) seek to define ‘smart 
cities’ in both a narrow sense and broader sense. They argue that the term ‘smart city’ used 
in a narrow sense indicates the use of the right hardware, software and technology platforms 
to solve many urban challenges, while, ‘smart city’ applied in a broader sense often places 
emphasis on good city governance, the empowerment of city leadership, smart citizens, and 
the right investment in smart technologies (Ibid). A group of researchers from Vienna, 
Ljubljana, and Delft tried a different approach to defining the term. They benchmarked the 
smartness of 70 European cities and distinguished six smart city characteristics, “smart 
economy”, “smart mobility”, “smart governance”, “smart environment”, “smart living”, and 
“smart people”. Many smart cities projects have adopted this classification to guide their 
smart city constructions (Caragliu et al., 2011; Vanolo, 2013). In a similar vein, Caragliu et 
al. (2011) summarise several characteristics that are shared by many smart city projects. For 
example, ‘smart city’ projects often propose to utilise networked infrastructure to improve 
economic and political efficiency as well as to enable social, cultural, and urban development 
(Hollands, 2008: 308); ‘Smart cities’ often emphasise business-led urban development and 
seek to achieve the social inclusion of citizens in public services; ‘Smart cities’ often 
highlight the role of high-tech and creative industries in long-term urban growth; ‘Smart 
cities’ claim to pay attention to the role of social and relational capital in urban development; 
Social and environmental sustainability are regarded as a major strategic component for 
‘smart cities’. Most of these smart city definitions and characteristics focus overly on the 
technological dimension of a ‘smart city’. Nam and Pardo (2011) seek to expand the meaning 
of ‘smart cities’. They identify three categories of ‘smart cities’, with the technological 
dimension of the smart city as one of them which includes sub-categories such as, Digital 
City, Virtual City, and Intelligent City. They expand the concept of ‘smart cities’ beyond the 
technological dimension by adding another two dimensions: the human and institutional 
dimensions. The human dimension of a smart city, as its name indicates, includes the human 




city. While the institutional dimension of a smart city includes concepts such as smart 
community, sustainable city, and green city.  
 
2.3 Current ‘Smart Cities’ research 
 
2.3.1 The conceptual critique of ‘Smart Cities’  
 
Conceptualisations of the city of the future have never been short of criticism. Scholars, 
thinkers, and writers explicitly and implicitly have always questioned future city making in 
their time. Some famous examples can be found in contemporary history. For instance, 
American urbanist Jane Jacobs (1961) argued that modern urban planning principles served 
planners’ utopian interests which ignore the actual working of cities. In her monumental 
book: The death and life of Great American Cities, she attacked modern orthodox urban 
planning and rebuilding principles. In the 1990s, sociologist Saskia Sassen (1994) analysed 
the global city phenomenon and argued that economic globalisation generates inequality 
among cities on a global scale and within cities themselves. Frederic Jameson (2003) 
attacked the consumerism aspect of contemporary future city making. He argued that modern 
cities’ development lacks imagination, because they continue to create what Rem Koolhass 
calls ‘Junk Space’. Following Henri Lefebvre (1991), David Harvey (2012) argued that the 
nature of urban development is a process of capital accumulation. In response to this capital 
accumulation process, he argued that there is a ‘right to city’. It is a collective right for people 
to transform the city from a site of capital accumulation to a place where the public can 
debate over what power is doing.  
 
The ‘smart cities’ movement is still in its infant stage. We can read and hear about many 
smart city initiatives in the media coverage. However, most of those initiatives are merely 
visions or remain in the experimental stage. Nevertheless, scholars have conducted many 
conceptual critiques of those visions. Robert Holland is one of the earlier smart city critics. 
Right after IBM launched its Smart Planet vision 3  (2008), he examined IBM’s vision 
alongside many self-designated smart city initiatives and found that most of these smart 
cities visions were driven by big businesses or multi-national technology companies. 
Drawing on Harvey’s (1989) ‘entrepreneurial city’ and Peck and Tickell’s (2002) ‘neo-





liberalizing space’, Holland argues that many of those smart cities visions are self-imposed 
market devices for city branding and function as an excuse for entrepreneurial urbanism 
(Holland, 2014). Rob Kitchin is another ‘smart cities’ critic. He (Kitchin, 2015: 133) 
compares current ‘smart cities’ ideas with other future city ideas that have arisen in recent 
years, including the competitive city, creative city, sustainable city, green city, and resilient 
city. He argues that the ‘smart city’ is a technological version of those new city visions. The 
potential problems of ‘smart cities’ are similar to the other new city visions, such as urban 
gentrification, widening inequality, and social polarisation. He warns us that a neo-liberal 
urban utopian ideology is on the rise and that those utopian visions of smart cities lack 
concern for democratic decision making, citizen participation, and alternative thinking in 
making their future cities (Ibid). More and more critics (Vanolo, 2013; Townsend, 2013; and 
Greenfield, 2013) follow Holland and Kitchin’s arguments, and point out that the current 
‘smart cities’ idea is becoming a technology giants’ ‘privatopia’ (Vanolo, 2013). Their 
visions of ‘smart cities’ pay more attention to selling technologies, rather than focusing on 
people (Greenfield, 2013; Townsend, 2013: 118). 
 
In opposition to the top-down smart city idea driven by technology companies, there are 
emerging discourses on bottom-up citizen centred urban innovation. This approach explores 
different ways of harnessing technologies at a grass roots level (Hemment and Townsend, 
2013; Townsend, 2013). Under the big umbrella of bottom-up approaches to smart cities, 
many citizens driving smart city ideas have emerged in recent years, such as the ‘smart 
citizen’, ‘civic hack’, and ‘citizen sensing’ (Saunders and Baeck, 2015). However, the citizen 
driven smart city approach is also questioned by many scholars. For instance, following 
Osborne and Rose (1999), Vanolo (2013) regards the idea of the ‘smart citizen’ as an 
instrument for ‘government at a distance’. He argues that the idea of ‘smartness’ is becoming 
a field of social control. Gabrys (2014) shares a very similar view with Vanolo, but she goes 
beyond ‘social control’ and argues that the computational materialisations in cities help to 
distribute power through urban spaces and processes. In order to understand the actual roles 
for ‘citizens’ and ‘the people’ in smart cities, Cowley, Joss and Dayot compared six UK 
smart cities and proposed four modalities of publicness, namely, ‘service-user’, 
‘entrepreneurial’, ‘political’, and ‘civic’ (Cowley et al., 2017). 
 
Apart from criticisms of top-down and bottom-up smart city visions, some researchers focus 




(2013) explores the relationship between real-time data and the city. He identifies three 
potential issues that real-time data might bring to urban development. First, he argues that 
technocratic governance is a reductionist and functionalist approach to the city. There are 
wider city elements that data do not take into account. Therefore, there are deep structural 
problems that cannot be solved simply by improving efficiency. Second, the one size fits all 
smart city idea generated by technology companies does not efficiently respond to the 
uniqueness of a place. Third, the combination of big data and data centre might bring many 
oligopticon systems together into a single panoptic vantage point. There is concern about the 
level of surveillance that big data might bring to societies (Kitchin, 2013). There are other 
general critiques about smart city solutions. For example, Michiel de Lange and Martijn de 
Waal point out that location-based services and customer loyalty cards will transform urban 
areas into spaces that produce and practice ‘social sorting’ (Lange and Waal, 2013; Crang 
and Graham, 2007). Vestergaard et al., (2016) argue that the proposed ‘smart city’ 
infrastructure visions reduce humans to objects and input devices that can be measured. It 
might disempower people rather than empower them. They use intelligent street lighting as 
an example to support this argument. They argue that humans use visual information to make 
the decision whether to risk a walk in the darkness or not of an evening. This type of decision 
making would no longer be possible in a condition of intelligent street lightning where a 
street may look dark from a distance even though when people approach it the light will 
automatically switch on. They suggest that intelligent street lighting might be an energy 
efficiency solution at night time, but it interferes with our human decision-making processes.   
 
2.3.2 The empirical turn in ‘Smart Cities’ research 
 
The conceptual criticisms of ‘smart cities’ are ongoing. However, the general critiques of 
‘smart cities’ visions are challenged by viewing ‘smart cities’ as universal, rational, 
depoliticised, and operating toward profit maximising and the interests of multi-national 
companies (Shelton et al., 2014). This one-size fits all smart city narrative dominates current 
academic accounts. But how the ‘smart cities’ concept operates in a real local context is more 
diverse and messy. So, smart cities research has entered into a new phase (Cowley et al., 
2017). As Kitchin (2015) suggests there is a need to have more in-depth empirical studies 
about specific local smart city initiatives. For example, how is the ‘smart city’ adapted in a 
local context? How are initiatives constructed and adapted from arguments elsewhere? How 




extent are the initiatives creating inequalities in the city? Shelton et al. (2014) share a similar 
attitude with Kitchin, they point out that the idealised visions of smart cities dominate the 
social imaginary of future cities. They urge us instead of critiquing these unrealistic visions, 
to study the “actually existing smart city”. To understand the actual process of how a 
particular smart city paradigm becomes grounded in a particular place. 
 
In the past few years, there have been some empirical case studies on ‘smart cities’. For 
example, Datta (2015) investigated the ‘entrepreneurial urbanisation’ in Dholera (India) and 
argued that Dholera’s smart city project prioritises urbanisation as a business model rather 
than a social justice model. Halpern et al., (2013) investigated the Songdo smart city (South 
Korea) and pointed out that test-bed urbanism is an epistemology which facilities a specific 
way of knowing. A digitally mediated city life will influence the way people experience 
urban reality. In the Songdo vision of the future city, the future mirrors the past because it 
relies on past data to predict the future. Gaffney and Robertson (2016) used smart city 
systems in Rio de Janeiro as a case study and found out that the “smartness” in Rio lacks 
citizen participation and citizens input in decision making. As a result, Rio’s smart city only 
represents a narrow set of economic and political interests.  
 
These empirical studies on smart cities seem to mirror the smart city criticisms identified 
above. However, most of these empirical smart city cases are chosen from the global south 
or are often cities built from scratch. There is a need to understand how ‘smart city’ ideas 
are taken and developed in more mature cities and in the global north (Shelton et al., 2014). 
Following this line of inquiry, empirical studies about the implementation of ‘smart city’ 
strategies at a European level have blossomed in the past few years (March and Ribera-
Fumaz, 2014). For example, Crivello (2014) studied the circulation and implementation of 
the ‘smart city’ idea in Turin (Italy). He focuses on studying the actors, processes, and 
networking that were involved in accepting and implementing smart city ideas in Turin. The 
research found that the idea of the smart city in Turin was coming from the European Union 
and the adaptation of the smart city idea was actually a re-labelling of existing initiatives in 
the city. March and Ribera-Fumaz’s (2014) research looks at the implementation of ‘smart 
city’ ideas in Barcelona. They identified the contradictions of implementing ‘smart city’ 
ideas in Barcelona. They urge more detailed research about how cities become a “laboratory 
for capital” and whether it is inclusive for citizens or not? Thomas et al., (2016) take a rather 




they explore citizens’ visions of future cities in three UK cities (London, Manchester, and 
Glasgow). Their research provides some valuable insights about local citizens’ expectations 
of the future city and this is an aspect that has often been neglected in much smart city 
research.  
 
2.4 Research gaps and foreshadowed questions 
 
2.4.1 Research gaps in current ‘Smart Cities’ literature 
 
This research is built upon current ‘smart cities’ literature. It is aware of the criticisms of 
‘smart cities’. It is also in line with the empirical turn in ‘smart cities’ research and would 
like to contribute to this line of inquiry. It seeks to address the gap caused by the lack of in-
depth empirical research in the current ‘smart cities’ literature. As we can see above, most 
current ‘smart cities’ empirical research relies heavily on data collected from documents and 
interviews. As a result, there is still a lack of substantive insights about the technological, 
social, and political processes that are involved in the emergence and realisation of a specific 
smart city initiative. This research addresses this gap through detailed empirical research 
into the innovation process of a smart city project. It relies not only on data from documents 
and interviews, but also from the researcher’s ongoing participation in a specific smart city 
innovation process.  
 
While studying the innovation process of a particular smart city in the making, this research 
also addresses another two gaps in current smart city literature. One gap is the lack of 
understanding about the role of vision in the innovation process. Vision clearly has a role to 
play in the current ‘smart cities’ movement. As noted above, most ‘smart cities’ nowadays 
remain at the vision stage. Much ‘smart cities’ research holds a dualist attitude towards 
visions. They either treat vision as an object to study, or research what happened in reality. 
This reflects the assumption that a vision is a static and external factor, independent from 
the innovation process. Using this assumption of vision, researchers often ask questions, 
such as, who produced the visions? How could the vision have been made differently? Or, 
what is wrong with the vision? As a result, the research mainly focuses on examining the 
content of a smart city vision or conducting a reality check (including citizen’s expectations 
of future cities) against the proposed visions. This way of thinking about vision blinds them 




like to address this gap.  It starts with an assumption that vision is neither static or an external 
factor independent from the social-technical innovation process. Instead, vision is a fluid 
factor which is embedded in the innovation process and co-exists with other visions or 
expectations. So, instead of critiquing the content of a ‘smart cities’ vision or simply 
observing what materialised vision actually does in reality, this research will explore the role 
that vision plays in a particular smart city innovation process. 
 
Apart from the role of vision, another gap I would like to address is citizen participation and 
the challenges of an actual smart city project. From the conceptual criticism of ‘smart cities’ 
discussed above, we already know that there is a lack of bottom-up citizen led smart city 
movements. Some empirical research also shows that there is a lack of citizen participation 
in current smart city making. However, we need to have a deeper understanding of citizen 
participation at a project level. For example, where is the opportunity for citizens to 
participate in a project? To what extent are citizens involved or not involved in a particular 
smart city project? What are the challenges of engaging citizens? Through following a smart 
city innovation process, this research seeks to investigate the issues of citizen participation 
in detail.  
 
2.4.2 Foreshadowed research questions 
 
In response to the three research gaps that I identified in the current ‘smart cities’ literature, 
I formed the following three foreshadowed research questions to guide the exploration of 
this research.  
 
(1) What are the innovation processes of a smart city project?  
(2) How does the vision contribute to the innovation processes of a smart city?  
(3) How are citizens imagined and enrolled in the processes? 
 
The first research question responds to the first research gap which aims to gain a more 
detailed understanding of the innovation process of a specific smart city project, for example 
how does a smart city project emerge or adapt in a local context? Who are the main actors 
of the project? How is it implemented in a local context? The second research question 
resonates with the second research gap, which seeks to understand the role of vision in the 




I am going to investigate. However, I will also pay attention to other collective and private 
visions and expectations that I have encountered in the smart city innovation process. The 
last question responds to the third research gap in the literature. It seeks to understand more 




This chapter locates this research in the broader context of the ‘smart cities’ phenomenon. It 
identifies three gaps in current smart cities research that this thesis will contribute to. These 
are the innovation process, the role of vision, and citizen participation. In the following 
chapter (Chapter 3), I will talk further about how the research was carried out in order to 
address the three gaps. Within the chapter, I will also briefly address the process of selecting 
and assembling a theoretical framework to investigate the three questions. A detailed review 










This chapter aims to introduce the design and research methods of this study. It starts by 
providing the rationale of choosing an ethnographic approach as a vehicle to explore a smart 
city in the making. It then explains the reason for choosing smart city project OPHC as a 
case for this research and the process of sampling sites, events and people within the case of 
OPHC. This is followed by introducing the methods of data collection, the process of data 
management and data analysis. It also illustrates the iterative-inductive (O’Reilly, 2005) 
process of configuring a theoretical framework to interpret data and describes the various 
stages of data analysis. Finally, this chapter addresses the ethical considerations of this 
research and reflects on the researcher’s own role in relation to the research. 
 
3.1 The initial approach 
 
3.1.1 The philosophical assumptions of this research 
 
I would like to start by clarifying the philosophical assumptions of this research because the 
choice of philosophic assumptions influences the way researchers find data to answer the 
research questions (Creswell, 2013). The philosophical assumptions refer to questions about 
‘ontology’ (the nature of reality) and ‘epistemology’ (the nature of knowledge). Creswell 
(2014) calls this set of philosophical beliefs ‘worldviews’, while Mertens (2010) calls them 
‘paradigms’. There are many different ‘worldviews’ and ‘paradigms’, such as positivism, 
post-positivism, social-constructivism, critical inquiry, feminism, and postmodernism 
(Crotty, 1998). Due to the word limit of this research, I do not go into detail about each 






Among the many philosophical assumptions, I chose the social constructivism worldview 
(often combined with interpretivism) for this research (Creswell, 2014). Social 
constructivism proposes that “individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live 
and work. Individuals develop subjective meaning of their experiences - meanings directed 
toward certain objects or things” (Ibid: 8). The ‘ontology’ of this philosophical position is 
that reality is socially constructed through lived experiences and interactions with others 
(Mertens, 2015). There can be multiple realities. For example, one phenomenon might mean 
different things to different people. So, people’s mental constructions might be in conflict 
with each other. Also, the perception of reality may change throughout the process of the 
research. The ‘epistemology’ of this approach requires a more interactive mode of data 
collection whereby researchers and participants interlock and influence each other. 
Constructivists regards subjective meaning as something negotiated socially and historically 
(Creswell, 2014: 8). Meanings are not bounded to the individual, but are formed through 
interactions. Therefore, researchers have to acknowledge that they are part of interactions 
and realise that their background also shapes the way they interpret the data.  
 
Social constructivism is the most suitable philosophical assumption for this research because 
the research aims to study the innovation process of a smart city in detail. The ‘smart city’ 
is a worldwide emerging phenomenon but different people have different ideas about what 
a ‘smart city’ is. So, there are multiple realities about the ‘smart cities’ phenomenon. Also, 
people have constructed the idea of ‘smart cities’ through interaction with each other. This 
means that to study the ‘smart cities’ phenomenon and its innovation process in a local 
context requires the researcher to focus on people’s smart city meaning making activities. 
This includes observing individuals’ processes of interaction, their expressions, and how I, 
as a researcher, make sense of it through interacting with them. It is worth noting that I also 
want to explore the question How are citizens imagined and enrolled in the processes? The 
results of this research might reveal who participates and who does not participate in the 
innovation process. This might indicate whether change is needed. So, this research might 
look like it adopts a critical or transformative worldview. However, I would like to argue 
this is a by-product of this research and not the main intention of this research.  
 
3.1.2 The ethnographic approach  
  




interactions between the researcher and participants. So, qualitative methods such as 
observation, interview, and analysis of texts tend to be used in this research ‘paradigm’ 
(Mertens, 2015). There are several approaches in qualitative research, such as narrative 
research, phenomenological research, grounded theory, ethnography, and case studies 
(Creswell, 2014). Different approaches have different methodologies and research designs 
which guide researchers to choose the research methods (Crotty, 1998).  
 
This research seeks to understand the innovation process of a specific smart city innovation. 
This involves understanding a group of people’s (smart cities innovators) collective meaning 
making with regards to ‘smart cities’. Thus, it does not focus on studying a specific 
individual (narrative study) or an individual experience (phenomenological research) of 
‘smart cities’. It also does not aim to build a theory for ‘smart cities’, so grounded theory is 
not suitable for this research either. Ethnographic research and case studies are both possible 
approaches for this research. The former focuses on the interpretation of a cultural, social 
group, or a system. It often looks at people’s interactions in ordinary settings, such as what 
they do (behaviour), what they say (language), the tensions between what they do and what 
they say, and what they make and use (artefacts). What an ethnographer tends to do in this 
approach it to distil patterns such as life cycles, events, and cultural themes from the setting. 
In terms of the research process, ethnographic research often involves ethnographers 
immersing themselves in people’s daily lives and using participant observation to collect 
data. They also conduct interviews with members of groups and gather artefacts in the 
process. Case studies meanwhile are usually applied to explore a bounded system or a case 
(or multiple cases) in detail. Multiple data resources are often collected to shed light on a 
specific case, for example, interviews, observations, audio-visual material, and documents.  
 
There are overlaps between ethnographic research and case studies. For example, both 
approaches focus on exploring processes and details. They also apply similar data collection 
methods (Creswell, 1998). Ethnographic research always ends up in a case as well. 
Researchers have attempted to make distinctions between ethnographic research and case 
studies. Parker-Jenkins (2016) argues that the key difference between ethnographic research 
and case study is the level of “immersion”. Ethnographers often immerse themselves in the 
context and generate a large set of data. Traditionally, an ethnographer tends to spend their 
time constantly in the field to build up relationships of trust with people, and this can last for 




employed by specific programmes, modern ethnographic research is more likely to “last 
months rather than years” (Hammersley, 2006). However, this still involves fairly lengthy 
contact. Case study research does not necessarily need constant immersion and it may only 
last hours, days, or weeks. Hammersley (2006) also highlights another distinction between 
ethnographic research and case study research; although both approaches share similar data 
collection methods, a case study can only rely on the method of interview to fulfil the 
research purpose, whereas ethnographic research does not exclusively rely on interview and 
often involves the use of participant observation to collect data. 
 
Creswell (1998) suggests researchers ask themselves several questions before choosing an 
approach. For example, what approach is frequently used in the given field? What kind of 
training do the researchers have? What is most needed to contribute to the scholarly literature 
in the field? Which approach is the researcher more comfortable with (e.g. a more structured 
approach or a more storytelling approach) (Creswell, 1998). Bearing these questions in mind, 
I think an ethnographic approach is most suitable for this research. There are two main 
reasons. One reason is that a smart city innovation is very much about a technological 
innovation. The ethnographic approach is particularly relevant to study science and 
technological innovation at the micro level (Barry, 2001; Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Hess, 
2001; Rabinow, 1996). According to Hess (2001), there are at least two generations of 
researchers using the ethnographic approach in the interdisciplinary field, Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). So, it is a sort of tradition to use an ethnographic approach to 
study the process of technological innovation. Another reason is that there is a need for a 
more detailed empirical study about smart city making. As I identified in Chapter 2 many 
current smart city literatures rely heavily on interviews and documents to understand the 
smart city phenomena. In order to generate a much richer picture of smart city making, the 
ethnographic approach is required, because it not only relies on conventional methods (e.g. 
interview and documentary sources), but also requires researchers to immerse themselves in 
the smart city making process and conduct participant observation. Based on these two 
factors, I chose an ethnographic approach for this study. Like all approaches there are 
advantages and shortcomings; the ethnographic approach is also faced with many charges, 
such as, the crisis of representation and the relationship between ethnography and theory. I 







3.2.1 Selecting a smart city project 
 
In order to fulfil the objectives of this research, the first thing to do was identify a suitable 
city undertaking a smart city project. There is no a standard way to select an ethnographic 
setting/case. However, several factors tend to affect the selection process. First, theories or 
literatures that ethnographers read often become the starting point for them to select an 
ethnographic setting/case. Although ethnographers might not have hypotheses to test, they 
still cannot escape the influence of the theories/literature that they read. As O’Reilly (2005) 
points out, it is impossible to start ethnographic work without preconceptions. Second, 
researchers can choose a setting based on well-defined research problems or what 
Malinowski (1922) referred to as ‘foreshadowed problems’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007: 21). Although researchers usually find their ‘foreshadowed problems’ are not open for 
investigation in their chosen setting/case, those initial problems still have the capacity to 
influence the selection of the ethnographic setting/case at the beginning. Third, a setting/case 
may be selected based on an opportunity that arises that seems worth investigating. For 
example, a researcher might encounter a historical event in the making that is yearning for 
his/her attention. Moreover, pragmatic factors, such as easy access, travel costs, geographical 
location, cannot be neglected in choosing an ethnographic setting/case. In fact, it is often the 
major consideration for researchers and is the reason why researchers often narrow down the 
selection to places close to where they live. As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 31) point 
out “usually ethnographers study only one or small number of settings, and sometimes there 
are ones that are geographically close to where they are based. Often this is forced by the 
cost of using more remote sites and the limited resource available”. Choosing a local smart 
city project for this research was influenced by all the factors mentioned above, but they 
came in a different order in shaping the sampling decisions.  
 
(1) Exploring the possibilities of conducting research in Harbour City 
 
I needed to identify a suitable city to conduct this ethnographic research. Taking the three 
‘foreshadowed problems’ and practical reasons (e.g. research timeframe and travel fund) 
into account, I decided to explore the possibilities of conducting this research in the city 
where I was based, Bristol, a middle-sized city located in England (UK). The choice of 




interesting case study because of its recent claims to a specific commitment to future city 
making. In this thesis, I give Bristol a pseudonym. I call it Harbour City. The reason for this 
is because this research aims to study the smart city phenomenon in a real context rather than 
the city itself. So, using a pseudonym aims to help me to maintain a certain distance from 
the city itself and concentrate on slicing out the smart city making process. I will address the 
ethical considerations of this choice further in the ethics section below (See page 61).  
 
In order to explore the possibility of carrying out this research in Harbour City, I conducted 
several informal interviews and field trips to Harbour City in February 2015. The selection 
of interviewees and places to visit were based on the criteria that they were ‘insiders’ of 
Harbour City’s future city making. With the kind introduction of my supervisor Professor 
Keri Facer, I managed to contact five people in Harbour City who come from various local 
institutions, such as a local university, a social enterprise organisation, and a community 
organisation. Their knowledge covers the areas of digital technology, citizen engagement, 
aging and wellbeing, environment and green technology, civil engineering, and local 
minority groups. This initial mapping made me realise two things. First, Harbour City has 
various future city visions, such as green city, smart city, resilient city, happy city, digital 
fun city, all-age-friendly city (Facer, Horner, and Manchester, 2014), future transportation 
project, tele-health initiative, and many others. Second, amongst those future city visions, 
there was a newly launched smart city project in Harbour City which I have given the 
pseudonym, Open Programmable Harbour City (OPHC). During interviews, three out of five 
participants mentioned OPHC. The smart city project OPHC immediately drew my attention 
and I considered it as a possible case for my research objective.  
 
(2) Choosing Open Programmable Harbour City (OPHC) as the ethnographic case 
 
To deepen my understanding of OPHC, I started to read the information available about 
OPHC online. I also applied the snowball method to talk to more people in Harbour City 
who knew something about OPHC, including local civil servants, engineers from the 
Harbour City University, and some local businessmen. The piece-by-piece information I 
pulled together about OPHC showed that OPHC would make a suitable case for the purposes 
of this research. One reason for this was that OPHC offered a good opportunity for me to 
answer the three foreshowed questions. OPHC officially launched two months before I 




place at the right time. The entry time allowed me to follow and witness a real-time smart 
city innovation process. Alongside following the innovation process, I could observe the role 
of vision and citizens in the innovation process. 
 
Another reason for choosing OPHC was because the vison of OPHC demonstrated a unique 
smart city project which deserved attention. It is a joint venture project between the local 
council and the local university. Technologically speaking, it has not only installed some 
conventional smart cities technologies (e.g. Internet of Things and smart applications), but 
has also adopted a state-of-art networking technology Software Defined Network (SDN). 
This technological configuration claims to bring transitional capacity to the existing network 
regime and the way a city network operates. Socially speaking, OPHC was aware of the 
problems of top-down smart city innovation models and lack of citizen engagement. It 
proposed to build a smart city project that allocated roles for different people. It also 
specifically put citizen at the centre of its vision. For instance, it wanted to open its 
programmable infrastructure for anyone to test their applications. It also proposed several 
citizen engagement elements in its vision. Both its technological configuration and citizen 
engagement agenda suggested that OPHC would be an interesting case to investigate and 
might enrich our understanding of the smart city phenomenon.  
 
3.2.2 Sampling sites and people within the case 
 
The selection of a local smart city project was not the only form of sampling that was 
involved in this research. A researcher cannot be everywhere all the time. She or he needs to 
constantly make decisions about where and when to observe, and who to talk to (Hennink et 
al., 2011; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). So, I also needed to sample within the case of 
OPHC. This sampling process mainly referred to two things: where I would conduct 
participant observation and who I would interview. Below, I provide readers with an 
overview of the two sampling processes. It is worth noting that the sampling process was not 
as tidy as I present it here. The number of events I attended and people I talked to were more 
than I describe below. The full list of key events and interviews can be found in appendix 1. 
 
(1) Samplings sites 
 
Identifying suitable sites for research is not straightforward. Researchers often know very 




they have chosen in the early stages of fieldwork (O’Reilly, 2005: 38). Thompson (1988) 
regards this exploring process as the ‘general gathering stage’. O’Reilly (2005: 38) vividly 
describes this stage as, “putting your toe in the water to test it before plunging in”. Similarly, 
Fetterman (1998: 32) talks of a ‘big-net’ approach in the early stages of ethnographic 
research. In this stage, ethnographers tend to mingle with everyone that they can and attend 
a wide range of events. The process helps ethnographers to capture a big picture of the case, 
refine their focus, and narrow down the research to specific sites and people. In order to find 
sites to observe, I went through a ‘general gathering stage’ between May 2015 and July 2015. 
I reviewed news, documents and reports online about OPHC. The documentation process 
provided me with a better idea about OPHC and of the events to attend. I also interviewed 
the Chief Technology Designer of OPHC (Susan) and some engineers from the NEXT Lab. 
The interviews helped me to build a basic understanding of the use of technologies in OPHC. 
I also actively attended a whole range of events, including a workshop for OPHC’s 
application Data Dome, a social scientists’ gathering event, and Harbour City to Delta City 
webinar 1. Those events established the foundation of the fieldwork for this research. After 
three months’ exploration, I noticed that it was difficult to find a single site to conduct 
observation because the innovation activities of OPHC happened in multiple sites, including 
relevant projects, conferences, workshops, festivals, etc. The nature of the ethnographic 
context of this research might resonate with some contemporary understandings of the 
ethnographic field, such as ‘multi-site ethnography’ (Marcus, 1986; Hannerz, 2003) or 
‘field-event configuring’ (Delgado and Cruz, 2014: 44) in organisation ethnography (Sim, 
2017: 26). In response to the fluid, composite, and distributed nature of the ethnographic 
field of this research, I sort the OPHC related events into four types: (a) Events irrelevant to 
OPHC. (b) Events irrelevant to OPHC, but that could deepen my overall understanding about 
OPHC. (c) Events related to OPHC and has a series of planned events. (d) Stand-alone events 























Figure 1. The processes of selecting the ethnographic sites 
 
Type (a) events were irrelevant to OPHC. An example of this type of event was My Society 
meet up. According to the description of the event, the Chief Manager of OPHC (Chris) and 
the Chief Technology Designer of OPHC (Susan) were scheduled to give a talk but they did 
not turn up so, what I observed in this event was not relevant to OPHC at all. Type (b) events 
were also not related to OPHC, but had potential to enrich my overall understanding of 
OPHC. I will come back to this point later. 
 
Type (c) and type (d) events were considered as ethnographic sites for this research. Type 
(c) events were directly related to the innovation process of OPHC. They were a series of 
events associated with OPHC. In the ‘general gathering stage’, I identified two type (c) 
events. One was the experiment of building OPHC’s first application, Data Dome4. Another 
                                                     
4 This is the first application of OPHC and it aims to become an urban data visualisation device to visualise 
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one was the Harbour City to Delta City smart city programme5. The former allowed me to 
conduct a detailed observation into the implementation of the vision of OPHC, while the 
latter showed a very interesting phenomenon in the innovation process, that of innovation 
diffusion. Type (d) events were different, stand-alone events, that related to some aspect of 
OPHC. For example, OPHC infrastructure was a topic found in several independent events, 
including the SDN workshop and OPHC Tech meet up. Those events were not related to each 
other, but together they revealed the innovation process of the OPHC infrastructure.  
 
After the ‘general gathering stage’, I formed some ideas about where to go. I closely followed 
two type (c) events: The Data Dome application and the Harbour City to Delta City smart 
city programme. In the process, another type (c) event emerged; a Citizen Sensing project6 
led by OPHC’s local host partner Straw House. The project was considered relevant to 
OPHC because it was supposed to co-produce an OPHC application with citizens. So, I 
decided to include the Citizen Sensing project in my sampling of ethnographic sites. I also 
attended some type (d) events. Key themes that emerged in the process not only drew on the 
infrastructure aspect of OPHC, but also covered other aspects of OPHC, such as the 
performative roles of the OPHC. 
 
The type (c) and type (d) events are the major sites for this ethnographic research. But the 
type (a) and (b) events also contributed to this research. For example, they deepened my 
understanding of the technological components of OPHC and helped me better understand 
the context (Harbour City). I also met some important actors of OPHC at some of those 
events, for example, I attended an event about data and healthcare, where I was looking for 
information on the OPHC related tele-health application, but though the event turned out not 
to be relevant, I met John who later helped Straw House to develop a sensing application 
(Toad) (See Chapter 6). Having met John at this event made it easier to ask him for an 
interview at a Citizen Sensing event later on. 
 
The sites that I gradually selected in the process covered many aspects of OPHC, but I should 
admit that it is not the complete picture of OPHC. It is impossible for one researcher to 
                                                     
5 This is a smart city communication programme between Harbour City and Delta City. OPHC seek to 
diffuse to Delta City through this programme. More on the diffusion process in Chapter 7. 
6 This project aims to co-produce a sensing application with citizens, and this application seeks to use 




follow the entire process of a large-scale project like OPHC. As Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007) remind us, in selecting ethnographic sites, a researcher must always make a trade-off 
between breadth and depth of investigation because the more settings studied the less time 
can be spent in each. In choosing a suitable site for study, I was aware of other sites of 
potential interest that I could not include. For example, there was an Engineering Professor 
from Harbour City University who planned to do something with the OPHC infrastructure. 
But, I only found out about this at the very late stage in my data collection, so I decided not 
to include it. When choosing where to go, I also had to take into account the ethical concerns 
of real-time research. This research follows a real-time smart city innovation process which 
gained ethical consensus from many innovators. Although I was welcomed to observe the 
process and sometimes even invited to events. I made the choice not to request to observe 
some events and to maintain a good distance at other times. This is because I considered my 
presence at certain events might impact the innovation process and I also did not want to put 
pressure on the innovators. However, I made sure to balance ethical considerations with the 
need to gain enough data. My knowledge and cultural background also influenced the way I 
selected the site. For example, OPHC has many interactions with cities overseas, including 
Delta City in China and Windy City in the USA. There are many reasons that I chose Delta 
City rather than Windy City. Apart from the fact that I heard about Delta City earlier than 
Windy city, there was also a concrete project plan between Harbour City and Delta City for 
me to conduct a series of observations. Moreover, my personal background also influenced 
my selection of Delta City because I had lived in the region for four years and had thus built 
up some understanding of Delta City’s culture and industry. This personal background gave 
me greater confidence in understanding the interactions between Harbour City and Delta 
City. 
 
(2) Sampling people 
 
Apart from selecting where to go, I also needed to select the people to talk to. This mainly 
included choosing people with whom to conduct informal interviews and arranging formal 
interviews with others. I would like to briefly talk about how I selected the respondents for 
both types of interviews. 
 
I used two ways of sampling people for informal interview: my judgement and sheer good 




judgement that each person was important to talk to. For example, based on this type of 
hunch, I interviewed a game designer in the site of the Data Dome; Chinese participants in 
the site of the Harbour City to Delta City smart city programme; a project manager of Citizen 
Sensing, and a community activist, among others. Sometimes, I was lucky enough to meet 
the right person at the right time in the right place. For example, I was interviewing Chris at 
the DOCK one morning and I noticed the engineering Director of MiniCat (Emma) also at 
the DOCK. I knew that she was doing something about the Data Dome. After the interview 
with Chris, I went to say “hi” to Emma and asked her about her recent involvement with the 
Data Dome. To my surprise, she had just brought a group of six engineers to work on 
developments for the dome. From our previous interactions, she already knew that I was 
doing research about the Data Dome so she immediately asked her engineering team for 
consent to be interviewed and recruited a group three engineers for me to interview. It was 
quite unexpected, but in the end, I gained oral consent to conduct the interview from the 
engineers and promised not to write anything about their design before their official release 
date. This type of good luck happened many times in my fieldwork.  
 
In terms of finding suitable people for formal interview, I usually applied non-probability 
sampling. This included ‘theoretical sampling’, ‘judgement sampling’ (the researcher 
selecting the most suitable person based on her knowledge), and the ‘snowball technique’ 
(finding one informant from another informant) (Brewer, 2005: 79). I mixed the use of these 
three sampling strategies to select people with whom to conduct interviews. For example, 
after the Data Dome launch event, I needed to understand how ‘insiders’ thoughts about the 
launch event. Based on my knowledge about the social network in the field, I thought Henry 
from the Data Dome team might be a suitable person to talk to and I contacted him for 
interview. In this case, I use ‘judgement sampling’ to choose the interviewee. Sometimes, I 
also applied the ‘snowball method’ to select people to talk to. For example, in order to 
understand the emergence of OPHC, I interviewed a key informant (Ruby) from Harbour 
City Council because I knew Ruby was involved in the history and current development of 
OPHC project. Through Ruby I got to know that Vincent (a computer scientist) and Brian 
(the Director of the DOCK) were also involved in the history of OPHC. I subsequently 
interviewed both of them as well. It is worth noting that using the ‘snowball method’ to find 
interviewees has a shortcoming; the data can be misleading if too many respondents come 
from the same group of people, thereby weighting the responses a certain way (Hammersley 




leeway to choose who to interview. Thus, when finding people who knew the history of 
OPHC, beyond contacting interviewees through one person’s recommendations, I also 
identified other interviewees based on my own knowledge and other informants’ 
recommendations. 
 
3.3 Data collection and management 
 
Ethnographic studies tend to use a wide variety of methods to collect data, including 
participant observation, interview, photography, and documentary (collecting documents and 
artefacts) (Brewer, 2000: 11). Pink (2009) argues that the choice of data collection methods 
should consider two factors. First, the method should serve the research questions. Second, 
it should be a method that best enables the researcher to explore the issue. Taking the two 
factors into consideration, I used participant observation, interview, photography, and 
documentary to collect data for this research. For the purpose of clarity, I would like to 
introduce how I used each method to collect and record data separately. At the end of this 
section, I will also briefly address how I organised the data that I collected using the different 
methods.  
 
3.3.1 Participation observation 
 
(1) Using participation observation to collect data 
 
Participant observation is a major data collection method in ethnographic research (Lassiter, 
2014: 58). To collect data through participant observation often requires ethnographers to 
understand aspects of people’s life from their own perspectives and from within the context 
of their own lived experience (O’Reilly, 2005). The data collected via participant observation 
provides a specific kind of field-based knowledge that touch-and-go surveys alone cannot 
achieve (Lassiter, 2014). Participant observation is a useful method for this research because 
it allows for the collection of data about what people say and do to make a smart city, how 
they interact with each other in the innovation process, and so forth. There are a wide variety 
of participant observation roles that an ethnographer can take in the field. Gold (1958) 
classified fours levels of participation in the field: ‘complete participant’ (researcher 
completely participates in the event), ‘participant-as-observer’ (researchers research the field 
and participates fully in the field), ‘observer-as-participant’ (participation in the field is 




(researcher completely observes the event) (Brewer, 2000). In this research, I shifted 
between different participatory roles. Most of the time I took the role of ‘participant-as-
observer’ and ‘observer-as-participant’. For example, at the Citizen Sensing site, I took the 
role of ‘participant-as-observer’; I actively participated in the discussions like an ordinary 
event participant. While, in some less interactive events, such as technological talks, I took 
the role of ‘observer-as-participant’. I listened to what was said in the event and observed 
how audiences reacted to it. Sometimes, I took a ‘complete participant’ role. For example, 
in the Harbour City to Delta City delegation’s visit Day 1, I helped to translate one official 
meeting from English to Chinese. In this event, I sat behind one key OPHC actor and 
translated his words from English into Chinese. In such an intense translating session, my 
brain was only able to operate in translating mode and could not conduct any initial analysis 
about what was said. So, I was completely a participant in this event.  
 
(2) Constructing observation data 
 
The observation note is a key way to record data from participant observation. Ethnographers 
usually have their own style of note taking. I developed a colour coding system at the 
‘general gathering stage’ (See appendix 2). Crang and Cook (2007) suggest observation 
notes consist of six layers of descriptions including, “location”, “space”, “others’ 
interaction”, “my participation”, “reflecting on the research process”, and “self-reflections”. 
My observation notes contain the first four elements, while the elements of reflecting on the 
research process and self-reflection were recorded separately in my research diary and 
reflexive diary. In recording events, I often started by describing where the event took place, 
usually followed by sketching the setting in my notebook (Figure 2) (More examples in 
appendix 3). I had to constantly make decisions about what to write and what not to write. 
O’Reilly (2005: 99) and Emerson et al., (1995) argue that observation notes inevitably 
reduce events and are highly selective. As I mentioned above, ethnographic work is always 
a trade-off between breadth of focus and detail (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Although 
I had some initial idea about what I was interested in, for example, focusing on people’s talk 
and their interactions rather than their body language, I still tended to record whatever I could 
in the early stages of the fieldwork. As the research went along I developed a clearer focus. 











(1) Using interviews to collect data 
 
Interview is another data collection method that is widely used in ethnographic research. 
Crang and Cook (2007) argue that we should not treat interviews as a separate method 
because all social research involves learning through conversations. In ethnographic 
research, the ethnographer inevitably engages in both formal and informal communication. 
Interview as a data collection method enables researchers to get the subjective views from 
participants or the insiders’ view. Punch (2009) defines interview as “a very good way of 
accessing people’s perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations, and their constructions 
of reality” (Punch, 2009: 144). The use of interview in ethnographic research locates the 
ethnographer in the larger context of what she/he sees and experiences (Davies, 2008: 40).  
 
As with participant observations, there are also many forms of interview, ranging from a 
spontaneous informal conversation in the field (informal interview) to a formally arranged 
meeting (formal interview) (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Informal interviews are like 
casual conversations and they are the most common interview in ethnographic fieldwork. 
Ethnographers use these to discover what people think. Whereas, formal interviews often 
require explicit agendas. They can be formally structured or semi-structured. The formal 
interview is often used in the middle and late stages of research to collect data on specific 




type of interview called the retrospective interview. It is a type of interview that 
ethnographers use to “reconstruct the past, asking informants to recall personal historical 
information” (Fetterman, 1998: 40). Retrospective interviews usually contain people’s 
autobiographical descriptions. They tend to be very personal and not completely 
representative of group. They are valuable because they capture people’s perception of the 
past. This provides a window for the researcher to look at how people’s cultural and personal 
background shape the way they perceive the past (Ibid: 51). Weaving different personal 
descriptions together, ethnographers can tell the fabric of certain social groups and form an 
integrated understanding of the target picture.  
 
Each type of interview has its role to play into “soliciting” information (Fetterman, 1998). I 
used informal interviews, formal semi-structured interview, and retrospective semi-
structured interviews in this research. For example, in order to understand the development 
of the programmable infrastructure, I arranged formal interviews with relevant people, such 
as the Chief Technology Designer of OPHC (Susan), and engineers from the NEXT lab. I 
also conducted informal interviews with a member of staff from Light Speed and engineers 
from the NEXT lab. A full list of key formal and informal interviews is in appendix 1. In 
general, the informal interviews tended to happen alongside participant observation, while 
the formal interviews were often arranged after participant observation. There is an 
advantage to this arrangement. To attend events before an interview allowed me to ask good 
questions in the interview and the interviewees were more willing to respond to questions 
with in-depth responses. In terms of interview time, I usually requested one-hour, however, 
it often took longer than one hour and the longest interview lasted three hours. 
 
(2) Constructing interview data 
 
Informal and formal interviews require different processes to construct and record data. 
Informal interviews often took place alongside participant observation and sometimes 
happen accidently. For example, some informal interviews occurred during a chat with 
participants on the street or in coffee shops. Mental notes and some scribbled key phrases on 
a piece of paper were the main methods for me to record the data that emerged from this sort 
of informal interview. In order to retain the information after an informal chat, I normally 
avoided absorbing new material and immediately sought a place to write down the informal 




the interview, I would often double check my interpretation.  
 
Collecting data through formal interview requires more procedures and preparations. I chose 
a semi-structured format for formal interviews, because on the one hand, I had specific 
questions I wanted to ask participants and on the other hand, I was open to things that 
emerged from the conversations. To prepare for the interviews, I usually drew up a list of 
questions that I wanted to ask in the interview (see an example of interview questions in 
appendix 4). Sometimes, I would also prepare historical documents that might help 
interviewees to recall things, such as the bid of Gigabit Harbour City. I used a mobile app 
called Evernote to record the formal interviews. I will address the ethics of recording in 
section 3.5. The data was stored in the cloud service provided by the application rather than 
on the smart phone itself. As it turned out this was extremely helpful because I twice dropped 
my phone in water during the research process. Although I could not turn on my phone due 
to the water damage, the data was kept safely in the cloud space and could be download to 
my newly purchased devices. Alongside recording, I also scribbled key phrases in my 
notebook. Interviewees were allowed to draw on the paper that I prepared. Those drawings 
helped them to illustrate technological elements or other complex things to me. I post two 
examples below. Figure 3 is a drawing done by an engineer. He used the drawings to explain 
the concept of RF Mesh network and 5G for me. Figure 4 is a timeline that I co-constructed 
with a member of the OPHC engineering team in an interview. These notes helped me 
understand the engineering process of OPHC and the workload of the OPHC engineering 
team. 
 





Figure 4. A member of OPHC engineering team drawing the workload of the OPHC 
engineering team 
 
3.3.3 Photography, documentary, and material circumstances/artefacts 
 
Apart from data collected from participant observation and interview, ethnographers easily 
overlook other types of data, such as photographs, documents, and artefacts (Lassiter, 2014). 
The empirical data for this research also included those three types of data. Below, I would 




Photography always has a role to play in ethnographic work (O’Reilly, 2005). In the early 
days of the ethnography discipline, there was a positivist attitude towards the use of photos. 
Photographs are often used as evidence that a researcher was there or that the event had 
happened. They are deployed in ethnographic research to make arguments more profoundly 
(O’Reilly, 2005). Apart from functioning as evidence, photos can also be used to show 
people, places, and objects that are difficult to describe vividly with words. Moreover, 
photography can serve as an art of ethnographic description. The aesthetic value that 
photography adds to ethnographic work should be embraced by ethnographers (Crang and 




will be chosen in preference to others. But, photographs never intend to show the truth, 
instead they show a partial truth.  
 
I used a smartphone to take photos at the sites and photos were functional for this research 
in several ways. First, I used photos as a way of taking fieldnotes. For example, in some 
fieldwork there were presentation slides which were hard to be note down quickly. So, I used 
photos to records the slides. Second, I used photography to capture events, activities, and 
scenes. They helped me to remember what had happened and I also use some photos to 
support the narrative in this thesis. Readers will come across some of these photos in the 
empirical chapters. Third, I used photos to record artefacts and physical surroundings that 
could not be take away from the sites such as the ‘active note’(Figure 19) and the Citizen 




In the contemporary world, most ethnographic research takes place in a literate society. 
Therefore, there are always a lot of documents at ethnographic sites (Lassiter, 2014). As 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) point out, administrators, accountants, civil servants, managers 
at all levels, and many other experts are routinely involved in producing, consuming, and 
circulating written documents such as rule-books, timetables, and memoranda. If we call 
observation notes, interview transcripts, and photographs first-hand data, then documents 
can be regarded as the secondary data. There are many types of documents that 
ethnographers can collect in the process. They can range from informal documents with 
many copies widely distributed both online and offline to published documents, such as 
reports.  
 
For this research, I collected both online and offline documents related to OPHC. In terms 
of online sources, I documented OPHC related news from March 2014 to June 2016. I 
printed out whatever I read about OPHC online and archived it chronologically in five 
folders. I also collected documents in the field. For example, at the site of the OPHC 
programmable infrastructure, I collected documents such as booklets, information sheets 
from the workshop, and presentation slides. In the end, the documents included OPHC news, 
official OPHC announcements, presentations slides, advertisements, blogs, bid documents, 




three main ways. First, they helped me gain an overarching view of the actor-network of 
OPHC that was not easy to grasp through ethnographic observation. Second, they provided 
me with information about upcoming OPHC events. Third, they captured events that I could 
not attend. For example, there were four or five key OPHC actors who frequently travelled 
around the world to promote OPHC. It was impossible for me to follow them but the online 
news and reports about these events provided me with a window to see what had happened.  
 
(3) Material circumstances/artefacts 
 
Ethnographic fieldwork not only contains people and documents, but many sorts of “things”. 
The material circumstance of an ethnographic work shapes the performance of an individual 
and their interaction (Atkinson, 2006). In this research, I paid attention to the physical 
circumstances of the fieldwork, such as the setting of the site (See appendix 3). I also paid 
attention to artefacts in the field. For example, at the OPHC infrastructure site, I paid 
attention to technological components such as the ‘active nodes’, optical fibre, and the 
supercomputer (See photos in appendix 5). At the Data Dome site, I paid attention to the 
chairs, projectors, and other artefacts (see Figure 2). At the Harbour City to Delta City 
communication site, I observed the digital conference system. At the Citizen Sensing site, I 
paid attention to the artefact, the Toad (Figure 36). I was able to take away some of the 
artefacts, such as a balloon pictured bellow ( Figure 5), but that was not the case with 
physical settings and most of the artefacts. In these cases, I use photography and drawing to 
capture the settings and objects (See some photos in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and appendix 3).  
 
 




The decision to stop collecting data is often based on several criteria. There are three main 
factors that influenced my decision to stop collecting data. The first was practical, that is 
time and funding. PhD’s have a specific deadline and a large amount of time is spent on 
analysis, writing, and editing. So, I could not collect data forever. Second, I stopped 
collecting data when a project finished its full circle. For example, both the Delta City to 
Harbour City programme and the Citizen Sensing project finished within the observation 
period. I witnessed the whole process of these two projects. Third, I realised that general 
pictures and patterns appeared again and again in some sites. This was an indication that I 
should wrap things. For example, at the Data Dome site, the way actors repeatedly aligned 
game producers and did not realise that the real problems repeated many times. There was 
no fundamental difference to be found during the observation period.  
 
3.3.4 Data management 
 
At the end of this section I would like to briefly address data management. Data management 
is an important step in ethnographic research because good data organisation makes 
ethnographic analysis and writing more effective (Davies, 2008: 10). I formed the habit of 
organising data after each piece of fieldwork. I built folders in my research computer labelled 
with a series number and the name of the fieldwork (e.g. participant observation or formal 
interview). I transcribed some of the important notes (e.g. actors’ speeches) that I had 
collected from participant observation. I also wrote a research diary or summary about the 
fieldwork (See an example in appendix 5). I transcribed data collected and recorded in 
interview immediately after each interview. This allowed me not only to note down what 
participants had said, but other elements that I perceived in the process. However, 
transcribing is a time-consuming activity. If I was not able to transcribe the whole thing, I 
would just transcribe the key phrases and re-listen to the recording the next day. After 
finishing transcribing, I would often write thank you emails to interviewees. It was very 
useful to write these emails after transcribing because it offered the chance to ask the person 
to clarify any confusions and remind them of any resources they had promised to provide.  
 
Building an individual folder for each piece of fieldwork was very useful because it enabled 
me to pull relevant fieldwork together under the same theme/site very quickly in the analysis 
stage (see section 3.4). Each folder might contain data such as, written materials (sometimes 




my own reflections and analysis, such as my research diary, initial analysis notes, and my 
reflexive diary. In terms of documents, and artefacts that I collected from the field, I archived 
and stored them in different folders in locked cabinets. At the end, I organised my data 
chronologically in digital and physical spaces. Apart from pulling everything together and 
writing reflections, I also formed the habit of logging key fieldwork information in an excel 
sheet. This sheet contained categories of series numbers, time, negotiated access, recording, 
material objects, interviews, initial analysis, and so forth. This index system provided me 
with an overview of my fieldwork and made the later data retrieval easier.  
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis is not the last phase of ethnographic research. Ethnographers do not gather 
data blindly in the field, then bring it all back to home to see what they find out from it. 
Instead, they conduct many levels of analysis in the research process. As you can see from 
the descriptions above, the way the ethnographic data is constructed is never raw because it 
has been partly analysed in the research design and data collection process. For example, in 
the ‘general gathering stage’, I analysed and compared data that I had gathered in different 
sites. This gave me ideas about how to select participant observation sites. When taking the 
observation notes, I also noted down any analysis ideas. After observation, I would write 
down initial analysis in my research diary. In preparing for interviews, I often jotted down 
ideas in my interview checklist about why I wanted to interview a particular person and what 
I wanted to ask them. The questions I wanted to ask were also informed by my analysis. 
During the interviews, I would also note down any initial analysis ideas. So, the analysis is 
an ongoing process which is tangled up at every stage of research including the research 
design, data collection, data handling (e.g. coding, indexing, sorting, retrieving), theorising, 
and writing (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). As Ezzy (2002) argues, data collection, analysis 
and writing up are inextricably linked in ethnographic research. O’Reilly (2005) calls this 
interrelated process an iterative-inductive approach where researchers swing back and forth 
between research design, data collection, and analysis. They continually do analysis and 
write up during the research process, and this can lead them to more data collection and 
writing up. So, it is difficult to say that there is a data analysis stage in ethnographic research. 
However, below I would still like to provide you with a sense of the data analysis through 
introducing key data analysis activities, including sorting, coding, re-coding, and writing. 




data analysis and theorising. It might be not a convention to see theoretical discussion in a 
methodology chapter, but it is relevant to this research because theorising is integral to 
analysis and not a separate stage. 
 
3.4.1 Theorising and data analysis 
 
In terms of the relationship between theory and ethnographic research, many ethnographers 
are more in favour of the inductive approach than the deductive approach. They hold the 
attitude that researchers begin with an open mind and as few preconceptions as possible. 
However, it is widely accepted that it is impossible to start out on ethnographic research 
without preconceptions (Berg, 2001; O’Reilly, 2005). As Ezzy (2002: 10) further points out, 
“all data are theory driven. The point is not to pretend that they are not, or force the data 
into theory”. O’Reilly (2005) provides a solution to this dilemma. She suggests we use the 
iterative-inductive lens to look at the relationship between theory and ethnographic research. 
The iterative-inductive perspective regards ethnographic research as an ongoing 
simultaneous process of inductions. This attitude helped me think about the choice of theory 
for this research. On the one hand, this approach accepts the fact that ethnographic research 
is more or less directed by theories. On the other hand, it encourages researchers to embrace 
the beauty of annoying moments in research, such as unexpected data, the initial framework 
proving to be wrong, and things that the initial theoretical framework cannot explain. The 
advantage of this approach is that it provides fluidity and flexible space for ethnographic 
research. It allows the researcher to go back and forth many times to find a suitable 
theoretical framework to interpret the data. 
 
In order to find an appropriate framework to interpret the data, I went through an iterative-
inductive process. I formed the habit of keeping theory notebooks where I constantly logged 
my thoughts about possible conceptual tools; recorded whatever I read about those concepts; 
and applied them to analyse the data. Finding a suitable theoretical framework and 
conceptual tools for this research was not straightforward because when I immersed myself 
in the field to study something fluid and continue evolving, it was difficult to immediately 
see the bigger picture. So, I went through an iterative-inductive process of theory building, 
testing, and rebuilding, to find a suitable framework. Below, I briefly address the iterative-





(1) The initial theoretical framework 
 
Based on empirical data that I gathered between March 2015 and September 2015, I tried to 
form the theoretical framework. Taking the key elements that I identified from the empirical 
data into account, such as heterogeneous actors, alignments, expectation, and an attempt to 
diffuse. I pulled together conceptual tools from four sources to build an initial theoretical 
framework. The first source was Actor-Network Theory (ANT). ANT could have been 
suitable because the empirical data showed that the innovation process of OPHC involved 
many human and non-human elements, such as humans, sensors, the dome, money, text, and 
many others. ANT is relevant here because it provides a series of useful conceptual tools 
(e.g. heterogeneous engineering, engineer-sociologist, translation) to analyse how 
heterogeneous things align to generate effects. In other words, how do various elements work 
together to reach the goal of OPHC? The second intellectual resource comes from Andrew 
Barry’s work. Especially his work on the technological zone and citizens in technological 
society. The technological zone suggests the conduct of government operates not only in 
territorial boundaries but also in relation to the technological zone formed through the 
circulation of technical devices and practices (Barry, 2001: 3). The element of intellectual 
property rights and standardisation are considered important to unify and harmonise the 
technological zone. While, the concept of citizens in technological society sheds light on the 
relationship between citizens and technologies. He argues that interactive technology is often 
regarded as a way to engage citizens in what he calls the technological society. The 
interactivity implies a less rigid articulation of bodies and objects, because through 
interactivity, subjects are not disciplined, instead they are allowed (Barry, 2001: 148). 
Barry’s work was considered relevant to this research in two ways. First, because OPHC has 
the ambition to diffuse to another cultural context before it fully materialises in Harbour 
City. One good example is its ongoing communication with Delta City. The conceptual tool, 
technological zone, seemed useful to interpret what was happening in the Harbour City to 
Delta City communication site. Second, the discourse of OPHC highlights the citizen 
engagement elements. For example, the goal to build a Data Dome for citizens to view and 
interact with urban data. The element of citizens and interactive technologies links to 
Andrew Barry’s observation on citizens in a technological society.   
 
The third and fourth sources are from the Sociology of Expectation (SOE) and the Sociology 




process. In the empirical data, I found the element of vision to be pervasive in the innovation 
process of OPHC. However, the element of vision is insufficiently addressed in ANT. To 
fill this gap, I first turned to the Sociology of Expectation (SOE). SOE provides fruitful 
insights about the role of vision in an innovation process, such as the performative role of 
vision (see more in Chapter 4). However, I also noticed that SOE faces the criticism from 
SOF that it does not pay attention to the immaterial aspect of expectation and does not 
explain how the layerdness of expectations work together. Although SOF also does not 
provide answer to these shortcomings, it suggests direction to expand the way we think about 
vision. So, I decided it was necessary to take SOF’s insights into account as part of my initial 
framework as well. In order to show how the four intellectual sources could be pulled 
together as a coherent framework, I first illustrated them in a diagram in my theory notebook 
(Figure 6) and then designed a tidy version (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 6. The first attempt to assemble the initial theoretical framework in a notebook 
 
 




(2) Rethinking the theoretical framework 
 
As the research progressed, new data emerged which made me rethink my initial theoretical 
framework. It is acceptable for ethnographers to modify theoretical framework in the process 
of research. As Clifford Geertz (1973) argued, theoretical ideas are not created wholly anew 
in each study and they are adopted from each other. Ethnographers test theories in the process 
of using them. If the theories are useful, they are further elaborated and go on be used 
(Geertz, 1973; Hammersley, 1992).  
 
There were two major periods in the research when I needed to rethink the initial theoretical 
framework. The first time happened between February 2016 and April 2016. I had collected 
a lot of data from the Data Dome site and the Harbour City to Delta City smart city 
communication site. The initial idea to use the conceptual tools technological zone and 
citizens in technological society to interpret both sites was challenged. I had followed the 
project for nearly nine months at the Data Dome site. The Data Dome project was still at the 
exploration stage. No real-time interactive application had been produced at this site and 
citizens did not interact with data in the dome. So, the empirical data produced at this site 
did not really relate to the conceptual tool citizens in technological society. What could be 
observed at this site were the difficulties of building applications and the processes of 
aligning developers. So, I needed to find other conceptual tools to understand what was 
actually happening. Second, I finished data collection at the Harbour City to Delta City smart 
city communication site. I initially wanted to apply the technological zone to understand the 
diffusion of OPHC. So, I paid attention to the data that was associated with standardisation 
and intellectual property rights at this site, because both are key elements to form a 
technological zone. However, from what I observed at this site, the issue of standardisation 
and intellectual property rights were not salient in the diffusion process. This does not mean 
Barry’s (2001) work is wrong, the diffusion of each smart city project has its unique 
characteristics. For example, smart city innovation is a system innovation which consists of 
a wide range of technologies and most of them are novel. It is really hard to form a unified 
standard and get IP protection in the early stages. Second, the OPHC did not diffuse a 
technological product, instead it diffused a vision. So, I needed to find conceptual tools that 
could interpret those characteristics. 
 




the innovation process of OPHC. This mainly arose from three aspects. First, through 
studying the history of OPHC, I found that OPHC emerged as an accident rather than from 
a strategic plan. From ANT point of view, alignment always starts with problematisation 
(Callon, 1986). This was clearly not the case with OPHC, as you can read about in the 
Chapter 5. Second, the emergence of OPHC was a result of interactions between local actor 
networks and actors at the national level (See more in Chapter 5). The flat ontology of ANT 
does not emphasise a structured difference between the micro level and the meso/macro 
level. So, ANT cannot explain the long-time negotiation process between local actors and 
the constraints from the meso level (e.g. national government, law, telecom companies). 
Third, the innovation process at the Data Dome site, the Harbour City to Delta City smart 
city communication site, and the Citizen Sensing site also required appropriate conceptual 
tools to make sense of them. Although ANT efficiently shed light on what was aligned and 
what did not align, there was more to the innovation process. For example, in the case of the 
Data Dome, ANT might explain the alignment of human and technology actors, but it 
neglects the large amount of time that actors spent trying to figure out what to do next; 
conducting experiments; reflecting on their actions; and exploring new pathways, etc. So, 
persisting with ANT, felt like forcing the data to fit the theory. This would not only go against 
the validity of the research, but also show no respect for the people involved in the story of 
OPHC.  
 
(3) Re-configuring the theoretical framework for this research  
 
In order to find suitable conceptual tools for the empirical data, I turned to the socio-technical 
perspective of Transition Studies. The socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies is 
very similar to ANT. It treats socio-technological change as a result of the overall 
configuration of technology, policy, market, cultural meaning, and so forth. The analytic 
tools in the socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies, in particular, Multi-level 
perspective (MLP) and Strategic Niche Management (SNM) are useful for interpreting what 
happened in the case OPHC which I will explain later. I choose the socio-technical 
perspective of Transition Studies as a theoretical framework for this research for four 
reasons. First, the smart city project, OPHC, has a transition ambition. This is reflected in 
two aspects. One aspect is the design of the project. OPHC seeks to create a programmable 
infrastructure as a platform that will enable a wide variety of actors using digital technologies 




practice from how cities are operating now. Another aspect is the SDN technology that 
OPHC adopted. This technology claims to bring transition possibilities to the existing 
network industry. Second, this approach sheds light on the structure that OPHC is embedded 
in. The core of the socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies is the Multi-level 
perspective (MLP). It regards transition as coming through interaction between three analytic 
levels: niches, regimes, and landscape (see details in Chapter 4). The emergence of OPHC 
is not just alignment at a local level. Instead, it is a result of interaction between the local 
level and the meso level (regime). The use of MLP can clearly acknowledges the structure 
restrictions of OPHC. Third, the management approach of the socio-technical perspective of 
Transition Studies, called Strategic Niche Management (SNM), provides a series of 
conceptual tools (e.g. niche internal process) to understand innovation activities in many 
sites that ANT does not pay attention to. Fourth, it distinguishes between local niches and 
global niches, and the spatial dimension of SNM can help shed light on the diffusion of 
OPHC. I discuss all of these in Chapter 4.   
 
In terms of exploring the role of vision in the innovation process, SNM emphasises the role 
of vision in helping form a niche. However, there are still some aspects of vision that are not 
addressed in SNM. In this sense, the conceptual tools from the Sociology of Expectation are 
still useful to this research and compliment SNM. Both Transition Studies and the Sociology 
of Expectation (SOE) are compatible with each other because they share some similar 
scholars and thinking traditions (see more in Chapter 4). In terms of the Sociology of the 
Future, although it points out the shortcomings of SOE, it does not provide sufficient 
conceptual tools to interpret the empirical data of this research. So, I decided to drop 
Sociology of the Future to make the overall theoretical framework coherent.  
 
In the end, the theoretical framework for this research consists of two main intellectual 
resources: the socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies and the Sociology of 
Expectation. I have indicated these here to help explain the analysis process and I will 
provide a detailed review of this framework in Chapter 4.  
 
3.4.2 The process of data analysis 
 
(1) Sorting and coding data 
 




process of sorting and coding. Sorting data is a process of putting data into different boxes 
or categories. In total, I sorted the data into six categories: (a) Data Dome, (b) Harbour City-
to Delta City smart city communication, (c) Citizen Sensing, (d) the OPHC infrastructure, 
(e) the performative role of vision, and (f) the history of OPHC. The categories were 
informed by the data collection and management process. One way of sorting data is to put 
events that relate to one site together. This would include Data Dome, Harbour City-to Delta 
City smart city communication, and Citizen Sensing. Another way of sorting is to put 
different events that are associated with one topic together. The categories that gradually 
emerged in the research process included the OPHC infrastructure, the performative role of 
vision, and the history of OPHC.  
 
After sorting the data into categories, I started to code it. The coding process is not straight 
forward. There is a need to constantly re-code and re-order data. I chose to use the computer 
software, NVivo, to conduct initial coding because the software made it easy to make 
connections between different themes, make changes, and manage a large amount of data. I 
built six folders in NVivo and imported the six categories of data. Then, I started the coding 
process. It is worth noting that I always conducted coding activities during the data collection 
process. For example, I identified evolving themes, tested them with my participants, and 
tried to find a theoretical framework to interpret the data. So, when I came to the coding 
stage, I already had some idea about coding. I use the thematic analysis method to code the 
data. There are two types of thematic analysis: ‘inductive thematic analysis’ and ‘theoretical 
thematic analysis’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The former suggests researchers read the data 
many times and see what emerges from it, while the latter requires researchers to apply 
theoretical frameworks to search for corresponding elements within data. I applied both 
inductive and theoretical thematic analysis to code the data. For example, when I analysed 
data from the category performative role of vision, I read through all the data about how 
innovators communicate the vision of OPHC. I found that the rhetoric of “first” can be 
identified in almost all discourses. So, I labelled the relevant data under the code “first”. 
This is an example of how I used the ‘inductive thematic method’ to analyse the data. I also 
used the ‘theoretical thematic analysis’ to shed light on the innovation process. For example, 
according to the Strategic Niche Management, there are three niche internal processes 
(articulating expectation, building social network, and learning) that contribute to 
developing a niche for novelty. So, I looked for relevant data in the three innovation sites 






(2) Using drawing and objects to assist analysis 
 
Sorting and coding data through software helped me to reduce a large volume of data to 
manageable themes. However, analysis is a result of repeating interactions between 
conceptual tools and data (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). The analysis can happen in any 
space, it is not necessary to restrict it to software. I found drawing on a piece of A3 paper is 
a convenient way to conduct data analysis. I would draw diagrams and symbols; write notes; 
and apply arrows to make linkages between codes, themes and conceptual tools. Fetterman 
(1998) argues that visual representation is a useful analysis tool for ethnographic research 
because it helps to crystalise networks, understanding, and pave new paths to explore. Latour 
(1986: 22) has a detailed study about the function of inscription in knowledge production. 
He summarises several advantages of working on two-dimensional paper. For example, 
paper is easy to move around and contents on a paper are immutable in the moving process. 
Paper is flat and the scale present on paper can be modified at will. And it is possible to 
superimpose several images on a single piece.  
 
Visual analysis on A3 paper contributed to this research in several ways. First, it was an 
extremely useful way for me to map the innovation process in each site and synthesise 
empirical and conceptual themes into stories. For example, in order to have a clear 
understanding of the innovation process at the Data Dome, I listed all themes (empirical and 
conceptual) that I had identified from the coding stages on a piece of paper. Among those 
themes, I identified three key episodes at the Data Dome site. Then, I drew a series of three 
rectangular boxes on a piece of paper to represent a sequence of three key episodes in the 
innovation process of the Data Dome (Figure 8). Within each box, I wrote down the key 
actors and technologies. Around the boxes, I noted down key inductive themes and 
theoretical themes (see more examples in appendix 6). Drawing empirical and theoretical 






Figure 8. Using drawing to figure out the innovation processes of the Data Dome 
 
Second, drawing allowed me to simplify inscriptions; pull together a large number of events 
in one space; and apply conceptual tools to relevant data. This function is similar to La 
Perouse who travelled the Pacific with the mission to create a better map of Sakhalin. He 
drew maps of the places he went to and together they formed a picture that could be used to 
understand whether Sakhalin was an island or not (Latour, 1986). In the case of OPHC, the 
innovation process of OPHC happened in multiple sites. I collected data from different sites 
and came back with key insights from each one. Then, I pulled them together to understand 
the innovation process of OPHC. For example, Figure 9 is one of my analysis notes. In this 
note, I gathered themes from several key sites, such as the Data Dome, Citizen Sensing, and 
Harbour City to Delta city communication. Together they show the innovation process of 
OPHC within and beyond Harbour City. The bubbles on the upper-left corner of the paper 
shows the key sites involved in the innovation process. On the same page, I also note down 
conceptual tools that are useful to interpret innovation processes, including niche experiment, 
local niche, MLP, and spatial dimensions of niche development. The paper provided me with 






Figure 9. Pulling data from multiple sites and applying conceptual tools onto a piece of A3 
paper 
 
However, when I worked with large amounts of data/themes from different sites in response 
to specific issues, the analysis on two-dimensional paper showed its limitations. No matter 
how big the piece of paper, the relationship between themes are hard to visualise by drawing 
alone. I often ended up with messy arrows, notes, and lines which confused more than 
clarified. This is because what is written is fixed, drawings do not provide the ‘affordance’ 
(Gibson, 1979) to move conceptual tools, signs, and figures around quickly while conducting 
analysis. In order to more easily reshuffle, recombine, and make a series of different cuts of 
data, I needed a tool with different properties; it had to be moveable, immutable, presentable, 
and be able to combine codes/themes. Mind map software was an option, but I ended up 
inventing a 3D embodied tool which has similar function to the mind map. I bought a box of 
Jenga. On each piece of wood, I attached a white sticker which enabled me to write words 
on it. Those words were the main components that I had found in the innovation process of 
OPHC, including the names of key actors, organisations, projects, technologies, and 
expectations. In order to easily identify actors from different sites, I added coloured stickers 
to distinguish them. For example, blue stickers represented actors at the Data Dome site. 





Figure 10. Reconfigured Jenga as a data analysis tool 
 
When I dealt with complex data sets across sites, I would often move my reconfigured Jenga 
around a large piece of paper. The paper allowed me to write notes and conceptual tools 
beside the Jenga. It not only helped me to crystalise my thinking and analysis, but also 
enabled me to record the placement of Jenga at the end of the day. This provided what Latour 
(1986) called optical consistency. It enabled me to recall unfinished analysis and continue 
the analysis in the future. Figure 11 is an example of how I used Jenga, paper and written 
notes to conduct analysis. It records the moment that I was trying to figure out the question 
“to what extent does the innovation of OPHC in multiple sites fulfil the prospective structure 
of OPHC (the vision of OPHC)?” In order to answer this question, I needed to look across 
data and themes from four categories (Data Dome, Harbour City to Delta City 
communication, OPHC infrastructure, and Citizen Sensing). I decided to use Jenga to assist 
in the analysis. As we can see in Figure 11, the whole analysis occupied six A3 pages. I 
drew the prospective structure of OPHC on the paper, then arranged actual actors and 
artefacts from four categories around the prospective structure. Around each cluster of 
Jenga, I also noted down the conceptual tools. For example, I drew the conceptual tool 
promise and requirement cycle at the lower left part of the figure around the Citizen Sensing 
site (see the full explanation of this conceptual tool in Chapter 4 and see the actual analysis 
of this theme in Chapter 6). In this specific case, without the help of Jenga, it would have 
been much more difficult for me to visualise and make sense of the large number of themes 





Figure 11. A photo recording of the use of Jenga to analysis data 
 
(3) Writing as a form of analysis  
 
Apart from sorting, coding, and figuring out story lines, matching themes with conceptual 
tools, and arranging themes in answering questions, writing is also a process of data analysis. 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) argue that writing helps to deepen the level of analysis. They 
say that, “analytic ideas are developed and tried out in the process of writing and 
representing” (Ibid: 109). This is especially true for this research because a lot of codes, 
themes, and conceptual tools were generated in the analysis process. Sometimes, merely 
drawing connections on papers did not allow me to see the contradictions or logic 
inconsistencies in detail. So, I needed to weave codes, themes, and conceptual tools into text 
to see whether the use of the concept was precise. To what extent did I capture the story of 
OPHC? How did they work together to answer the research questions? What themes were 
not relevant for this research but could be explored in future research? Writing was a way to 
help me reach these goals. 
 
Writing as an analysis process for this research was an ongoing process and it can be divided 
into three stages. The first stage was writing alongside the data collection process. I sent my 
supervisors monthly reports. Those reports often contained analysis of the data that I had 
collected in a specific period of time. For example, in the April 2016 report, I reported my 













I explained why I needed to modify the initial framework. I also presented several themes 
about the difficulties of diffusing the vision of OPHC to Delta City. The writing at this stage 
was useful as a way to work with the data in a very detailed way, test the initial conceptual 
tool, and conduct some initial coding.  
 
The second stage of writing happened between July and November 2016. I wrote six essays 
on six categories: the history of OPHC, the programmable infrastructure of OPHC, the Data 
Dome, the Citizen Sensing, the case of Delta City, the performative roles of the vision. Within 
each essay, I wove the themes and conceptual tools together. I printed these essays out, cut 
them section by section, and pasted the sections on an eight-meter-long background. 
Between each section, I left some empty space to write notes. I also wrote key arguments 
and conceptual tools on different coloured stickers which were easy to move around (Figure 
12). This was very useful. On one hand, it provided me an overview of the empirical data 
and conceptual tools for this research. On another hand, it allowed me to make linkages 
between analysis units and establish an ordered relationship between them, and examine the 
use of the conceptual tools in detail. 
 
 




Although the examination of themes and the use of conceptual tools according to different 
categories provided me with some confidence about the appropriate use of conceptual tools 
to interpret the data, I also needed to think about how to synthesise different analysis to 
answer the research questions and figure out how to present such a messy innovation process 
to people who are not familiar with OPHC and who are not technology experts. It required 
me to think of a forest rather than a wood. So, in the third writing stage, I arranged the six 
analysis categories into three chapters. The first chapter drew on the analysis of the history 
of OPHC and some data from the performative role of the vision. Together they helped to 
answer the question how did OPHC emerge in Harbour City? I put the category OPHC 
infrastructure, the Data Dome and the Citizen Sensing into one chapter. They show different 
aspects of how OPHC was rolled out in reality. In the last Chapter, I drew on analysis in the 
Harbour City to Delta City communication and the performative role of vision to discuss a 
phenomenon in the innovation process; diffusion. These three chapters together answered 
research question 1: what is the innovation process of a local smart city project? Within the 
three chapters, I also stressed the roles of vision and citizens in the innovation process to 
answer the second and third research question which focus on exploring the roles of vision 
and citizens in the innovation processes. This stage of writing aimed to make sure that the 
codes, themes, and conceptual tools were linked with each other to reveal the innovation 
process of OPHC. It was also a process of crafting and getting rid of unnecessary narratives 
and analysis. For example, I found the theme of intermediary actors in the diffusion of 
OPHC. I did some analysis around it in the original writing, but during the third writing 
process, I realised that I did not have enough data to trace intermediary actors’ effect in the 
OPHC innovation process. So, I decided to delete the analysis, put any relevant data in the 
appendix, and set aside this theme for future research. However, on reflection, one drawback 
of writing throughout the data collection and analysis process was that it did not always allow 
me to keep proper distance from the data. I noticed this in the late stage of writing where I 
had more distance with the field. I started to realise I was sometimes too focused on exploring 
details and this blinded me to the bigger picture or larger patterns.  
 
3.5 Ethical considerations 
 
The value of ethnographic research lies in producing knowledge, but this does not mean that 
other values should be ignored during research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). It is a 




On the other hand, they should also consider the people whom they study. Ethnographers 
often find themselves standing at a crossroads trying to make decisions which satisfy both 
the demands of the research and morality (Fetterman, 1998). Ethics considerations pervade 
every stage of ethnographic research, ranging from negotiating access to the write-up phase. 
I was aware of ethical issues all the way through the research. Below, I address several key 
ethical considerations and decisions of this research. 
 
3.5.1 Informed consent 
 
Researchers should gain meaningful consents from participants. The informed consent in 
this research mainly involved consent for conducting participant observation and interviews. 
Since the fieldwork consisted of participant observation in a series of public and private 
events and formal and informal interviews, I used both of formal and informal consent for 
this research.  
 
Before beginning fieldwork, following the BERA ethical guidelines, I thought through the 
ethical issues that might arise during this research and designed two documents. One 
document was an information sheet to tell participants enough information about the research 
and what it would mean for them to agree to participate to this research. The other document 
was a consent form. This document further ensured that participants understood their rights 
and how their data would be used in the research. Both documents received approval from 
the ethical committee of my department (see both documents in appendix 7). I used both 
documents to gain formal consent during participant observations and formal interviews.  
 
For participant observation, there were four main key sites. In general, there were two types 
of events: private events (accessible only to a small group of people) and public events 
(accessible to anyone). Private events are limited to small numbers of people so in these 
cases I gained not only the gate keepers’ consent, but also the written consent of the other 
participants. It is much more difficult to gain full consent for public events as it is impossible 
to control people who come into the field, but I still tried my best to gain as many people’s 
consent as possible. There are several ways that I use to gain consent at public events. For 
registered events, I informed event organisers of my research purpose by filling online 
registration forms. Organisers often checked who was going to come beforehand and knew 




events require people to introduce themselves at the beginning of the event, and I normally 
took the chance to ask for consent. Sometimes, I would introduce myself and my research to 
people that I met in the field. As for incidental data arising from fieldwork, I would 
immediately gain people’s oral consent. In some cases, they even signed the consent form 
afterwards and send it back to me by email.  
 
In formal interviews, I would start by introducing the purpose of research. Following this I 
would provide time for interviewees to read the information sheet, ask questions, and sign 
the consent form. I would also ask their permission to record interview. It is worth noting 
that, consent for a long-term research can be difficult because people might forget you are 
researching them (O’Reilly, 2005). The best I could do was to reconfirm consent with 
participants. For both formal interviews and observations at private events, participants were 
required to sign the consent forms as a sign that they understand the information provided 
and were willing to participate in the research. I kept a good record of ethical negotiations. 
Any documents with the personal details were kept separately from the data in a locked 
cabinet. 
 
3.5.2 The issues of exploitation, over-rapport, and withdrawal 
 
During the ethnographic research process, there were many ethical issues and below I 
address three main issues. The first is the concern of exploitation. Ethnographers are often 
challenged on this because people supply information to researchers, but researchers give 
little in return (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Therefore, researchers are recommended 
to give something back as a demonstration that the ethnographer is not an exploitative 
interloper, but has something to offer (Lassiter, 2005). Researchers can balance this through 
asking themselves what participants can benefit from the research and how their needs can 
be served. For this research, I can give back in two ways. First, the outcome of this research 
will make practical intellectual contributions to local smart city innovation. It can provide 
local innovators with a holistic view of the innovation process and inform them about what 
can be improved. Second, during the data collection, I balanced the exploitation issue by 
providing volunteer services for participants. For example, in the entire Harbour City to 
Delta City programme, I provided Harbour City participants with assistance and advice, such 
as translation and assisting with delegation visits. While in interviews, I often provided 




As the research progressed, the services I did in the field not only fulfilled the need to give 
something in return, but also helped me to win people’s trust and built up a good reputation. 
Since Harbour City is not a big place and social networks in the City are interconnected, the 
trust established in one site sometimes spread to other sites. Gradually, I became very well 
accepted by local communities; being enrolled onto people’s mailing list, being added as 
their Facebook friends, and being invited to different events as their guests. Sometimes, 
people even invited me for tea, suppers, and birthday parties. I decided to accept these offers, 
because I wanted to maintain a relationship of trust with my participants and consistency is 
the basis for human trust. I could not pretend to be their friend when I needed them and act 
as a stranger when I no longer needed them. That would hurt people’ feelings. Also, to attend 
those private activities deepened my thinking and helped me to understand my research 
context and the people within it better.  
 
However, this generated the second concern which was the danger of ‘over rapport’, of the 
researcher going completely native. As a result, researchers can lose their critical faculties 
and become ordinary members of field (Brewer, 2000: 60). In the whole research process, I 
am always trying to keep a balance between maintaining a distance with people and being 
truthful to people. At the beginning, I maintained a good distance with people but as project 
progressed, this became more and more difficult, especially, in the later stages of data 
collection. I realised that I started channelling in line with existing networks of friends and 
boundaries. The attempt to maintain distance even caused what Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007) calls the ‘marginal native’ stress symptom, that on the one hand, ethnographer resists 
over identification with the native and on the other hand, the ethnographer feels bad about 
the divided loyalties for native. I am glad that I became friends with actors at the late-stage 
of this research, otherwise I might not have stepped into the dangers of over-rapport but also 
have experienced more ‘marginal native’ stress symptoms. I felt much relief after I had 
finished data collection. 
 
Once good quality relationships are established in the field, it is not easy to cut them off. So, 
this leads to my third concern: withdrawal. Withdrawal from the field is not a straightforward 
matter. Gradual withdrawal is recommended by many researchers. Although I finished 
fieldwork, I still stayed in Harbour City for about a year to write up my thesis. This provide 
me with an advantage in gradually leaving the field. From early November 2016 onwards, I 




relationships that I had established with people. Most ethnographers retain friends and 
acquaintances from their periods of fieldwork, sometimes a long term (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007: 91). In my writing phase, I still maintained contact with many actors who 
were involved in my research. I have been invited to private activities, such as going to 
theatre, attending a Christmas dinner, participating in a charity cooking event, and going to 
see exhibitions together.  
 
3.5.3 Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
Finally, I will discuss the confidentiality and anonymity issues of this research. O’Reilly 
(2005) defines confidentiality as applying to anything the researcher hears. It can only be 
shared between participants and researchers. Researchers should respect the privacy of those 
they are researching. I have taken confidentiality seriously and maintained good practice all 
the way through the research. This is reflected in several aspects. First, I often gained very 
detailed descriptions of human interactions. For a while, I thought that I was the only person 
to see the bigger picture. Because people from different sites rarely knew what others were 
doing. A good side of this is that I was able to collect rich data. The critical side is that I 
heard many people’s “secrets” and what they plan to do in the future. Since those plans 
normally do not bring harm to other people, I decided that I would just quietly wait for things 
to happen and bring as little impact to the innovation process as possible. Second, as the 
research progressed, I gained acceptance into the community and this opened-up new levels 
of understanding of previously undisclosed symbols and knowledge. Sometimes, the 
information involved in how one organisation or person regarded another organisation or 
person. The delicate web of interrelationships in the local communities might be destroyed 
if I had revealed the real identity of people. So, I kept silent about those comments and 
allowed interviewees to switch-off the recording if they complained about someone. Third, 
the ‘smart city’ is an emerging hot research topic at the local University. During my research, 
many academic researchers and students in the Harbour City University emailed me and 
wanted to talk to me about my observations of OPHC. Although I received funding from the 
Harbour City University and should support research activities, in considering the privacy 
of my participants and the impacts my words could bring to OPHC, I decided to only 
communicate my observations to my participants. As for my supervisors, given they have 
responsibilities to guide this research, they could access my observations and I trust them to 




treat my return on their investment as a long-term thing, rather than short-term thing. The 
best way I can show my gratitude to my funder is to produce a good piece of research. 
 
Ethnographic research rarely involves damaging consequences, but researchers should still 
carefully consider the likely effect on people who are involved in the research (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007). One concern for me is the public dimension of this research, that this 
study is about real people and a project in a real city. The publicity of the research might 
potentially damage the reputation of persons, institutions, or locations. It might also hurt the 
feelings of people who involved. Nespor (2013) faces a similar problem. He acknowledges 
the difficulties of providing full anonymity in community research because it is easy for 
people to figure out where the place is. His strategy was to reveal the real name of city or 
place and anonymise the names of the streets, parents, teachers, and principals. He also 
altered information that might have identified them. He further points out that the research 
only focuses on a certain period of time. People and situations in his research had changed 
since he finished his study. But, stories are still valuable in the research because they allow 
readers to generate questions about their own experiences (Ibid: xix-xx). 
 
I am using Nespor’s (2013) strategy to deal with anonymity. I reveal the real name of the 
city and anonymise all the institutions and people. I have applied some techniques to disguise 
the identity of people and institutions. For example, I use pseudonyms to anonymise real 
names of participants and institutions. Sometimes, I have mixed the use of the title of the 
person and pseudonyms of the same person in the writing. For example, I use a member of 
the Data Dome team rather than refer to the pseudonym of the person. This provides readers 
with enough information about the sources as well as protecting the real identity of the 
person. I also evaluate levels of risk to reputation. I noticed only a few participants that could 
be easily identified even if I concealed their real name. So, during writing, I was mindful 
about every instance when I referenced these individuals. I had to justify whether the 
information was sufficiently important to justify revealing the identity of the individual, or 
attempt to find another resource for the same information. For example, in order to show 
readers how the spokesman of OPHC provided the rationale to the vision of OPHC, I needed 
some quotations from the speaker. Initially, I chose a quotation from an online video source. 
However, I very quickly realised that if I used the video source, I would have to cite the URL 
of the video. This would reveal the identity of the speaker. So, I searched for a similar 








Ethnographic research often faces the charge of what extent the outcomes of ethnographic 
research claim to represent an independent social reality (Hammersley, 1992). Like much 
qualitative research, ethnography does not match these positivist cannons (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). From a constructivist perspective, ethnographic data is constructed in and 
through the process of analysis and the writing of the ethnographer. In other words, the 
ethnographic work is a product of participation in the field, rather than a representation of 
what they describe (Clifford, 1988; Hammersley, 1992). From the 1960s onwards, two trends 
emerge; feminism and postmodernism attempt to address the crisis of representation. They 
call into question the hegemony of Western situated knowledge and the power relationship 
between the researcher and the researched (O’Reilly, 2005; Lassiter, 2014). For some, 
ethnographic research is no longer trustworthy, while others start to embrace the “reflexive 
turn” (O’Reilly, 2005). Reflexivity could be broadly defined as turning back to oneself. It is 
a process of self-reference (Davies, 2008: 4). It refers to the way in which the products of 
research are affected by researcher herself/himself and the process of doing research. The 
“reflexive turn” requires ethnographers to acknowledge that they are part of the world and 
think critically about how their subjectivity affects their reading, interpretation, and writing. 
In other word, ethnographers cannot escape the social world in order to study it and they can 
never truly be objective due to their personal experiences, theoretical framework, 
subconscious political/ideological agendas and even their sensory bias (Pink, 2009).  They 
might influence the research at different levels, ranging from the choice of topic to the 
interpretation of data (O’Reilly, 2005; Lassiter, 2014). As feminist writers famously argue, 
“a view from nowhere was always a view from somewhere” (O’Reilly, 2005: 211). But this 
does not mean we should abandon our research or find a way to completely eliminate the 
effect of researchers. Rather, we should be honest and acknowledge our vulnerability 
(Lassiter, 2005), embracing the ethnographic experience critically and opening ourselves to 
try to understand how this experience works and affects our research. In line with the 
“reflexive turn”, I kept a reflexive diary during the research process. In this journal, I 
constantly logged my reflections. Due to the word limit, it has been impossible to talk 
through them all. Below, I briefly reflect how I influenced the sampling, data collection, data 




Apart from my Chinese identity that I mentioned earlier, the sampling process of this 
research was also influenced by my personal interest in studying radical technologies. For 
example, I have always been fascinated by technological innovations that bring huge change 
to society, such as electric lighting systems, telegraphy, trains. When I read that OPHC has 
an ambition to revolutionise the current communications network regime through deploying 
a city-scale SDN solution, I was excited because it reminded me of the story of Thomas Alva 
Edison who sought to introduce an electrical illumination system to replace gas and oil-based 
lighting in 1878. My intuition told me that OPHC would be an exciting case to look at and I 
thought that I might stand in a historical vantage point to witness history in the making and 
the project’s rises and falls.  
 
I impacted the data collection process in several ways. First, my belief system influenced the 
way I interacted with people when collecting data. As a Zen practitioner, I tried to treat 
people equally despite their secular social status or class. I think this practice brings me some 
advantages because I am not affected by British class/status. For example, I do not have a 
process of evaluating people’s class before approaching them for interviews. I did not realise 
this until I conducted an informal interview with a British participant in the field. He told me 
that “you will be able to ask me for an interview because you are a middle-class professional. 
My neighbours (Asian working class) do not even dare to borrow a screwdriver from me” 
(Research Diary, July 2016). It was a shocking moment in the fieldwork because I do not 
know which class I sit in and he projected a certain British class on to me. I asked him for 
an interview purely based on my judgement that he might provide some useful data. Second, 
I am an ‘outsider’ to Harbour City and British culture. This ‘outsider’ role brings me some 
advantages. For example, people are more open and patient in explaining things to me.  
 
I also influenced the data analysis. First, my cultural background influenced some of my data 
interpretation, in the sense that I was not be able to spot certain things which I take for 
granted in my own cultural context. For example, I grew up in a country where 
infrastructures are owned and controlled by the government. So, this background made it 
difficult for me to understand why OPHC is only possible because the city council owns its 
fibre duct. That a local city council owns its fibre duct and makes it accessible to people is 
common sense in my mind. I did not realise how significant this was to the emergence of 
OPHC at the beginning. I heard people mentioning it once, twice, three times and I did not 




the importance of the fibre duct in OPHC. At that moment, I started to realise that I needed 
to re-evaluate my assumption. Second, my non-native English speaking background 
influenced the data analysis. For example, as a non-native English speaker, when I collect 
data, I tend to note down people’s words at face-value during fieldwork, and it takes me a 




This chapter following a conventional methodological chapter sequence. It provided the 
rationales and a detailed account of the many important choices that I made in relation to the 
research design and research process. It has explained why the ethnographic approach is 
suitable for the purposes of this research, and why OPHC is a good smart city case to look 
at. It has provided a detailed picture of the boundaries of this investigation. This mainly 
refers to where I went, whom I talked to, and what I collected. It has also illustrated the 
process of data collection, management, and analysis. The descriptions were supported by 
the photos, drawings, maps, tools that I produced in the process (e.g. Jenga). Finally, it has 
reflected the concerns that arose from the ethnographic processes, including key ethical 
issues and has been reflexive of the researcher’s own subjectivity. While talking about the 
data analysis, it has briefly addressed the iterative inductive process of selecting and 
configuring Transition Studies (socio-technical perspective) and the Sociology of 
Expectation as a theoretical framework for this research. I am going to expand on this by 










Theoretical framework  
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework for this research which draws on two 
interrelated intellectual school of thoughts: The socio-technical perspective of Transition 
Studies and the Sociology of Expectation. In order to provide readers with an overview of 
the main conceptual tools that have been used in this research, section 4.1 and section 4.2 
introduce the key conceptual tools from both approaches in their original context. It is worth 
noting that there are some detailed aspects of the conceptual tools that are difficult to explain 
without the empirical context, so, I briefly indicate some of them below and expand on this 
in the empirical chapters. At the end of this chapter, I highlight the strengths of using this 
theoretical framework to investigate the case of OPHC.  
 
4.1 The socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies 
 
I would like to start by introducing the social-technological perspective of Transition 
Studies. The social-technological perspective of Transition Studies is one school of 
Transition Studies. What is Transition Studies? Transition Studies was born in response to 
persistent problems in contemporary society, such as climate change, the loss of biodiversity, 
and the depletion of resources (e.g. oil, water, food) (Geels, 2011: 24). These problems are 
often expressed as crises. Transition Studies posits that these crises are generated through 
processes that are embedded in the social structure and they often reflect dominant patterns 
of socio-technological development which are difficult to resolve. So, in order to address 






only requires technological change but also an overall configuration of a system of elements, 
such as regulation, markets, user behaviour, and cultural meaning (Elzen et al., 2004; Geels, 
2011; Smith et al., 2005).  
 
Transition Studies is an umbrella term that holds the above attitude of socio-technical 
change. It has three ‘schools’ (Grin et al., 2010): socio-technical transition (Geels and Schot, 
2010), transition management (Loorbach and Rotmans, 2010), and governance perspective 
(Grin, 2010). Socio-technical transition is based on historical cases of already completed 
transition in areas such as transportation, energy and, sewer systems. Studies look at how 
technological artefacts were developed and diffused in society (Darnhofer, 2015). Famous 
examples include how sail boats were replaced by steamships (Geels, 2002) and how the 
automobile replaced the horse-drawn carriage (Geels, 2005b). Through analysis of these 
historical cases, researchers have built theories about how transition comes into being 
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2011; Twomey and Gaziulusoy, 2014; Darnhofer, 2015). Transition 
management and governance perspective represent more recent transition research. Both 
approaches aim to steer transition towards a more sustainable direction (Darnhofer, 2015; 
Lawhon and Murphy, 2011). The three transition approaches share some core conceptual 
notions, such as co-evolution, multi-level perspective, multi-phases perspective, and 
learning. Both the socio-technical transition and transition management approaches attempt 
to conceptualise the underlying transition patterns and mechanisms. They translate those 
conceptualisations into a more management approach to guide the innovation process, such 
as Strategic Niche Management (SNM) (Kemp et al., 1998; Raven and Geels, 2010) and 
Transition Management (TM) (Loorbach, 2007 and Loorbach, 2010). Considering the 
purpose of this research is to understand the innovation process of a local smart city project 
(OPHC) rather than steering the smart city innovation in a desirable direction. I identified 
the socio-technical transition approach as the most suitable for this objective among the 
three transition approaches. 
 
The socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies focuses on studying innovation 
processes that lead to a fundamental shift in a socio-technical system (Markard et al., 2012). 
It borrows insights from many distinct yet related disciplines, such as Science and 
Technology Studies, Evolutionary Economies, and Sociology (Lawhon and Murphy, 2011). 
Grin et al. (2010) summarise several key characteristics of socio-technical transition (Grin 




which require overall configuration of technology, policy, markets, cultural meaning, and so 
forth. This reflects a contextual way of understanding technology. It is inspired by Science 
and Technology Studies (STS). STS understands technology development as heterogeneous 
engineering (Law, 1987). It regards technological development as a process of creating 
linkages between heterogeneous elements. In other words, technology itself does not have 
power. It has power only if it aligns with human agency. Hughes (1987) coins the term 
‘seamless web’ to describe the combination of heterogeneous elements in achieving 
functionalities. In the same vein, Rip and Kemp (1989) define technology development as 
“configurations that work”. A “configuration” refers to the alignment of heterogenous 
elements and “that work” indicates that the alignments fulfil a function. Together the phrase 
means the alignment of heterogeneous elements that are stabilised to fulfil a function (Geels, 
2002). Second, socio-technical transition regards transition as a multi-actor process which 
involves interactions between different social groups with different interests, capabilities and 
roles, such as scientific communities, businesses, policy makers, and special interest groups. 
Third, it regards transition as a radical transformation. This does not necessarily mean the 
speed of change, but it indicates the change from one social-technical configuration to 
another. Fourth, it regards transition as a long-term process which usually unfolds in the 
course of 20+ years (Coenen et al. 2010). The OPHC case fits the first three characteristics 
of the socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies, for example, it is a novel social-
technical configuration that involves multiple actors and has ambitions to bring transition 
change to current urban development and the communication network industry. However, 
due to time constraints, the research only observed the early transition process. This does not 
mean that the socio-technical transition approach is not suitable for this research. It still 
provides rich theoretical insights to understand the micro innovation process that were 
embedded in the broader and longer socio-technical context. Its analytic tool Multi-Level 
Perceptive (MLP) especially helps to analyse the structure that OPHC smart city innovation 
is imbedded in. Its analytic tool Strategic Niche Management (SNM) contributes to 
understanding the innovation process of OPHC in detail. At the time of writing, there were 
several examples of using MLP and SNM in studying smart cities projects. For example, 
Carvalho (2014) applied MLP and SNM to study the processes of two paradigmatic ‘smart 
city’ cases (Songdo and PlanIT Valley). Valdez et al., (2017) use SNM to study a smart 
transportation application called Motion Map in Milton Keynes (UK). Below, I introduce 
the analytical tools of Multi-level perspective (MLP) and Strategic Niche Management 




4.1.1 Multi-level perspective (MLP) 
 
(1) The intellectual sources of the MLP 
 
Multi-level perspective (MLP) is the core of socio-technical Transition Studies. It originated 
with a group of researchers who sought to bridge Science and Technology Studies (STS) and 
Evolutionary Economics (EE) (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Schot, 1998; Geels, 2005a). It 
combines concepts from Evolutionary Economics (niche, regime, speciation, path 
dependence), Science and Technology Studies, Structural Theory, and Neo-Institutional 
Theory (structure is both context and outcome of actions). Although they have different 
roots, their understanding of the process of technological change are very similar (Grin, 
2010: 30).  
 
MLP creatively assembles the best elements from four sources into a coherent framework 
and avoids the weaknesses of each approach. For example, MLP takes from STS its 
sensibilities of paying attention to complexity, fluidity, alignment, linkages, contingency, 
and agency in technological change. Informed by ANT’s concept of heterogeneous 
engineering, each level of MLP is regarded as a heterogeneous socio-technical 
configuration. However, ANT has its weaknesses. One issue is that it is overly focused on a 
heroic storyline, which neglects the wider structure that an innovation is embedded in (Grin, 
2010: 33). For example, Callon’s classic electronic car case, follows how different actors 
work together to produce an electronic car. When things go wrong, actors just create new 
alignments. This approach neglects other elements in the innovation process, such as 
expectations, learning, experimentation, and so on. Another issue of STS or ANT is that they 
focus on studying short term topics and neglect long term patterns and macro-dynamics. 
MLP incorporates Evolutionary Economics to address some of STS’s weaknesses. For 
example, Evolutionary Economics provides useful insights in explaining macro topics 
because it regards innovation as an interaction between species and its selection 
environment. Its concept technological regime can also complement STS by providing more 
structural embeddedness of actors. Influenced by Evolutionary Economics, MLP suggests 
alignment between levels have evolutionary characteristics. Niches are places to generate 
radical novelty (variation). Radical innovation often emerges outside existing regimes and 
needs a protected space (niche). The selection and diffusion of innovation depends on its 
alignment with regime and landscape (Grin et al., 2010). MLP also incorporates Structural 




conceptualising the structural embeddedness of actors. It contributes to differentiation at 
each level of MLP according to its stability and size. For example, at the niche level, a social 
network is small and unstable. While at the social-technical level, the social network is larger 
and heterogeneous elements (e.g. artefacts, regulations, markets, and infrastructure) are 
configured into a more stable structure. It also enriches Evolutionary Economics’ concept of 
regime by expanding the dimension of regime beyond a merely technological angle.  
 
(2) The three analytic levels of MLP 
 
MLP consists of three analytical levels: the niche (the locus of radical innovations), the 
socio-technical regime (existing practices and rules), and the social-technical landscape 
(Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002; Geels, 2011). The three levels are analytic concepts 
rather than essential categories (Lawhon and Murphy, 2011). They are based on the 
assumption that alignment within levels and between levels will produce transition. The 
relationship between the three levels can be understood as nested hierarchy. Geels (2002) 
illustrates this nested hierarchy in Figure 13.  
 
The meso-level of the hierarchy is socio-technical regimes7. Regime contains three types of 
rules: cognitive, regulative and normative (Geels, 2005). Examples of cognitive rules are 
belief systems, agendas, and search heuristics. Examples of regulative rules are standards, 
laws, and regulations. Examples of normative rules are values and behavioural norms. The 
rules of the social-technical regime account for the stability and lock-in of a socio-technical 
system. Therefore, the existing socio-technological regime is stable. Innovation occurs in an 
incremental nature which leads to cumulative technological trajectories (Grin et al., 2010). 
The trajectory is not only restricted to the technological aspect alone, but also refers to other 
aspects, such as science, politics, markets, user preference, and cultural meanings. These 
different dimensions are regarded as different dimensions of regimes which have the 
potential to create tension within the existing regime.  
 
The micro-level is formed by socio-technological niches, a protected space where novelty 
can emerge and grow. Niches are considered crucial for Transition Studies. This is because 
novelties are often quite crude in the early stage, so they need protected spaces (niches) to 
                                                     
7 The concept socio-technical regime is built upon the concept of technological regimes, but it is broader 




shield them from mainstream market selections. A network of actors (e.g. entrepreneurs, 
start-ups, spin-offs) dedicatedly invest their resources in new technologies. Technological 
niches are carried out by experimental projects which are exposed to the selection 
environment gradually. Actors who work on radical innovations hope their novelties will 
replace the existing regime one day. Niches provide spaces for learning. Innovators not only 
learn about the technological aspects of an innovation, but also other aspects such as user 
preferences, production systems, and symbolic meanings. Niches also provide a space for 
innovators to build social networks to support innovations (Geels, 2005). The creation and 
enactment of niches is explicitly addressed in the Strategic Niche Management (SNM) 
literature which I will expand on later.  
 
The macro-level is formed by the socio-technical landscape. The socio-technical landscape 
is a long-term exogenous trend that influences regimes and niches, such as demographic 
trends, climate change, urbanisation. The metaphor of landscape is chosen due to its 
connotation of “hardness” and “materiality” in the context of society (Geels, 2002). Socio-
technical landscape is an external context of regime and niche. It goes beyond the direct 
influence of the individual and cannot change in the short run (Geels, 2005). However, there 
are two types of change at landscape level. One is slow change such as cultural or 
demographic change. The other is more rapid, even shock change, such as oil prices changes 
or economic depression.  
 
 





(3) Mechanisms of MLP transition  
 
MLP regards transition as a result of ongoing interaction and co-evolution between the three 
levels. Transition is not a linear process and there is not a simple force that drives the 
transition. Each transition is different, but there are some general patterns; a) internal 
momentum builds up in a niche. b) changes at landscape level create pressures on regime. 
c) destabilisation of regime creates windows of opportunity for niche innovations (Geels, 
2011: 29). Geels (2002) made a representation of this ideal transition (shown in Figure 14) 
which has somewhat become the standard picture of this dynamic. As we can see in Figure 
14, there are many small arrows at niche level which go in different directions. They 
represent novelties emerging in the niche in the context of existing regime and landscape 
because novelties are not stable at the beginning of an innovation. They may compete with 
other designs and innovators have to figure out the best design through experiment. Although 
a novelty is promising, it will remain in a niche for a while. There are several reasons. First, 
it takes time to troubleshoot (Grin et al, 2010). Second, radical innovation may be a mismatch 
with the existing regime, such as infrastructure, policies, and user experience. Third, the 
existing regime might be explicitly against the novel innovation. In this case, the niche 
innovation will find it hard to have a breakthrough as long as the regime remains stable.  
 
 




New technology gradually improves as a result of a learning process. For example, it might 
stabilise in terms of design and articulated user experiences. As we can see in Figure 14, 
Geels uses longer and fatter arrows to represent stabilised novelties. The wider breakthrough 
of the niche innovation depends on changes at the landscape level. But, changes at landscape 
level usually happen slowly. Geels (2002) uses fat long arrows (Figure 14) to illustrate the 
stability at landscape level. The landscape might create pressures and tensions to the existing 
regime (vertical dotted arrows). This may result in a window of opportunity for the niche 
innovation. In the end, the niche innovation might diffuse to the market and succeed over 
the competition. This might eventually lead to wider socio-technological regime change.   
 
(4) Criticisms of MLP 
 
There are some criticisms of the multi-level perspective of the socio-technical transition. 
First, geographers criticise MLP for its lack of sensitivity of spatialities, scales, and places. 
They argue that the three levels in MLP are not geographic levels. Current MLP assumes 
that country and nation are the key context in which niche and regime are situated. However, 
this way of thinking lacks understanding of how local conditions contribute to the emergence 
of a particular innovation. In response to this criticism, some scholars are seeking to develop 
a second generation MLP called the multi-scalar MLP perspective. For example, Raven et 
al.(2012) have explored Multi-level perspective at spatial level. Coenen et al. (2012) have 
studied the geographic unevenness of transition processes. Senger and Raven (2015) have 
traced how Rapid Bus Transit has spread from South America to Bangkok. In relation to the 
role of the city in MLP, Huston and Marvin (2009) have explored the role of city and region 
in the socio-technical transition. Lawhon and Murphy (2011) have argued that there are 
many transition case studies conducted in a European context (e.g. Netherlands) and there is 
a need to include more cases from global south. I will elaborate on the lack of spatialities in 
the next section. Second, MLP is criticised because of the lack of agency in transition. Smith 
et al. (2005) have argued MLP is too descriptive and structural which leaves little room for 
studying agency. In response to this, Geels (2011) has argued that although MLP does not 
explicitly show agency, the alignments at each level and trajectory are actually always 
enacted by social groups. It accommodates agency such as bonded rationality and 
interpretive activities. However, it is true that other types of agency (e.g. power struggle) are 
less developed in MLP. There have been some attempts to incorporate other types of agency 




Elzen et al., 2004; Geels and Verhees, 2011). Third, the bottom up change model of MLP 
has been criticised for bias because it tends to believe that regime change begins with niches. 
To counter this bias, Geels and Schot (2007) identified four transition pathways. Since this 
research only focuses on the earlier transition phase, I will not go into detail about this. For 
more on this, please see Grin et al. (2010). 
 
4.1.2 Strategic Niche Management (SNM) 
 
MLP conceptualises the underlying patterns of transition and those conceptions are 
translated into the management approach: Strategic Niche Management (SNM). The term 
SNM was first labelled by Rip (Schot, 1992). It was later adopted by Schot et al. (1994) and 
Kemp et al. (1998). The birth of SNM started from the questions: “why do many promising 
sustainable technology innovations always end up in R&D Laboratories or as demonstration 
projections? Why it is so difficult for them to move to the market or spread widely in real 
life?” SNM was created to answer these questions. The core assumption of SNM is that a 
sustainable innovation journey can be facilitated through creating a technological niche. A 
technological niche is a protected space to allow the nurture and experiment with co-
evolution of technology, user practices, and regulatory structures (Schot and Geel, 2008: 
538).  
 
The technological niche often involves policy makers. They subsidise niches to develop ‘not-
yet’ profitable technology because they believe niche innovations can become important for 
society in the future. However, this does not mean SNM is created by government in a top-
down approach. Instead, it emerges through collective enactment or what SNM scholars call 
“steering from within” (Grin et al., 2010: 80). People who steer SNM do not necessarily have 
to be policy makers, they can also be users and others societal groups. The steering process 
can fulfil many development goals. For example, it can expand the social network of the 
innovation. It can fulfil specific learning. It can also carry out a series of demonstration 
projects to find a desirable pathway. Below, I review three aspects of SNM which are 
considered relevant to this research.  
 
(1) Three niche internal processes 
 
Early SNM research believed that novel innovation needed to be developed in a protected 




through a niche development process. This process might eventually transform or replace 
the dominant technologies in the existing regime. In response to the question, how does the 
process happen in reality? Kemp et al. (1998) and Schot and Geels (2008) drew on insights 
from STS, Evolutionary Economics, and the history of technology, to develop three niche 
mechanisms that contribute to successfully developing a niche: (a) articulation of 
expectations/visions, (b) building social networks, and (c) learning.  
 
a) The articulation of expectations/visions is considered as a crucial mechanism for niche 
development, especially in the earlier stage of an innovation where nothing is solid. 
The articulation of expectations can nurture niche development through attracting 
attention and resources. It also provides direction for learning and research. Hoogma 
et al. (2002) argue that if visions are robust (shared by many people) or they are high 
quality (manifested in an ongoing project), this will make the vision easier to articulate. 
Schot and Geels (2008) have argued that the proposed expectation should leave a 
certain degree of interpretation flexibility (See more in Chapter 7) for people. If the 
expectation is too general, it will lose its function of guidance. It is too narrow, it will 
not encourage people to participate. The Sociology of Expectation has also studied the 
articulation of expectation as part of its argument that vision is performative (see more 
in the next section). SOE highlights some elements that affect the articulation of 
expectation. For example, Van Lente (1993) argued that the articulation of expectation 
through words should not contradict readable actions (See more in Chapter 6). 
Otherwise, it will affect the articulation of expectation. Konrad (2006) studied private 
expectation and collective expectation, and has argued that collective expectation 
sometimes causes image pressure (See more in Chapter 6) for people to take up an 
expectation which they have no specific interest in. Berkhout (2006) found visions of 
future tend to be moralised and might make people buy-in. I expand on both these 
insights in Chapter 6.  
 
b) Building social networks around new technology is considered another important 
mechanism for niche development. It can facilitate interactions between different 
stakeholders and attract necessary resources (money, people, skills) around new 
technologies. The quality of social networks will influence niche development. Broad 
social networks which involve many stakeholders and views will enhance the 




represent their organisations can also be beneficial for niche development. Because 
those actors can mobilise commitments and resources in their organisations. 
 
c) Learning is another key element for niche development. It can happen in multiple 
dimensions, including the areas of techniques, markets, user preferences, cultural and 
symbolic meanings, infrastructures, industries, regulations, societal and environmental 
impacts (Hoogma, 2000; Schot and Geels, 2008: 540; Raven, 2005). Hoogma (2000: 
58) further distinguishes between first-order learning and second-order learning. 
First-order learning refers to accumulated facts and data to verify pre-established 
goals. While second-order learning indicates learning that changes the initial cognitive 
frames and underlying assumptions.  
 
The three niche internal process hypotheses have been tested through an EU project and 
three PhD theses (Hoogma, 2000; Van Mierlo, 2002, and Raven, 2005). The three niche 
internal processes have been applied to cases to explain the success or failure of a project 
(Schot and Geels, 2008). The empirical cases have generated many recurring findings. For 
example, many demonstration projects tend to have a narrow social network and are overly 
focused on first-order learning. In those projects, users have often been regarded as 
consumers with pre-assumed needs. This is reflected in the way that most of the 
demonstration projects have sought to discover the mismatch between technological features 
and assumed needs. Some of those findings have also identified shortcomings of SNM. For 
instance, many demonstration projects have focused overly on experiment with 
technologies. The involvement of outside actors and secondary order learning never 
happens easily. 
 
(2) Local niche and Global niche 
 
The niche internal process established earlier thinking about how novelty moves from a 
technological niche to the market, and eventually changes the regime. The idea is that a niche 
is a protected space that can help the novelty to develop. Niche internal processes help the 
novelty to build up a protected space to experiment, learn, and mature. When the novelty is 
ready to be exposed to a harsher environment, innovators gradually reduce the protection. 
Then, the novelty is expected to replace the old regime. Raven (2005) and Van Mierlo (2002) 




niche is not merely characterised by protection, but also by locality and instability. The core 
of their argument is that a niche development can be understood as a process at two levels 
(the local and global level) simultaneously. Geels and Raven (2006) illustrate the distinction 
between the local and global level in Figure 15. As we can see from figure, there is a network 
of actors who carry out several projects at the local level. While at the global level, there are 
emerging stabilised rules. The separation between local niche and global niche was inspired 
by Actor-Network Theory. ANT theorists had made the distinction between local and global 
networks (Law and Callon, 1992). For them, the local network refers to heterogeneous 
human and non-human actors that are related to the project. Whilst the global network are 
actors who hold a certain distance to the project but could provide resources, finances, 
workforce, and technical support to the project. Geels and Raven (2006) rephrase the 
definition of local and global networks. They argue that local actors are people directly 
involved in a project, while global actors refer to an emerging field of community. 
 
 
Figure 15. Local niche level and global niche level (Adopted from Geels and Raven, 2006: 
378) 
 
Geels and Raven (2006) develop the parallel local and global niche development model in 
Figure 16. As the figure shows, there are many concrete projects that happen at the same 
time at a local level when an innovation is in the early stage. Place specific actor networks 
generate place specific knowledge. They are carried by local actors and networks for local 
or idiosyncratic reasons. At a global level, the cognitive rules at this stage are diffuse and 
unstable. So, Geels and Raven (2006) use dotted lines to represent the unstable nature of 
rules in the figure. As time goes by, projects at local level build on each other for a sequence 




local lessons distil and contribute to stable rule formation at the global level. Eventually a 
sequence of local projects adds up to a technical trajectory at the global level. The cognitive 
rules at the global level become more articulated, specific, and stable. The separation 
between local niche and global niche bring new insights in niche development. It shifts our 
attention from looking at the success and failure of a particular project to looking at a series 
of projects. It also shows how a sequence of projects contributes to shared rules at the global 
level.   
 
 
Figure 16. Emerging technical trajectory carried by local projects (Adopted from Geels and 
Raven, 2006: 379) 
 
The formation and stabilisation of the global niche is a process of accumulating local 
knowledge. Deuten (2003) and Geels and Raven (2006) regard this as a process of 
aggregation. What is aggregation? According to Geels and Deuten (2006: 266-267), 
aggregation is “a process of transforming local knowledge into robust knowledge, which is 
sufficiently general, abstracted and packaged, so that it is no longer tied to specific 
contexts”. This concept was originally generated from the question of “how knowledge can 
actually flow”. Deuten (2003) argues that local knowledge diffusion to a global scale is the 
first step for knowledge to flow. Lessons from local practices do not flow to other locations 
directly. Knowledge should be context-free before putting it into circulation (Geels and 
Deuten, 2006). This argument echoes lab studies which find that scientists in labs always 
want to find a way to make knowledge production in one lab work in another lab or outside 
the lab in a real-life context (Rouse, 1987; Latour, 2000). SNM scholars argue that lessons 




global niche level. The aggregation activities can help global actors to compare local 
practices and distil global generic lessons. There are several typical aggregation activities, 
including standardisations, codifications, model building, and the formation of best practices 
(Geels and Deuten, 2006: 267). Conferences, seminars, workshops, journals and news 
coverage, are regarded as infrastructures for aggregation. Those infrastructures are 
important for aggregating activities because they help to communicate and compare local 
practices.  
 
Actors in local niches often take up roles to promote aggregation. They aggregate local 
practices through presenting and attending conferences, workshops, and seminars.  Apart 
from niche actors, intermediary actors are another group of actors who aggregate local 
practices to the global level (Geels and Deuten, 2006). Intermediary actors are actors such 
as standardisation organisations, professional societies, industry associations, and firms. 
They monitor multiple local projects, perform the role of aggregation, and help to circulate 
local knowledge (Schot and Geels, 2008). Intermediary actors are considered important in 
aggregation processes because the knowledge production at the local level is a collective 
good. It might be used by people who are not involved in the production. Intermediary actors 
(e.g. standardisation organisation and industry association) can help to avoid free-riding. Van 
Lente et al. (2003) further argue that there is a new type of intermediary organisation which 
plays an important role in technological transition. They call it the systematic intermediary. 
The reason for this label is because traditional intermediary actors just work at a one-to-one 
level of interaction, while systematic intermediary actors work at a system or network level. 
According to Van Lente et al. (2003), systematic intermediary actors include knowledge 
intensive business services, research and technology organisations, industry associations, 
chambers of commerce, innovation centres, and university liaison offices. They broker 
relations between different parties.   
 
(3) The spatial dimension of the niche  
 
Going beyond the local and global niche models, geographers argue that the model lacks a 
proper dimension of space (Sengers and Raven, 2015). The words “local” and “global” 
would seem to have spatial connections, but in fact they have a narrow understanding of 
space. For example, the niche can often be seen as a national or local entity. Sengers and 




advantages of adding the question “where” to SNM. First, it brings us more insights about 
why niches emerge in a particular place. As Raven et al., (2012: 67) argue that, “niche 
development is not determined only by the development of actor networks, expectations, and 
learning, but also by the specification of the place and uneven endowments and access to 
innovation capabilities and resources”. To provide examples for this argument, Sengers and 
Raven (2015) observed that niches are more likely to emerge in settings where the relational 
assets are needed for radical innovations. Second, to add a spatial dimension to the simple 
local and global niche model can help enrich our understanding about the global diffusion 
of niche innovations. At the moment, we have little knowledge about how local niche travel 
beyond territories and whether they have been successful or failed to entangle in place 
specific power relations, institutions, and infrastructures (Sengers and Raven, 2015: 168). A 
spatial niche development could provide us with insights about the process of how a global 
niche innovation can became embedded in a specific local context.  
 
There is some pioneering research in the area of niche spatial development (Coenen et al., 
2012) and Sengers and Raven, 2015). For example, Sengers and Raven (2015) reviewed 
three geography literatures to seek to understand how those literatures can enrich the 
understanding of core SNM processes. The first group of literature is around the “local buzz 
and global pipelines argument”. The idea is that vibrant information (buzz) interacts and 
exchanges at the local level. Actors with shared values in a local context build a “pipeline” 
to communicate and harness external knowledge. Coenen et al, (2012) argue that the “local 
buzz and global pipelines argument” contributes to understanding learning processes in 
niche spatial development. The exchange of codified knowledge and lessons requires actors 
to build communication channels. However, successful communication requires not only 
communication challenge, but also different levels of proximity. I will come back to this 
point later. The second group of literature is that of global production networks (GPN). This 
type of literature looks at economic globalisation and its development consequences in 
relation to specific production. Coenen et al, (2012) argue that GPN contributes to spatial 
niche development in terms of building social networks. They suggest treating actors as 
anchored in different institutions and geographical environments. Together they form 
networks of actors across the global. These linked networks are power geometries which 
shape the niche building. The third type of literature is that of policy mobilities. This 
emphasises the role of the city as an important global node for knowledge exchange. Coenen 




exchange process. They are the knowledge workers such as urban planners, travelling 
technocrats, architects, and global consultancies. “Transfer agents” are important for spatial 
niche development because they help to articulate niche expectations to another context. 
Therefore, Coenen et al. (2012) suggest researchers should follow niche actors in their 
travels and examine how the story is told in their discourses. 
 
These three geography literatures are complementary with each other, in a way they all 
consider local and global interaction, trying to understand local networks of actors, 
knowledge circulation and embedded processes. But, they have different areas of focus. The 
“local buzz and global pipelines” approach starts with one place and investigates how it is 
connected with its distribution place. While, the other two approaches are either focused on 
the international diffusion network or the diffusion agents. In order to analyse the diffusion 
process of OPHC, I focus on the “local buzz and global pipelines” approach because it helps 
to understand how a local niche diffuses to another niche (Chapter 7). Within this approach, 
Boschma’s (2005) concept of proximity has been adopted to understand niche development 
in the spatial sense. Coenen et al. (2010: 168) point out that the concept of proximity 
(Boscham, 2005) can specifically enrich the local and global niche model in relation to the 
questions of upscaling an innovation. The concept of proximity was coined by Boschma 
(2005) based on his study about the relationship between the local context and innovation 
process. He distinguished five different types of proximity: cognitive-, organisational-, 
social-, institutional-, and geographical- proximity. Cognitive proximity refers to shared 
knowledge that enables communication, understanding, absorption, and successfully 
processing new information. Organisational proximity means a set of interdependencies 
within and between organisations. Social proximity is socially embedded relations between 
agents at a micro-level. It often involves trust based friendship, kinship, and experience. 
Institutional proximity is about institutional rules of the game, a set of cultural habits and 
values shared by economic actors. Geographic proximity is defined as a spatial or physical 
distance between actors (Boschma, 2005). Boschma also explains in detail why too much 
and too little proximity is harmful for interactive learning and innovation. Coenen et al. 
(2010) take the proximity dimension in niche seriously and have conducted a case study 
about the Netherlands’s Aquifer Thermal Energy Storage. They integrated proximity in three 
niche internal processes (voicing expectation, building social networks, and learning). Their 
research has generated many interesting findings, for example, the articulation of 




facilitate the articulation process because it allows an interactive articulation process. But 
too strong local networks cause difficulties to upscaling experiments. Organisational 
proximity and social proximity are considered primarily relevant to building social networks. 
And too much social proximity might affect second-order learning.  
 
4.2 The Sociology of Expectation 
 
Vision and expectation have a role to play in a socio-technical innovation process, especially 
in the early stages of an innovation where imaginations often pre-exist before the reality. 
Transition Studies briefly addresses functions of vision. Especially in Strategic Niche 
Management (SNM) where it highlights the articulation of expectation as one of three niche 
internal processes. The role of expectation is supposed to guide the learning processes, attract 
attention, and provide protection for niches (Geels and Raven, 2006). However, Transition 
Studies’ understanding of expectation/vision is not enough to interpret the role of 
vision/expectation in the story of OPHC. Because it does not provide answers for how 
expectations in technological innovation are structured. How does vision/expectation 
influence the innovation process and how does vision influence various actors’ (e.g. 
businessmen, researchers, policy makers) decision making and agenda building?  
 
To complement Transition Studies’ insufficient understanding of the role of vision in an 
innovation process, I draw on conceptual tools from the Sociology of Expectation (SOE). 
SOE analyses expectations and their role in emerging science and technology. Van Lente is 
a pioneer in the field and he defines SOE as follows, “sociology of expectation studies how 
expectations in science and technology are structured, how they grow, gain dramatic 
attention or quietly disappear, and how this affects the decisions of engineers, businesses 
and governments” (Van Lente, 2012: 772). The Sociology of Expectation (SOE) builds upon 
a number approaches, including Sociology of Technology, science, history, economics, and 
Innovation Studies (Borup et al., 2006). SOE argues that future orientation plays a crucial 
role in science and technology innovation development. It mediates boundaries between 
different time, scale, communities, and levels. According to Budde (2015: 23), “sociology 
of expectation can be interpreted as a term summarizing several approaches dealing with 
the role of expectations in science and technology, emphasizing the role of expectations have 
for the guidance and coordination of different actor and actor groups”. The term expectation 




representations of future technological situations (Borup et al., 2006). SOE provides a wide 
range of research about vision/expectation in the innovation process. It is worth noting that 
Transition Studies and the Sociology of Expectation are not two independent literature 
resources. Both literatures are based on some shared theoretical roots, including Science and 
Technology Studies, Evolutionary Economics, and Innovation Studies (Budde, 2015: 18). 
Also, the understanding of expectation in the Strategic Niche Management are directly 
influenced by the Sociology of Expectation literatures. Below, I review the conceptual tools 
from SOE. They cover various aspects of expectation/vision which are considered useful for 
this research.  
 
4.2.1 The performative role of expectation 
 
Expectations are statements about the future. A central argument in the Sociology of 
Expectation is that expectations are not merely statements describing future realities, instead 
expectations are performative in nature: they do something (Michael, 2000). As Borup et al. 
(2006) argue “expectation is wishful enactments of a desirable future”. Below, I review 
several key concepts, mechanisms, and forces of the central argument that expectations are 
performative.  
 
(1) The Prospective Structure  
 
Van Lente and Rip (1998) contribute a key concept to the performative role of expectation 
which is prospective structure. They regard expectation of future as a ‘not-yet structure’ and 
this ‘not-yet structure’ has a similar influence as if it had materialised in the real world 
(Borup et al., 2006). To emphasise this, they coin the paradoxical term, prospective structure 
(Van Lente and Rip, 1998). According to their definition, “a prospective structure is made 
up of links which can appear in texts. In the subsequent actions and reactions, the structure 
is filled in, modified, reshuffled, and becomes social structure” (Van Lente and Rip, 1998: 
203). In another words, a structure can be merely prospective, but still be influential. 
 
In order to better understand this concept, it is necessary to briefly revisit key ideas behind 
the concept. First, this concept was born in the context of an attempt in sociology to 
overcome the dualism between agency and structure. There is a long-running debate between 
structure and agency in the field of sociology. Functionalism focuses on the importance of 




forgets the constraints of structure. Van Lente and Rip (1998), in line with a non-dualist 
approach, regard expectation as a mediator between actors and structure. They argue that 
instead of looking at the structure behind the actors, they prefer to focus on the structure that 
actors create before them. They call this future oriented structure, prospective structure. 
There is a dialectical relationship between actors and structure. Actors create and shape the 
prospective structure. In return, prospective structure provides orientation for actors (Budd 
et al., 2012). So, from this perspective, innovation is a result of a co-evolution of structure 
and agents, and expectation/vision is a factor that is mediated in this interaction process. 
 
This future orientated ‘not-yet structure’ is often expressed as stories, scenarios, or 
statements (Van Lente and Rip, 1998). Van Lente and Rip (1998) further argue that the ‘not-
yet structure’ (prospective structure) contains scripts which allocate roles for the innovator 
themselves, others, and (future) artefacts. The idea of scripts is based on the Sociology of 
Technology Studies, especially Actor-Network Theory. The idea is that technologists and 
innovators not only define the characteristics of their objects, but also the world associated 
with the objects. Callon (1987) prefers to call this type of technologist an ‘engineer-
sociologist’. He observes that designers and engineers do not just design the features of an 
object, but there are also endless debates about what the object will do. Where it will be used. 
Whether they notice themselves doing it or not. Callon (1987) argues that engineers 
transform themselves into sociologists, moralists, and political scientists at the moment when 
they are caught up in technical questions. So, in another words, when engineers or innovators 
produce a vision statement (prospective structure), they not only describe a technology, but 
the whole ecosystem around it. Akrich (1992) and Latour (1992) use the term script to 
describe the heterogenous elements described by ‘engineer-sociologist’. The word script 
seeks to capture the explicit and implicit messages that innovators prescribe to the artefact. 
Instead of using the term script, Callon (1986) prefers to call it ‘socio-technical scenarios’.  
As he describes in his classic case, Électricité de France (EDF), engineers not only design 
the technological aspects of the electric car (e.g. batteries, fuel cell) but also think about the 
economic and political elements associated with it (Schot et al., 1994).  
 
The ‘not-yet’ arrangements/storylines in the prospective structure are scripts made by 
‘engineer-sociologists’. They are not merely descriptive statements or fictions of the future. 
Instead, they are performative: they do something. The vision statements will have an effect 




which provides a mode of coordination for people and orients people to make efforts to 
realise the story (Van Lente, 2012). So, although the structure does not yet exist, it is still 
forceful due to the perceived implication of the projected future. Some actors might adopt 
the vision and actively take actions to shape the prospective structure. A new social order 
might emerge based on a sequence of actions and reactions (Ibid: 206). As Van Lente and 
Rip (1998) argue scripts are “forceful fiction” which “open up space for action” (Ibid: 225).  
It is worth noting, the order that emerges in reality might not be exactly as described in the 
prospective structure. This is because people may strategically take up a vision which 
follows their own interest (Berkhout, 2006). As a result, different actor groups articulate 
expectation according to their own interests and some of their expectations might conflict 
with each other (Budd et al., 2012). 
 
(2) The promise and requirement cycle 
 
Van Lente (1993) further explores the mechanism by which a prospective structure 
coordinates people’s actions to build up agendas and take up actions to shape the actual 
future. Based on analysis of three historical cases (Moore’s Law, Membrane technology, and 
HDTV), he proposed a promise and requirement cycle to describe the mechanism that 
translates promises described in vision statements into the required actions (Van Lente and 
Rip, 1998).  Figure 17 illustrates the process of the promise and requirement cycle. As we 
can see from the figure, an expectation of promising technology is voiced which can often 
be described as an opportunity (1 in Figure 17). The future performance of the technology 
is often presented as promises to attract attention (2 in Figure 17). The actors who have been 
scripted in the prospective structure are required to have some responses to the roles that are 
allocated to them. They might reject the role allocated for them and either protest against the 
role or against the nature of the expectation. If they accept the roles allocated for them, then 
they will start to share the expectation or as Van Lente (1993) says the “mutual positioning 
of the expectation”. Then, actors start to build an agenda. An agenda is a list of priorities 
that requires action (Van Lente and Bakker, 2010) (3 in Figure 17). Then, the expectation 
translates into more specific requirements, such as goals, technical specifications, and task 
divisions (4 in Figure 17). It takes time and many experiments for activities to meet the 
requirements (5b in Figure 17). This is where the important concept, niche, comes into being 
in the promise and requirement cycle. The niche provides a protected space to continue 




available to a protected space (niche) and hope concrete activities can take place for a certain 
period of time (Raven, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 17. Promise and requirement cycles (Adopted from Geels and Smit, 2000) 
 
 
(3) The forces of expectations 
 
The concept of prospective structure suggests that a ‘not-yet structure’ has the potential to 
mobilise resources and support to ‘fill in’ the structure. The concept, promise and 
requirement cycle, shows how the mechanism operates in reality. Van Lenten (2012) further 
summarises three key forces in relation to the performativity of expectation (Van Lente, 
2012).  
 
The first force of expectation is that it helps to gain attention and legitimise investment. A 
novel innovation often performs crudely in the early stages. This is why Mokyr (1990) calls 
novel innovations ‘hopeful monsters’.  The reason they are ‘hopeful’ is because they believe 
in certain promising futures. They are ‘monsters’ because they perform crudely and cannot 
compete with existing technologies. So, a novel innovation itself is not convincing enough 
to attract investment and support. Expectation has a role to play here. It can link the novel 
innovation to a promising future. This linkage helps to attract necessary allies and resources 




technology, so expectation is often regarded as protective of new technology. The novel 
innovation might have many failures before it actually delivers something in the future. Since 
it is associated with a promising future, it is still granted support even it remains at a stage 
of experiment or produces many negative results. Konrad (2006) specifically investigates 
the failures within the protected space. She argues that it is difficult to evaluate innovation 
results. As long as the collective expectation provides a protected space for the novel 
innovations, innovators can apply interpretation flexibility (see more in Chapter 7) to justify 
failures. For example, current failures will be interpreted as temporary. The next experiment 
will surely succeed (Ibid) (see more in Chapter 6).  
 
The second force of expectation is that it provides a search direction for a scientific or 
technological innovation. This is especially the case in a time that there are many pathways 
and uncertainties in front of technology developers. Innovators have many choices and do 
not know which way to go. The informal expectation circulated amongst technology 
developers might suggest some promising directions. Expectation in this situation can reduce 
the uncertainty that innovators feel and function as a heuristic device that can guide 
innovators to explore certain possible future technological development directions. 
 
The third force of expectation is coordination. Usually, we regard markets, hierarchies and 
network as models of the coordination in social life (Thompson et al., 1991). In an emerging 
technological development, there is often a lack of a central control. Van Lente (1993) and 
Konrad (2006) suggest that expectation or vision serves as a co-ordination device in the 
socio-technical innovation process. Technological development is not isolated work, instead 
it needs co-ordination from various actors, such as a network of companies, institutes, and 
actors. Innovators often choose certain tasks for themselves and assume other tasks will be 
taken up by others (Van Lente, 2012). As we can see in the mechanism of the promise and 
requirement cycle, an expectation can motivate heterogeneous actors to engage the 
promising technology. Van Lente and Rip (1998) have conducted historical case studies 
(Moore’s Law, Membrane technology, and HDTV) of the coordination mechanism. They 
have found two different coordination mechanisms. One type of coordination is more 
articulated. An extreme case of this type of coordination is Moore’s Law. Moore’s Law is a 
classic case of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The prophecy of Moore’s Law was fulfilled just 
because actors took up the prophecy and acted accordingly. In other words, the visionaries 




of coordination is more diffuse coordination. In the case of membrane technology, there is 
no problem as it requires a membrane technology to solve. Innovators of membrane 
technology announced a promising direction and built agendas gradually into the process. 
No matter in a more articulated situation or in a more diffused situation, the vision’s 
coordination function describes the force to coordinate heterogeneous actors took up actions 
and to co-evolve with structures.  
 
4.2.2 The hype and disappointment cycle 
 
Expectation is performative in nature. In the early stage of an innovation, a vision of a 
technology can often be inflated and exaggerated in order to raise profiles and attract 
alliances (Borup et al., 2006). Van Lente (1993) further notes that innovators often inflate a 
vision in order to establish themselves as a salient point in a field for others to look at and 
follow (see more in Chapter 7). The purpose of high and rising expectation is to help mobilise 
the future in the present. However, exaggerated expectation is a double-edged sword. When 
the promise of early, high and rising expectation is hard to materialise as foreseen and the 
eventual technological development is not as accurate as the expectation, the expectation 
proves to be an overshoot and a disillusionment. This can damage reputations and trust in a 
project (Brown, 2003).  
 
Sociology of Expectation scholars observe this temporal pattern of expectation over time; an 
emerging technology tends to start with high and rising expectations and this is likely 
followed by disappointment. The high and rising expectation could be regarded as hype. The 
word hype in public discourse often has the negative connotation; that it is deceptive and 
incorrectly exaggerated. However, Sociology of Expectation scholars are not interested in 
hype as accurate. Instead, they focus on how hype effects the activities in the present (Van 
Lente et al., 2013). They give a special name for this temporal pattern of expectation; the 
hype and disappointment cycle (Ibid). Actually, Sociology of Expectation scholars are not 
the only group of people who pay attention to the hype cycle. In the business world, Gartner 
Consultancy has produced a hype cycle to facilitate strategical investment decisions (Van 
Lente et al., 2013). Gartner’s hype cycle illustrates the ups and downs in socio-technical 
development. As we can see in Figure 18, the cycle consists of five phases: “technological 
trigger”, “expectation peak”, “trough of disillusionment”, “slope of enlightenment”, and 






Figure 18. Gartner Hype Cycle (cited from Wikipedia, licensed under common creative) 
 
However, Van Lente et al., (2013) argue that Gartner’s hype model is too neat. The Gartner 
model shows a linear way of understanding technology development. It does not consider 
that technologies might reconfigure over time. Also, the Garner hype cycle may be more 
accurate in an established industrial environment and less useful for an emerging technology. 
Brown and Michael (2003) and Brown (2003) suggest that hype patterns are influenced by 
characteristics of an emerging technology and the environment it is associated with, such as 
funding and actor structures. Van Lente et al., (2013) further explore the hype patterns. 
Drawing on Van Lente’s (1993) levels of expectations (see below), they further distinguish 
that hype can happen at three levels: the micro level (project level), meso level (field level), 
and macro level (social level). They compare the hype cycle of three cases (VoIP, gene 
therapy, and high-temperature superconductivity) and find that the hype cycles in these three 
cases resemble Gartner’s hype model. But they also found greater disappointment might be 
experienced after hype when expectation at project, field and social level are neatly aligned 
(Van Lente et al., 2013: 1626). So, they suggest that some degree of misalignment between 
levels might turn disappointment into a productive reconfiguration of expectation (Ibid). 
From another starting point, Ruef and Markard (2010) also distinguish expectations at three 
levels: the project level, technology level and social level, to study the effects of 
disappointment (Budde, 2015: 26). They find that disappointment at the project level tends 
not to have an effect on actors’ strategies, while failed expectations at the field level or social 




4.2.3 Levels of expectation 
 
As mentioned above, expectations have many levels. Van Lente (1993) identifies levels of 
expectations by investigating many historical innovation cases. Similar to the Multi-level 
perspective, he distinguishes three levels of expectation: micro expectation, meso 
expectation, and macro expectation. The expectation at the micro level is an expectation of 
a technology in focus. It is a specific technology expectation. While expectation at a meso 
level is more general than the specific capability of a single technology. Expectation at the 
meso level often has a function to provide the criteria for the selection of technology. At the 
macro level, expectations are more related to broader social development. Expectation at 
different levels have different functions. Expectation at the micro level is likely to be taken 
up by research groups or firms to guide local research directions (Budde et al., 2012). 
Expectations at the meso level point to general opportunities and directions in a field. 
Expectations at the macro level legitimate a technology and open up opportunities for 
promising technologies. They also provide a protected space for niche developments.  
 
Expectation at the macro level tends to influence the choice of technology at the meso and 
micro level. Van Lente (1993) uses the term macro agenda to capture clusters of 
expectations in relation to technology at a macro level. The original definition of a macro 
agenda can be traced back to Kingdon (1984: 3-4). He defined a macro agenda as “the list 
of subjects or problems to which (…) people (…) are paying some serious attention at any 
given time. (…) Out of the set of all conceivable subjects or problems to which official could 
be paying attention, they do in fact seriously attend to some rather than others. So, the 
agenda-setting process narrows this set of conceivable subjects to the set that actually 
becomes the focus of attention” (Van Lente, 1993: 166). Van Lente observed that technology 
might appear in a macro agenda in two ways. First, certain technologies are considered 
important for certain cultures at a certain time. Second, technology is a generic promise of 
progress. Van Lente finds that the macro agenda of technological progress is part of the 
Western industrialisation culture and there is a deep belief in technological progress in 
western society. In a similar vein, Geels and Smith (2000) claim that expectation may be 
biased by “a broader cultural concern of the time”. Their cultural lens colours people's idea 
about the future (Geels, and Smith, 2000: 8). A culture may have certain anxieties and hopes 
at a certain historical time. The anxiety and hope is reflected in their future expectations. The 








‘Smart cities’ is a subject with a growing literature, but there is no unified or best theoretical 
framework for this emerging phenomenon. The choice of theoretical framework should 
depend on the characteristics of the smart city project. Through the iterative-inductive 
process, I combined conceptual and analytical tools from the socio-technical perspective of 
Transition Studies and the Sociology of Expectation to form a theoretical framework for this 
research. Above, I have provided a detailed review of the key concepts of both approaches; 
MLP, SNM, the performative role of expectation, the hype and disappointment cycle, and 
the levels of expectations. This research is not the first case to use MLP and SNM to 
understand smart cities projects. See more in Carvalho (2014) and Valdez et al., (2017). 
However, it might be the first attempt to creatively assemble MLP, SNM with conceptual 
tools from the Sociology of Expectation to study a smart city project.  
 
This framework is useful for this research in three ways. First, it contributes to understanding 
the complex innovation processes of OPHC. It not only illustrates the alignment process, but 
also provides explanations to various other elements in the innovation process. Second, it 
provides conceptual tools to understand the broader structure that OPHC is embedded in and 
its spatial diffusion process. Third, it provides insights into the dynamic roles vision plays 
in the innovation process of OPHC. In the next three empirical chapters, readers will see 
how this framework is useful to shed light on OPHC’s emergence, implementation, and 



















Brian, the Director of the DOCK 
Camila, co-director of Straw House 
Chris, the Chief manager of OPHC from July 2014 to June 2016. 
Luke, the Manager of OPHC till 2014. 
Ruby, a civil servant from Harbour City Council. 
Richard, a civil servant from Harbour City Council. 
Susan, the Chief Technology Designer of OPHC. 




Institution & company 
 
Blue Arrow, a company in Harbour City who provide its wireless product to OPHC. 
BOX, a business incubator in Harbour City. 
CONTAINER, an incubator in the BOX. 
DCMS, Department of Culture, Media, and Sports 
DOCK, a creative digital centre in Harbour City. 
Gold Autumn, a U.S company who provide RF Mesh network solution to OPHC. 
Harbour City Council, a local city council of Harbour City. 
Harbour City University, a university in Harbour City. 
JEP, a multinational IT service provider. 
NEXT Lab, a high-performance network Lab in Harbour City University lead by Susan. 
Science Museum, a local science education centre in Harbour City  






Data Dome, the first application of OPHC & it aims to become an urban data visualisation device.  





Harbour City, A middle-size city located in England (UK). 
















The Emergence of the OPHC   
 
This chapter is the first empirical chapter of this thesis. It explores how the smart city project, 
Open Programmable Harbour City, came into being. The empirical data of this research 
relies on interviews, documents, and some participant observation to support this exploration. 
Section 5.1 talks about key episodes in the history of OPHC. The story is arranged in five 
sub-sections chronologically which are companied by a brief analysis. Section 5.2 draws on 
three key conceptual tools (configuration, multi-level perspective, and prospective structure) 
to analyse three key aspects that have contributed to the emergence of OPHC, including the 
unique local network of innovators; the dialectic interaction between actors and structure; 
and the retrospective and prospective function of vision. This chapter show readers a unique 
smart city birth story which is rare in any smart cities literature. OPHC was neither created 
in a vacuum, nor in a top-down manner. Instead, it is a configuration of people, artefacts, 
expectations that survived in the selection process at a niche level. 
 
5.1 The story of the emergence of OPHC 
 
5.1.1 The Digital Challenge (DC)  
 
There are multiple entry points to tell a story of the emergence of OPHC which depends on 
when and where we press the start button. I would like to begin with an event called Digital 
Challenge (DC) because the event contributed to establishing both human and non-human 
pre-conditions for the emergence of OPHC. DC was one of eight digital strategies that were 
launched by the UK government in 2005. It aimed to act as a catalyst to develop e-enabled 






Initially, Harbour City Council did not want to join the competition, however, several local 
activists did perceive the opportunities of joining the competition. They went to Harbour 
City Council and suggested that “Harbour City should become the best digital city in the 
UK” (Interview with Ruby, 19 May 2016). Their proposal was accepted by the Council. This 
was followed up by a series of community meetings which attracted the participation of 
nearly 500 organisations (The official bid document; Interview with Richard, 17 June 2016; 
Interview with Camila, 28 June 2016). 
 
Harbour City did not win the national DC award in the end, but this event contributed to the 
birth of OPHC in two ways. First, it contributed to the formation of a broad and deep 
innovator network in Harbour City. The network was broad because it involved a wide range 
of local stakeholders, such as, two local universities, Harbour City Council, a creative digital 
centre (DOCK), a community engagement organisation (Straw House), and hundreds of 
other organisations. The network was deep because it involved people who represented the 
organisations and could mobilise resources within their organisations (Schot and Geels, 
2008). Moreover, what was significant about this innovator network was that there was a 
sense of collaboration between people. Before DC, apart from some small-scale 
collaborations, people had tended to work alone in Harbour City. DC provided local 
innovators with a chance to have a level of collective conversation about technologies and 
local opportunities. As one participant said, “people used to work alone, but now they want 
to work together” (Interview with Camila, 30 June 2016). Even after the DC competition 
had finished, the core nodes remained and connections between people had been established. 
When new funding opportunities emerged, they naturally re-connected and ran competitions 
together. We can read more about this in the next section and will see how they became key 
drivers for OPHC. Another thing DC contributed to OPHC was a fibre network. During the 
competition, Harbour City Council’s digital asset fibre network H-Net was re-discovered. 
H-Net is a duct which was originally built for the radio service. Harbour City Council had 
purchased H-Net from a cable TV provider twelve-years before. Since then, Harbour City 
Council has refurbished and extended the network. The fibre optical cable was used to 
connect the council’s own buildings and support council business (e.g. the CCTV network 
and traffic signals). The re-discovery of H-Net was important for OPHC because it was one 
of the key material enabler for the idea of OPHC. Without a fibre network owned by the 





5.1.2 Creating and modifying a configuration in response to a national 
digital infrastructure competition  
 
(1) The initial configuration: Gigabit Harbour City 
 
Another important event happened in the history of OPHC a few years later (2010). A 
national competition called Super Connected Cities (SCC) was launched by the Department 
of Culture, Media, and Sports (DCMS). The competition set a goal to create superfast 
connectivity across the UK by 2015. To support this goal, £100M was offered to support ten 
UK cities to increase their broadband speed up to 100 megabits per second. As Ruby, a civil 
servant, recalls, “the minister has launched a project which is very ambitious. They said that 
we want all UK cities to have Singaporean level of connectivity. We are quite excited.” 
(Interview with Ruby, 19 May 2016) 
 
The “we” in Ruby’s interview refers to key innovators who came from different sectors in 
Harbour City, including Harbour City Council, the creative digital centre (DOCK), Harbour 
City University, and a community organisation (Straw House). They knew each other from 
the Digital Challenge competition. Although they had different motivations behind why they 
wanted to join the CC, one thing they had in common was that they found CC somewhat 
related to what they always do. For example, Brian, the director of the DOCK, noted the 
similarity between the CC and the high-speed broadband project that he was involved in 
1999. At that time, he had worked with Vincent, a computer scientist from the local 
University, to experiment with high-speed broadband. So, he regarded CC as a “natural next 
step” for the experiment in 1999 (Interview with Brian, 15 June 2016). While Camila, a co-
director of Straw House, regarded CC as an opportunity to tap the organisation’s digital 
inclusion expertise. This is because Straw House had rich experience in the area of using 
media to engage local communities and she wanted to bring this agenda to CC. As she stated, 
“we bring different voices (…). My challenge to the high-speed broadband is who will benefit 
from it? and how do people access it?” (Interview with Camila, 28 June 2016). 
 
In the end, innovators gathered at a weekend at the City Hall to draft the bid for the CC. 
They called this bid Gigabit Harbour City (Interview with Richard, 17 June 2016). The bid 
not only presented an alignment of the digital resources (e.g. H-Net) and human actors, but 




assumption of this expectation was, “providing people with free gigabit connectivity and 
they will come up with ideas about how to use it creatively” (Interview with Ruby, 19 May 
2016). There is a very interesting historical reference point for this assumption. It is the story 
of a Victorian engineer called Joseph Bazalgette. The interview with Ruby reveals how the 
connection between Gigabit Harbour City and the story of Bazalgette was made: 
 
Ruby: There is an engineering story around it [Gigabit Harbour City]. 
When the Victorians developed London, there was a famous 
engineer called   Bazalgette. He built a sewage and water system in 
London that was a hundred times bigger than London needed at that 
time, and because he built it so big, then you can have more and 
more people using the water and sewers. Our argument is that you 
need to do the same thing with digital.         
   
JW: More demand? 
Ruby:   Capacity. You need to have more capacity than you know what to 
do with it. So, it creates an opportunity to grow new ideas (…). 
 
 Interview with Ruby, 19 May 2016 
 
As we can see from the Ruby’s explanation, the successful story of Bazalgette inspired the 
innovators in Harbour City to create the expectation for the Gigabit Harbour City project. 
They wanted to follow in the footsteps of Bazalgette and do the same with current digital 
infrastructure innovation. It seems that history will repeat itself in the form of digital 
infrastructure. It is worth pointing out that the retrospective tendency shown in this linkage 
neglected many conditions that enabled certain historical event. As Deuten and Rip (2000) 
argue, “retrospective memories of the innovation process often forget many of the wide-
ranging organisational and material contingencies upon which an artefact's future once 
depended” (Brown and Michael, 2003: 9). Despite this, the retrospective tendency helped to 
make linkages between the current innovation and people’s “ancestors”. It also helped 
innovators to create alignment between the past, the current project, and the future. As Adam 
and Grove (2007: 112) argue, aligning an expectation with historical memories not only 
enables people to connect themselves with their ancestors and future generations of 
successors, but also to connect their actions in a seamless web.  
 
The content of the bid reflected a configuration that was formed by local innovators. If we 
locate this configuration in a multi-level perspective framework, it is a configuration at a 




of heterogeneous engineering (Law, 1987) is about the alignment of heterogeneous social-
technical elements to achieve functionality. Those elements often include not only human 
actors with different interests, but also non-human actors, such as technological components 
and materials. As we can see from the Gigabit Harbour City bid, it contains the material 
element of the H-Net fibre duct and many local actors. However, the configuration shown 
in the Gigabit Harbour City bid suggests something that the conventional configuration 
concept does not pay attention to which is the element of expectation /vision. As shown 
above, the bid had an expectation to show people what the project was trying to achieve. 
This expectation has a specific function in this configuration. Drawing on the Sociology of 
Expectation’s study of the function of expectation (Van Lente, 2012), I would like to argue 
that the expectation in the Gigabit Harbour City configuration functions as a heuristic device 
that guides people to build a high-speed digital infrastructure that anyone can access. 
 
(2) The modified configuration: an experimental research testbed 
 
The Gigabit Harbour City bid was successfully allocated £10M from the Department of 
Culture, Media, and Sports (DCMS) with the condition to provide a practical delivery plan, 
but, the original idea to provide everybody with gigabit connectivity ran into difficulties. 
This was because the prize money belongs to a category called State-aid. If local councils 
were to use this public money to provide free connectivity to everyone, private commercial 
network providers (e.g. BT and Virgin Media) would feel this undermined their business 
model. One real-life example is the case of Plateau City Council, which was brought to court 
by BT and Virgin Media because the free connectivity plan that they generated would bring 
unfair competition to commercial business (Interview with a local civil servant, 17 June 
2016). So, in order to satisfy the industry, national government suggested ten DC cities use 
the funding to provide broadband vouchers for Small and Middle Size Enterprises (SMEs) 
to purchase fast connectivity. In the end, all other cities, nine in total, gave up the idea of 
providing free connectivity and adopted the strategy of providing vouchers for SMEs. 
Innovators at Gigabit Harbour City were unsatisfied with just providing vouchers, they still 
wanted to fulfil some of their original goals. In order to find a third way between their 
original plans and only providing SMEs with vouchers, the innovators embarked on a two-
year long negotiation journey. People recall this was as a “nightmare” (Interview with Brian, 
12 September 2016). As one witness Richard complained, “six or seven versions of the 




Richard, 17 June 2016). 
 
During the negotiation period, a replacement expectation experimental research test-bed was 
circulated in the innovation network. Actually, this expectation was briefly mentioned in the 
Gigabit Harbour City bid and it was re-discovered when innovators needed to find a third 
way. Vincent, one of the early experimental research testbed advocates, explained that 
instead of simply providing additional broadband connectivity to conventional businesses, 
Harbour City could build a more experimental network to support the experimental usage of 
networking (Interview with Vincent, 7 June 2016). The expectation of building an 
experimental research testbed was approved by other local innovators because they saw 
similarities or connections between their past experience of experiment and the idea of 
experimental testbeds. For example, Vincent has rich experience in experimenting with 
technological designs and he knew the importance of using an experimental testbed to help 
a prototype project to scale-up. Camila regarded the experiment as a way to co-produce 
knowledge with citizens8. So, even though the word experiment means different things to 
different people, the word had the capacity to glue innovators together to agree to build an 
experimental testbed. 
 
Adopting the idea of an experimental research test-bed, the revised bid proposed a new 
configuration. This configuration incorporated the technological element of the H-Net, 
human actors in the form of a group of local innovators, and an expectation of building an 
experimental research testbed. The modified bid was approved by DCMC. State-aid allowed 
the building of a high-speed network for research and experimentation purposes, because the 
word “research” sounds less contention to network providers. As Ruby explained, “if people 
using the connectivity differ from their everyday business needs, the law of State-aid is 
allowed to fund a research project where would not allow to give everybody to get access to 
all their everyday activities” (Interview with Ruby, 19 May 2016). The shift from the Gigabit 
Harbour City configuration to the experimental research testbed configuration suggests that 
innovators cannot create whatever configuration they want. The structure (regime) that the 
novelties (a niche level configuration) embedded in it might restrict their actions. Innovators 
have to anticipate selection results and make adjustments accordingly to it in order to survive 
in the existing restricted selection environment. I will come back to the restrictions of 
                                                     






5.1.3 Transforming an infrastructure innovation into a city innovation 
 
(1) Adopting new actors and technologies 
 
The modified bid approved by DCMC was not the end of the story. Actually, it was just the 
start of the trouble because the local innovators did not know how to deliver the idea. They 
explored many possible plans (see an example in appendix 8 (2)). Right at this time, Susan, 
a world leading optical network Professor, joined Harbour City University and heard about 
the project. She was excited by the idea of an experimental research testbed because before 
she came to Harbour City, she had already accumulated rich experience in the area of 
“landscape experiment of innovation”, that is, creating an environment for people to 
experiment with new technological concepts. As she explained in the interview:  
 
“I arrived at Harbour city with lots of experience. What we called the 
landscape experimental testbed for innovation. I have been involved in a 
number of international and national projects. What these projects have been 
doing were to create an environment that people can experiment with new 
concepts of technology. For example, one project called FIRE (Future Internet 
research and experimentation). The focuses of this project were to create an 
open environment and offer experimentation across Europe. Then, connecting 
those experimentations together and see how you are going to create the 
Internet of future (…)” 
 
Interview with Susan, 21 July 2016 
 
Susan thought that she could contribute her rich experiences to the experimental research 
testbed initiative. In return, the project would help further her knowledge in a real city 
context. So, she started to contact the innovators who were involved in the experimental 
research testbed project and to introduce the latest development in her field, Network 
virtualisation (NV). Network Virtualisation is a process of combining network resources and 
functionality as a single. It claims to bring revolutionary change to the current network 
industry. One thing it can do is to introduce the network programmability. What is network 
programmability? It is not the “programmability” that we are familiar with in the computing 
world where a programmer creates a set of instructions to tell computer what to do. Instead, 
it is a communication network terminology which is mainly used to describe the flexibility 
and configurability of a network. The idea of network programmability was not generated in 
a vacuum. It was inspired by the decoupling movement in the computing world. Many years 




separation lowered the barriers for people to enter the computing industry (Interview with 
Chris, 30 June 2016). Some people in the network sector think that the decoupling movement 
could also happen in the network industry. At the moment, communication network 
infrastructures are often tied to vendor specific equipment. So, vendors can sell their ready-
made boxes to customers. In order to make current networks more flexible, the techniques 
of Software Defined Network (SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) were 
introduced to the network. SDN means decoupling networking hardware from its control 
plane, and uses a centralized control plane to manage behavior of components in a network. 
Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) is a new way to design and manage service through 
decoupling the physical equipment from the functions (e.g. firewall or encryption) run on 
them. It allows network functions shared by multiple tenants and applications and to be 
programmed. In sum, the introduction of SDN and NFV have the potential to make a network 
more flexible, programmable, automated, elastic, open, and interoperable. 
 
In considering how NV could contribute to building a city-scale experimental research 
testbed, Susan suggested that the NEXT Lab and Harbour City University’s spin-off 
company Light Speed could utilise SDN and NFV to design two specific pieces of software 
for the project, namely, ‘City OS’ and ‘Network Emulator’. ‘City OS’ is a piece of network 
software which functions as an operating system to orchestrate heterogeneous network 
resources in a city. The abbreviation ‘OS’ stands for operating system which can use the 
analogy of the ‘OS’ that we encounter everyday on our computers or phones. We might not 
see them with our naked eye, but they work behind the scenes to support the functionality of 
our computers and phones. Why do city networks need an ‘OS’? The rationale is that 
nowadays, there are many different usages of the networks in a city (e.g. sensor network and 
fibre network) which are often separated. With ‘OS’, it is suggested, it is possible to link all 
the separate networks/network resources together and allow them to be reconfigured. 
Another piece of software called ‘Network Emulator’. It is a technique to test the 
performance of real application over a virtual network. It can increase the experimental and 
scale-up capacity of a network. This is because a physical network in a city often has a certain 
number of physical ‘nodes’9. When one computer connects to another computer, it is like 
one physical node talking to another physical node. In any network, at least three nodes are 
                                                     





needed to create a network, because it can create multiple routes for information to be sent 
from one party to another. A ‘Network Emulator’ could replicate those nodes in a city and 
represent them in a virtual space. The virtual world can create a simulated environment with 
100 or 1000 nodes. The simulated nodes could also be arranged into the network typologies 
that users want. So, this capacity would not only enable local people to test their products, 
but also allow people from other cities to use it: The ‘Network Emulator’ can create the 
virtual network environment of other cities and allow other cities to trial their technologies 
in the Harbour City’s testbed. In other words, an experiment run in Harbour City can be 
scaled-up and applied to other network environments. I will come back to this piece of 
software in Chapter 7.  
 
Not all the stakeholders of the experimental research testbed project fully understood the 
technical aspects of the SDN and NFV, but they saw the experiment composition those 
techniques might bring to the experimental digital infrastructure. For example, the ‘City OS’ 
could help to orchestrate the whole digital infrastructure and the ‘Network Emulator’ could 
help to scale up the infrastructure (Interview with Susan, 21 July 2016). So, Susan and a 
series of new technologies successfully become part of the project.  
 
(2) The quantum leap 
 
The introduction of new technologies brought new capabilities to the project and those new 
capabilities started to shape the simple idea of an experimental testbed. For example, one of 
main features those technologies added to the experimental testbed was network 
programmability. Based on this new feature, a series of ideas in relation to a city were 
developed, such as, the “programmable city” and “city experimentation as services”. In the 
end, Susan found a name that better reflected the key features of those ideas and called it 
“Open Programmable Harbour City (OPHC)”. The reason to call it “open” was because the 
testbed is free for anyone to use. The reason to name it “programmable” was because the 
testbed enables users to customize digital resources. The interview with Susan reveals the 
process of generating the name: 
 
“I have a large group of researchers who are experienced in designing what 
we called ‘infrastructure as a service environment’.  So, that means we provide 
this infrastructure to people. They can do whatever they want. We took this 
concept and evolve to what we called ‘city experimentation services’. Instead 




as services’ (…) We are offering this infrastructure for free to anybody, then 
we named our testbed ‘open’ (…). We see this as enabling actual users to be 
programming the infrastructure. So, we call it programmable”. 
 
Interview with Susan, 21 July  
 
So, the expectation of an experimental research testbed gradually transformed into an 
expectation of city experiment as a service. A digital infrastructure innovation was 
transformed into a city innovation. Right at this time, the smart city became an emerging hot 
topic at a global level. Innovators of OPHC perceived the opportunity of making linkages 
between OPHC and the smart cities trend. It soon claimed itself as a smart city innovation.  
 
The modified delivery plan-Open Programmable Harbour City, was re-submitted to the 
funder. The delivery plan illustrated a new configuration that consisted of the high-speed 
network H-Net, NV technologies, a network of innovators in Harbour City, an expectation 
of a programmable experimental research testbed, and it also relabelled itself as a smart city 
innovation. This re-configuration was approved by the DCMC with the condition that 
Harbour City Council had to form a joint venture with Harbour City University. This was 
mainly driven by the concern that Harbour City Council did not have the expertise to deliver 
it and it required expert input from Harbour City University. Both parties in Harbour City 
agreed to form a joint venture.  
 
5.1.4 Enriching the configuration through alignments  
 
(1) Alignments for the programmable testbed 
 
In order to materialise the idea of OPHC, innovators then needed to expand the configuration 
through aligning more actors. On the one hand, they focused on aligning actors (both human 
and non-human) for the programmable infrastructure. For example, Susan took the lead in 
designing the testbed and making alliances for the programmable testbed. She started by 
designing the network infrastructure. As an optical fibre10 network expert, she knew how to 
build a super-fast broadband network. The £5.3m funding from DCMS was used to upgrade 
the fibre to 144 cores11 and to increase the capacity of the network. However, a city’s 
network also consists of other networks (e.g. wireless communication) which were beyond 
                                                     
10 Is a thin fibre glass with cladding layers that can carry light from one end to another end. 
11 This is a type of fibre that has 144 cores within a fibre tube. It allows a lot of light to come through 




her expertise, so she formed alliances with professors at the local University who had 
relevant knowledge. In the end, she designed the network infrastructure for OPHC which 
consisted of three networks: a fibre network, a wireless network, and a Radio Frequency 
Mesh (RF Mesh) network12. Unlike the fibre network which could utilise the existing fibre 
infrastructure in Harbour City, the wireless network and the RF Mesh network had to be 
built from scratch. After discussions, the OPHC committee decided to purchase an RF Mesh 
network solution from a U.S. company called Gold Autumn and bought some wireless 
components from a local company called Blue Arrow. 
 
After sorting out the basic network infrastructure, Susan started to think about how to make 
all three networks programmable. Delivering the programmability of the network was not 
straightforward, because it was the first time that NV technology had been applied to a real 
city environment13. So, Susan and her engineering team had to design it from scratch. 
However, the funder (DCMS) set a deadline to use the funding. In order to meet this deadline, 
Susan and the OPHC committee decided to purchase the necessary components before 
designing the programmable testbed properly. As a result, they purchased a lot of equipment 
in advance to support the function of Network Visualisation, such as optical switch14 and 
routers. Apart from buying equipment, Susan’s engineering team started to develop an 
‘active node’ and the ‘City OS’. What is an ‘active node’? ‘Node’ is a network 
communication terminology that describing the physical point for network traffic 
conjunctions. An ‘active node’ is a network node that can be programmed. Due to this 
flexible character, it is called an ‘active node’. To provide you with an idea of an ‘active 
node’, I took a photo of an ‘active node’ and have highlighted its technical details in  Figure 
19. ‘City OS’, as discussed, is a piece of software which can be used to orchestrate all 
networks in a city.  
 
                                                     
12 It is a communication network that made up radio nodes and those nodes can be organised as a mesh 
topology. 
13 The NV technique had been applied to a place like data centre, but it had never been used in a city-scale 
environment. 
14 A device that can selectively interconnect optical signals among different input/output to direct light to 





Figure 19.  An ‘active node’ in the NEXT Lab (left) and its technical components (right) 
(The technical details are extracted from OPHC’s official presentation) 
 
(2) Aligning applications 
 
The programmable testbed claims to enable many city related applications to run on top of 
it. However, nobody had actually thought about what these applications might be. Vincent, 
a computer scientist, was the first person to suggest a possible application for OPHC. This 
possible application was to create an urban data visualisation device called the Data Dome. 
The idea was also not born in a vacuum. A few years before, Vincent became a trustee of 
the local Science Museum and he soon noticed that the organisation wanted to upgrade its 
planetarium show system from a starboard projection system to a digital system. The digital 
system would to bring a more powerful visual experience to audiences. For example, it 
would allow a presenter to zoom in and out of the universe in an astronomy show, something 
that a starboard projection system cannot do (Interview with Vincent, 15 June 2016). Based 
on his knowledge in computing, Vincent further suggested that the dome could be linked to 
the local University’s supercomputer. In this way, the dome could be transformed into a 
powerful visualisation screen backed by powerful computing capability. In his words “the 
dome is a like a big PC screen” (Interview with Vincent, 15 June 2016). 
 
However, this idea of connecting the dome to a supercomputer did not materialise until the 
opportunity of OPHC emerged. As member of the local innovation network, Vincent 




be an application for OPHC. In order to make the funder feel comfortable to spend money 
on scientific visualisation, he then came up with the idea to upgrade the dome and make it 
the first application for OPHC. He suggested to link the dome to OPHC and the 
supercomputer15 in Harbour City University. This design would transform the dome into an 
urban data visualisation device and a space to visualise urban data (e.g. environmental data 
and traffic data) (I will expand more on this expectation in Chapter 6). The OPHC committee 
accepted Vincent's proposal and called the idea ‘Data Dome’. The idea was also added as an 
appendix in the final version of the OPHC delivery plan. In the end, before Christmas 2014, 
DCMS specifically added an additional £1M to OPHC to build Data Dome.  
 
(3) Aligning local host partners 
 
Alongside building alignments for infrastructure and application, Luke (the Manager of 
OPHC) and his successor Chris (the Chief Manager of OPHC) started to create alliances 
with local institutions and organisations. Local organisations who were willing to become 
local host partner of OPHC were called host partners; this was because they could help host 
‘active nodes’ as well as use the OPHC testbed. Several factors influenced the selection of 
host partners. First, they should have some digital resources that could link to OPHC. 
Second, they should have some the human resources that could use OPHC.   
 
However, the alignment of host partners was not straightforward. Sometimes it was simply 
because organisations did not want to participate. For example, a local Japanese technology 
research lab was an initial partner of OPHC, but did not sign up in the end because the 
company was more interested in building applications rather than developing a platform 
(Interview with Brown, 11 May 2016). Other times, it was due to the restrictions of State-
aid. For example, innovators had wanted to put an ‘active node’ in a famous local animation 
company. However, they had to give that up because the funding was State-aid. The funder 
worried that private companies might utilise the infrastructure for commercial purposes.  
 
Despite many difficulties, innovators successfully aligned four organisations/institutions in 
Harbour City who were willing to become host partners of OPHC. We are already familiar 
with their names from the story above. The first organisation is Harbour City University. It 
would contribute its supercomputer facilities as well as rich know-how skills to the project, 
                                                     




especially in the areas of high-performance networks, wireless communication, 
supercomputer, and media visualisation. Susan’s NEXT Lab naturally became a space to 
host one of the ‘active nodes’ because it was close to many networks know-how resources. 
The second organisation was the Science Museum, a local science education centre. It would 
bring “eyes” (data visualisation capability) to the OPHC network. The third organisation was 
a local digital creative centre, DOCK. The organisation has a cluster of creative digital 
workers with a reputation for producing creative and fun projects. The creative class in the 
DOCK was supposed to come up with more use cases for OPHC. The fourth organisation 
was BOX which has many IT focused businesses in it, especially the incubator 
CONTAINER that has a high hatch rate across Europe. In theory, connecting BOX would 
encourage local SMEs to use OPHC. Apart from those four nodes, other local organisations 
also wanted to be a host partner. Straw House, for example, eventually become the fifth local 
host partner as we will see in Chapter 6.  
 
(4) Aligning big corporations  
 
Luke and Chris also sought to align big businesses. The alignment of big corporations 
contributed to OPHC in two ways. First, the involvement of big businesses would make the 
project look more credible. Second, big companies could help SMEs to move into the 
market. The idea was that developers who experimented with their products through the 
programmable infrastructure could either establish their own companies or sell their products 
to big businesses. The involvement of big business was for the latter purpose. So, Luke 
invested a great amount of time to convince big businesses to partner with OPHC. However, 
he left the project in 2014 and this job was handed-over to his successor Chris. In the end, 
Chris successfully enrolled OPHC’s first business partner, a multi-national IT service and 
product provider calls JEP. JEP was interested in OPHC because the company is an SDN 
solution provider. OPHC needed JEP’s SDN solutions. In return, it would test its SDN 
solution through OPHC. Moreover, it perceived possible positive linkages between OPHC 
and Harbour City Council. It wanted to sell its products back to Harbour City Council as 
well (see more in Chapter 6).  
 
The ongoing alignment of actors around OPHC provided more substance for the idea. For 
example, the alignment of the technological components and the suppliers provided more 




Dome and some partners (local host partners and business partners) around the project 
helped define how the infrastructure could be used and who going to use it. For clarity, I 
have listed key technological components, partners, and mutual interests between partners 
and OPHC in Table 1 below. The alignment process enriched the initial configuration of 
OPHC and this enriched configuration provided the foundation for Chris to produce the 
vision of OPHC. I will elaborate this later.  
 
Table 1. The main alignments formed around the OPHC 
Main Human and non-human actors aligned around OPHC 
Technological 
components 
Partners Partners’ interests OPHC’ interests 
144 core fibres Gold Autumn Selling products to OPHC. 
Purchasing RF Mesh network 
solution. 





Increasing the   
University’s reputation and 
have an opportunity to 
research in the wild. 
Gaining more research projects to 






Upgrading its Dome 
infrastructure. 
Having the first application and 
hosting the active node. 
City OS DOCK 
Utilising the infrastructures 
for the next generation 
experiment. 
Finding use cases (e.g. ‘Fun City’) 
and hosting the active node. 
Supercomputer BOX 
Testing their products. 
 




Testing SDN solutions in a 
real-life city environment. 
Providing SDN components and 
use cases. 
 
5.1.5 Creating a vision statement for OPHC   
 
At this stage of the development, Chris replaced Luke and became the Chief Manager of 
OPHC. With a business to business marketing background, Chris very quickly realised that 
OPHC at that time did not have a clear message to communicate to the world (Interview with 
Chris, 30 June 2016). In order to better communicate OPHC to the general public, he 
thought, there needed to be a simple story. The quotation at the beginning of this chapter 
reflects this concern. So, Chris spent six weeks creating a vision statement for OPHC. The 
vision statement arranged facts and future possibilities around the idea of OPHC. It tidied 




contained three aspects: the rationale for the project, the vision itself, and the business model. 
 
(1) Linking OPHC to Promising Trends 
 
Coming from a marketing background, Chris knew the importance of answering the question 
“why” in communications. As he states, “in marketing theory or marketing practices, you 
need to actually answer the question why very fast. If you cannot explain why, why are we 
doing this? People do not know why they are listening (…)” (Interview with Chris, June 30, 
2016). Based on characteristics of OPHC, Chris creatively aligned OPHC with three 
promising trends to address the question “why”, namely, the trend of smart cities, two 
specific technological trends, and the future city making trend in Harbour City.  
 
The first trend he related to OPHC was the trend of smart cities which comes from a 
background of the rapid urbanisation globally, which causes many problems for already 
suffering cities such as congestion, ageing populations, waste, etc. All those problems are 
being faced with less government money and technologically smart cities are regarded as a 
solution. OPHC followed the trend of smart cities by proposing an experimental testbed to 
test smart city solutions. Although OPHC had successfully transformed from an 
infrastructure innovation to an urban innovation, it had never claimed itself so explicitly as 
a smart city innovation. In the vision statement, Chris explicitly talked of OPHC as a smart 
city project which responded to landscape pressures (e.g. urbanisation and demographic 
shifts).  
 
The second type of trend he associated with OPHC were technological trends. Chris 
mentioned two specific technological trends. One was the trend of the increasing 
consumption of technologies and the production of data. This trend suggested that 
connectivity is essential for the future. As Chris stated, “machines will gradually use more 
bandwidth than humans” (Chris’s presentation at a local digital health event, May 2015). 
OPHC is a response to this trend because it would provide people with up to 30Gbps 
connectivity which would be 30 times faster than the world fastest connectivity. The other 
trend was the Network Visualisation (NV). I explained the revolutionary possibilities this 
trend might bring to the network industry earlier (section 5.1.3). OPHC following this trend 






The third type of trend was popular future city ideas in Harbour City. Harbour City had 
recently made a strong commitment to making a ‘future city’. So, many future cities 
initiatives had popped-up in the city, such as ‘green city’, ‘resilient city’, ‘fun city’, and the 
‘citizen central’. OPHC suggested that the OPHC testbed could help further develop those 
already existing local future city initiatives. To associate OPHC with those local future city 
trends could help OPHC better articulate its vision at a local level. 
 
(2) The content of the vision 
 
After providing rationales for why to develop OPHC, Chris further illustrated what OPHC 
is about, the vision of OPHC. For clarity, I have provided a figure of the content of OPHC 
in Figure 20. As we can see from the figure, project OPHC mainly consisted of two parts: 
the programmable testbed of OPHC and an ecosystem of users around it. Because both 
aspects were merely expectation, I would like to call the vision of OPHC a prospective 
structure (Van Lente and Rip, 1998). Above, I have introduced the idea that a prospective 
structure is a ‘not-yet structure’ which made up links in texts. Although the structure is not 
yet realised, it might orientate people to take actions to realise it. I will come back to this 
later (section 5.2.2).  
 
 














The programmable testbed is the foundation of the project. Chris summarised key technological 













































in a tube-like map. This map was printed on all OPHC related materials. For anonymity, I made 
a simplified map with the key messages in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. The layout of the programmable testbed 
 
As we can see from the Figure 21, the OPHC infrastructure consists of three networks: the 
144 cores fibre network (see ①), a mile of heterogeneous16 wireless network (Wireless 
Mile) (see ②), and an RF Mesh network to be deployed on 1500 lampposts across the city 
(see ③). Both the Wireless Mile and RF Mesh network were to be connected to the core 
fibre network (see ④) which allow data collected from both wireless networks to send to 
the fibre network. The fibre network connects the host partners by four ‘active nodes’ which 
are placed at four locations (NEXT Lab, Science Museum, DOCK and BOX) (see ⑤). The 
‘active node’ in the NEXT Lab further connects to the supercomputer facility in Harbour 
City University and associated with two software (‘City OS’ and ‘Network Emulator’) 
(see⑥). The ‘active node’ in the Science Museum linked the dome to OPHC (see ⑦). It is 
worth mentioning that not all features described in the figure have been realised. For those 
‘not-yet’ realised features, the vision statement provides a timeline, such as, Data Dome 
                                                     
16 The reason to say it is heterogeneous because it includes components such as Wi-Fi, 3G, 4G, millimeter 
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opens in November 2015, IoT Mesh17 to be ready to use in April 2016, 5G18 and SDN 
controller to be available in summer 2016. There is more on actual materialisation process 
of those features in Chapter 6.  
 
Regarding the programmable testbed, the vision statement also made linkages between the 
programmable testbed and an ecosystem of possible user groups. As we see from Figure 20, 
there is a ring of ecosystem actors outside the square. The vision statement specifically 
highlighted four groups of users that can use OPHC. The first group is academic researchers. 
Scholars in two local universities were used as an example to support this claim because they 
had the technological know-how skills (e.g. data science, computing, networking and 
network security, etc.) to use the OPHC infrastructure to research in the wild.  For example, 
it was suggested that two existing research projects (TUBE19 and FLOOR20) at the Harbour 
City university could use the testbed. The second group was the local host partners. For 
example, creative designers and projects in DOCK could use OPHC infrastructure to further 
their research. SMEs in the BOX could test their solutions before putting them on the market. 
Moreover, Straw House, a local media community organisation added to this group. It could 
help OPHC to engage citizens all the ways through the project. The third group was business 
communities, ranging from large companies to the start-ups. JEP is an example of a large 
company. Blue Arrow who sells its equipment to OPHC was mentioned as an example of an 
SME and start-ups user who can use the testbed. As one spokesman of OPHC said, “Harbour 
City has the largest digital cluster outside London, and it has the highest workforce in any 
English core city region. The infrastructure of OPHC enables a variety of technological 
businesses to trial their solutions, ranging from technology readiness level one (technology 
which is close to the market) to technological readiness level nine (technology that is far 
from the market)” (Presented in the local digital health event, May 2016). The last category 
is other cities around the world. As Chris expressed explicitly “the buyers of OPHC are 
cities” (Interview Chris, 30 June 2016). Similar to other smart cities projects around the 
                                                     
17 This another name for RF Mesh network. 
18 It is the 5th generation wireless system. It provides faster and better Internet access than the 4G that we 
use nowadays and with enhanced telecommunication standards. 
19  TUBE is a research project from the NEXT lab. It explores the method of synchronising the 
heterogeneous networks. The project TUBE could use OPHC infrastructure to further its knowledge of 
network convergence. 
20 FLOOR studied sensor platforms in residential environments. The connection between a sensor house 
and OPHC is a scenario that the high-speed broadband of OPHC could help forward large files 




world which have ambitions to become a model for other cities, OPHC also wants to scale-
up and mobilise its vision to other cities. This could be realised either through selling the 
SDN network solution to other cities or by letting other cities try their solutions through the 
OPHC infrastructure (Harbour City News, 11 March 2015).  
 
(3) An initial business model of OPHC 
 
A business model was also presented at the end of the vision statement. Although OPHC is 
funded by DCMS, it required additional money to cover operation costs and staff salaries. 
In order to get the money to run the project, a business model was required. The key elements 
of the business model are summarised in Table 2. As we can see from the table, users of 
OPHC are regarded as partners and are divided into three categories: long-term partners, 
project partners, and eco-system partners. The long-term partners include people and 
organisations who use the network to do research (e.g. researchers); use the network service; 
and experiment with network infrastructure (e.g. JEP). They pay a fixed fee to the OPHC. 
In return, OPHC allows them to access the network to conduct experiments and provide 
engineering support. The project partners are partners who collaborate with OPHC on 
specific projects. They pay a project specific fee to OPHC. The ecosystem partners refer to 
SMEs, community organisations, local governments, and foundations. Examples of this type 
of actors are people from Straw House, DOCK, and BOX, etc. They collaborate with OPHC 
to form a lively ecosystem around OPHC. So, in order to encourage them to use the network 
and balance the cash flow, Chris decided that ecosystem users could use a pay-as-you-go 
method to use the network and there is a special small payment system designed for them 
(Interview with Chris, 30 June 2016).  
 
Table 2. The business model of OPHC 
The initial business model of OPHC 
Partner type Examples Fees 
Long-term Partners 
Research experiment, network services, and 




Project partners Bespoke activities Project fees 
Eco-system partners 
SMEs, Community organisations, institutions, local 





5.2 Understanding the Emergence of OPHC 
 
From the descriptions and brief analysis above, we can see that the emergence of OPHC 
does not fit into the conventional imaginations about the birth of a smart city. In those 
popular imagining, a smart city is often led by visionaries (e.g. big corporations and actors 
in authority) and created in a vacuum. However, the birth of OPHC presents a rather different 
picture. Many factors contributed to the birth of OPHC, including a network of local 
innovators, the structures that the novelties were embedded in, the alignment processes, and 
the formation of the vision. Above, I conducted some brief analysis within the context. 
Below, I would like to draw on some conceptual tools (configuration, multi-level 
perspective, and prospective structure) to further some of those discussions.  
 
5.2.1 A local network of innovators and evolving local configurations 
 
The key drivers behind OPHC are a network of local innovators, who come from different 
areas in Harbour City, including the local Council, the local University, a community 
organisation, a digital creative centre, etc. This network of innovators was formed gradually 
in Harbour City, mainly stimulated by big events, such as the Digital Challenge (DC). To 
some degree, we could say this network was open to cooperation. For example, many of 
them were willing to run projects together and they were open to adopting new actors, such 
as, the involvement of Susan at the late stage. However, the network was not completely 
open. People would be part of the network either if they were interested in digital innovation 
or if they could bring something to the network. Whereas, ordinary citizens without skills 
and interests in technology were less likely to become part of this innovator network.  
 
To have a network of innovators in Harbour City was important for the emergence of OPHC, 
because they were sensitive to innovation opportunities at both national and international 
levels. Without this network of innovators, OPHC might not even exist, or it would have 
become a different project. As we see above, this network functioned as a mediator, 
constantly mediating external innovation opportunities and local resources. For example, 
when the innovation opportunity, Super Connected City (SCC) programme, was announced, 
this network of innovators creatively made linkages between heterogeneous local digital 
resources (e.g. fibre network, dome and supercomputer) and actors (e.g. human and 
institutions). From a socio-technical perspective, the alignments of those human and non-




configuration in the case of OPHC was not merely a socio-technical configuration because 
these configurations also have an element of expectation/vision in them. This might be 
especially the case for an early stage innovation where nothing is solid. Expectation/ vision 
has a role to play in a novel configuration. For example, there are three configurations that 
can be identified in the story: The Gigabit Harbour City, the experimental research testbed, 
and the Open Programmable Harbour City (OPHC). Each configuration has an expectation, 
such as providing gigabit connectivity to people, building the experimental research test-
bed, and making programmable infrastructure. Drawing on the Sociology of Expectation’s 
study about expectation (Van Lenten, 2012), I would like to argue these expectations were 
incorporated in the configurations function as heuristic devices which suggested the future 
innovation directions. 
 
5.2.2 Structures restrict innovation as well as provide opportunities for 
innovation 
 
Innovators in Harbour City have not always been able to create the configuration according 
to their desires. From the series of configuration and re-configuration activities above, we 
can see that the novelty is not born in a vacuum. It is embedded in an existing structure, and 
this structure can restrict as well as enable innovation. Multi-level perspective (MLP) 
provides us with a framework to understand the interaction between novelties and their 
structures. MLP creates three analytic levels: niche level, regime level, and landscape level. 
Novelties often exist at niche level where they are provided with protections. In the case of 
OPHC, a series of three configurations mentioned in the story could be regard as novelties 
at the niche level. Novelties cannot freely diffuse and grow, because there is a regime 
structure above them. Regime is the existing stabilised social-technical system in the area of 
technology, science, politics, market, user preference, and cultural meaning. Regime can 
create barriers for novelties and stop them growing freely. The restrictions often come from 
existing rules at the regime level. MLP summarises three types of rules: cognitive rules (e.g. 
belief, search agenda, heuristic), regulative rules (e.g. law and regulation), and normative 
rules (e.g. value and norms). In order to survive, innovators at niche levels have to anticipate 
selection results from the existing environment (regime) and re-configure the novelty 
accordingly. This is influenced by the quasi-evolutionary theory that regards a novel 




selecting environments. One key point of quasi-evolutionary theory is that variation is not 
generated isolated from the selection environment. Instead, variation and selection are 
interrelated. One way they are linked is through innovators (human actors)’s anticipation 
activities. Innovators can anticipate and strategically interpret the selection results from the 
environment and constantly make relevant adjustments in order to survive in the existing 
environment (Schot and Geels, 2007; Grin et al., 2010). Above the regime level, there is the 
landscape level. This refers to the long term exogenous trend that influences the regime and 
niche levels. Change at landscape level might not directly affect innovation at niche level, 
but it can create pressure on the existing regime level. This might open windows of 
opportunity for novelties at a niche level to emerge and replace existing structures at a regime 
level. 
 
In the case of OPHC, the structure at the regime level and the landscape level created 
frustrations as well as providing opportunities for local niche innovations. We can find 
examples from above. The first example is how the structure restricted innovation: In the 
episode of forming the Gigabit Harbour City configuration, an idea to provide people free 
with gigabit connection was suggested. However, this idea faced challenges from the 
existing regime. Resistances came from the normative rule and regulative rules at the regime 
level. The normative rule was the existing way of doings things and values in the network 
industry. In the current UK context, broadband services are provided by private network 
vendors, such as BT and Virgin Media. They explicitly protested the expectation of 
providing people free gigabit connectivity because they claimed it would affect their business 
model. The regulative rule refers to competition law in the UK. According to competition 
law, public money (State-aids) cannot be used to support a project that creates unfair 
competition for private companies. Both rules at regime level made innovators at the niche 
level modify their original plans in order to survive. They anticipated the likely selection 
results from the regime level and adjusted the local configuration by adopting the idea of an 
experimental research testbed. The structure also created opportunities for novelties at the 
niche level to grow. An example can be found in how OPHC was linked to the global trend 
of smart cities. As we see above, alongside innovators in Harbour City who were busy 
finding a delivery plan for the infrastructure innovation, change at landscape level (e.g. 
demographic shift and aging population) created pressures on the current regime. This 
pressure required the existing regime to change its structure. It provided a window of 




was proposed under this pressure. The social-technical future that was incorporated into the 
idea of smart cities could help to release these pressures. Local innovators in Harbour City 
perceived this opportunity to link OPHC with the trend of smart cities. They creatively 
relabelled the existing infrastructure innovation as smart city innovation. They claimed 
OPHC not only shaped the existing regime of how the city was run, but also might bring 
revolutionary change for how the communication network industry is run at a regime level. 
 
5.2.3 Creating alignments and a vision for OPHC  
 
After a series of interactions between local innovators and the selection environment, OPHC 
is the configuration that survived from the selection environment. In order to enrich and 
nurture the idea of OPHC, innovators in Harbour City went through a process of forming 
alignments around the idea. They started by developing a clearer picture of the 
programmable testbed. This was followed by a series of alignment activities in relation to 
the programmable infrastructure, including people with professional know-how skills (e.g. 
wireless communications professors); technological components and suppliers (e.g. optical 
switch, Gold Autumn, Blue Arrow). Then, they also found a wide range of possible use cases 
and users for the programmable infrastructure, such as, an urban data visualisation device 
(Data Dome), several local host partners, and a big partner corporation.  
 
Despite actors having different reasons for enrolling in OPHC, they brought more substances 
to the project. This was reflected in the vision statement that was created at a later stage of 
the birth process. The vision statement introduced the programmable testbed of OPHC and 
the ecosystem of users around it. It also gave a rationale for the project and suggested a 
business model. The beautiful story of a smart city illustrated in the vision statement of 
OPHC is partly fact and partly fiction. For example, some elements in the vision had already 
been realised at the time of drafting the vision, such as upgrading the fibre to 144 cores and 
installing ‘active nodes’, etc. While, some elements were waiting to be done, such as, 
upgrading the dome, connecting different parts of the infrastructure together, opening the 
RF Mesh network. However, there are some elements in the vision statement which were 
just potentials. For example, the four types of ecosystem actors with possible examples 
mentioned in the vision statement were merely potentials, not reality.  
 
I would like to argue that the vision statement of OPHC was not merely descriptive. It 




function. Like Janus’s Head, the two-headed God looks to the past as well as the future. 
When the vision looks backwards (retrospective function), it tidies up the messy birth 
process of OPHC and pulls together multiple social interests, expectations, and networks of 
actors (both human and non-human actors). This function is similar to what Latour (1980) 
calls ‘fiction-building’. Latour observed that in a Lab study, scientists have the capacity to 
structure the world afterwards (Van Lente, 1993: 72). What the innovators of OPHC did here 
is similar to scientists in the lab, because they gave order to the chaotic process of the 
emergence of OPHC after the event. When the vision looks forward, it illustrates a ‘not-yet 
structure’ which allocates roles to many actors and artefacts. This ‘not-yet structure’ is what 
Van Lente and Rip (1998) calls a prospective structure. It is a structure which scripts 
heterogeneous actors (human and non-human); makes linkages between different actors in a 
text; allocates a role for itself and others. The reason it is called prospective is because not 
all the elements mentioned in the structure are realised at the moment of forming the vision. 
This future oriented ‘not-yet structure’ “does” something. It invites people and organisations 
who have been scripted in the vision statement to take up the roles allocated to them. For 
example, in order to realise the vision of OPHC, the non-human actors such as the 
technological components should work together to deliver the programmable infrastructure 
and some prescript application (e.g. Data Dome). Human actors, such as individuals and 
organisations, need to take the role assigned to them and act towards realising those roles. 




The story-telling and analysis in this chapters shows that the birth of OPHC was very messy, 
speculative, and complex. It contradicts the conventional stories of emerging smart cities 
that we often read in the literatures, where smart city projects are either created by big-
corporations or actors in authority using a top-down model. OPHC went through a very 
unique birth journey. It is a configuration of people, artefacts, expectations that survived in 
the selection environment at a local niche level. This configuration was originally created 
by a network of local actors in response to a national digital infrastructure competition. The 
network of local actors had certain degree of agency to create configurations and link 
opportunities (e.g. ‘smart cities’). However, their action is also restrained by the structure 
(regime). For example, the original Gigabit Harbour City configuration was restricted by the 




survive in the existing environment, innovators had to anticipate the selection results from 
the environment and modify the configurations accordingly.  
 
A configuration emerged as a result of this interaction and it provided material, social, 
technological, and expectation foundations to OPHC. This configuration was later creatively 
bridged to the trend of ‘smart cities’. A vision of OPHC was created in the end to tidy up the 
messy birth process and relabelled the configuration as a smart city project. This vision 
statement is a prospective structure which sought to mobilise the future to the present. In the 
next two chapters, we will explore to what extent the vision of OPHC was enacted in reality. 
Chapter 6 studied how this vision was implemented in Harbour City. Chapter 7 explores how 











“Whenever something is useful and available, 
it has to be integrated as part of the platform.” 
 
Interview with the head of OPHC engineering team, 














“The Data Dome is an opportunity to build not 
because there are real-time data coming through 
the OPHC network and waiting to project onto the 
Dome. The infrastructure is not set-up to do so (...)” 
 













“They talk as if the infrastructure (OPHC) is 
there and waiting for people to use.” 
 
Interview with a member of Citizen Sensing team, 












Site 1: Programmable infrastructure 
 
Charlie, a researcher in the NEXT Lab. 
Carlo, a researcher in the NEXT Lab. 
Chris, Chief Manager of OPHC. 
David, the head of OPHC engineering team. 
EXTRA, a mobile technology company. 
Harbour City University, a local university in Harbour City. 
Hazel, a researcher recruited by OPHC to facilitate research around OPHC. 
JEP, a multinational IT service provider. 
NORMAN, a communication device and service provider. 
NEXT Lab, a Lab in Harbour City University led by Susan. 
OPHC engineering team, is the engineering team of OPHC. It includes David (the head of OPHC 
engineering team) and another 2-4 engineers. 
OPHC business team, is a small team in charge of promoting OPHC and aligning partners. It includes 
Chris and Rufus. 
Ruby, a civil servant from Harbour City Council. 
Rufus, a member of OPHC business team. 
Sam, a member of staff from the BOX 
Susan, the Chief Technology Designer of OPHC. 
 
Site 2: Data Dome 
 
Chris, the Chief Manager of OPHC. 
Data Dome team, a team of actors lead the Data Dome innovation including Peggy, Jim, Henry. 
DOCK, a creative digital centre in Harbour City. 
Digital Moon, a digital planetarium solution provider. 
Future City Radar (FCR), a UK government support agent. 
Henry, a member of Data Dome team. 
H&C, a British multinational company. 
I-LOOK, a digital content design company. 
MiniCat:  a U.S multinational technology company. 
Orbit Game, a Virtual Reality company in Harbour City. 
Peggy, a member of Data Dome team 
Jim, a member of Data Dome team 
DOCK, is a local digital centre. 
Science Museum, a science education centre in Harbour City. 
Tim, a game developer at Orbit Game. 
UK BROADCAST, a British national wide media company 
WISO, a server provider for Data Dome. 
 
Site 3: Citizen sensing 
 
Citizen Sensing team, a group of actors (Camila, Stein, Judy, Lucy, Maria) lead the Citizen Sensing 
innovation. 
Camila, a co-director of Straw House. 
Gold Autumn, a U.S company who provide RF Mesh solution to OPHC. 
John, a data analyst from Harbour City & the initial designer of the Toad. 
Judy, a staff of Straw House. 
Lucy, a staff of Straw House. 
Maria, a PhD researcher. 
Michael, an actor from a local energy company. 
Straw House, a community engagement organisation in Harbour City. 
Stein, a co-director of Straw House. 








The implementation process of OPHC  
 
By the end of the last chapter, we could see that a beautiful vision of OPHC had been 
produced. Following up, this chapter looks at how the vision of OPHC was rolled-out in 
Harbour City. The data in this chapter is based on my 17 months of participant observations 
and interviews. The implementation process was carried out in three parallel sites: the 
programmable infrastructure site, the Data Dome site, and the Citizen Sensing site. The 
process of sampling those sites has already been discussed in Chapter 3. They are pulled 
together in this Chapter because they are the main activities that I observed in relation to the 
implementation of OPHC. I introduce them accordingly in three sections. Section 6.1 
explores the innovation activities around the programmable infrastructure. Section 6.2 looks 
at the innovation process of OPHC’s first application Data Dome. Section 6.3 studies the 
process whereby Straw House co-produced a Citizen Sensing application (Toad) with the 
local community for OPHC.  
 
Within each section, I draw on conceptual tools from Strategic Niche Management (SNM) 
and the Sociology of Expectation (SOE) to conducted site specific analysis. The conceptual 
tools include niche internal mechanisms (articulating expectation, building social network, 
and learning), performative role of expectation (promise and requirement cycle, forces of 
expectation). Section 6.4 deepens the analysis by looking across the three sites and 
summarises the key implementation mechanisms. The analysis suggests the implementation 
of OPHC was loosely coordinated by a network and a vision, which occurred in three niche 
experimentations. It highlights two issues in the implementation process: the lack of 
coordination between sites and the challenge of citizen engagement. In the end, it also 






6.1 Making the Open Programmable Infrastructure  
 
6.1.1 Delivering the Programmable Testbed 
 
Five months after the official launch date of OPHC, David arrived in Harbour City in August 
2015 as the head of the OPHC engineering team. He was excited about this new job because 
from his previous work experience in the telecom industry, he saw the revolutionary 
potential that Network Virtualisation (NV) might bring to the current network industry. 
Given OPHC’s claims to become the first SDN city in the world, David felt that working 
with OPHC would associate him with this future trend. His job was to lead the OPHC 
engineering team to deliver the programmable testbed.  
 
He has a desk in the NEXT Lab, a place in the Harbour City University that hosts one of 
OPHC’s ‘active nodes’. In the first few weeks, David had no clue about what to do. In front 
of him were a tube-like map (see Figure 21), two engineers in the OPHC engineering team, 
and many disconnected infrastructure components (optical switches, routers, LTE-A21, Etc.). 
It is not difficult to understand David’s situation. From Chapter 5 we know that Susan and 
other managerial level people in OPHC felt obliged to purchase equipment before designing 
it properly in order to meet the funding deadline. So, the work of delivering a programmable 
testbed included connecting those already purchased components and designing other 
missing details of the testbed. It was an adventure for David and the OPHC engineering team 
because they were going to build the first city-scale SDN testbed with has no pre-existing 
model to copy from. 
 
(1) Setting up the physical infrastructure  
 
David decided the first thing to do was to connect the physical components of the testbed. 
They called this job as “network set-up”. The “network set-up” is a bit like setting-up a 
domestic Wi-Fi network, but more sophisticated and complicated. This was not merely an 
issue of scale and the number of components involved, there was also the issue of re-
engineering. Because not all purchased off-the-shelf equipment supports the idea of 
programmable networks, in order to make purchased components fit into the vision of a 
programmable infrastructure, the OPHC engineering team had to re-configure some of the 
                                                     




equipment and make them support the idea of network programmability. Ruby recalls the 
difficulties of configuring technological components:   
 
“It was supposed to be a three-year project and we had to deliver it in about 
six months. We were buying equipment which was absolutely the state-of-art 
(…). Some of the equipment we bought, Susan had to test each item to make 
sure that it worked. Actually, to get things working together is difficult. We 
still had some problems, because we did not necessarily buy the right things. 
We did not necessarily get them working together properly (…)”  
 
Interview with Ruby, 19 May 2016 
 
By October 2015, the OPHC engineering team had set-up a series of component of the 
physical network infrastructure. This included the Wi-Fi network, the optical network, the 
layer-2 switch network 22 , and the Millimeter Wave 23 . These components belonged to 
different parts of the three networks that were described in the vision statement (Figure 21: 
110). For example, the Wi-Fi and Millimeter Wave belonged to the wireless network, 
Wireless Mile (see ② in Figure 21: 110), and the optical network is another name for the 
144 core fibre network (see ① in Figure 21: 110).  
 
(2) Developing a platform 
 
Alongside setting-up the physical infrastructure, David also worked on designing a platform 
for the physical infrastructure. The platform is an important part of delivering a 
programmable infrastructure. Without it, setting up heterogeneous physical networks merely 
creates an ordinary network infrastructure which ‘prescribes’ some network functions. 
People cannot conduct further re-configurations. To build a platform, David first sought to 
design a roadmap to guide the innovation directions. However, he was not able to convince 
the OPHC management to agree to the roadmap. Then, he started to work at a more practical 
level: designing the High-Level Architecture (HLA). The HLA is the crucial part to build a 
platform. However, the design of the HLA was not straightforward and required a lot of 
experimentation. As I mentioned above, there was no model for the engineers to work from 
and they had to design the platform from scratch. To provide readers with an idea of what it 
means for a High-Level Architecture (HLA), I have reproduced a version of the HLA based 
on David’s presentation in Figure 22. 
                                                     
22 It is a data link layer of a network, usually is Ethernet. 
23  It short for mm Wave. This is the band of radio spectrum between 30 GHz and 300 GHz. It can be used 






Figure 22. A version of the High-level Architecture produced by David in September 2016 
(The light salmon boxes in the figure refer to already finished designs, while the other boxes 
are functions that were under development.) 
 
When designing a HLA, the OPHC engineering team had some basic ideas about what kind 
of features they should include (e.g. a SDN controller24 ), but they did not have a precise 
agenda. So, they assembled whatever technological components were available for them in 
the process. For example, the cloud controller was not included in the original idea. But 
during the engineering process, the engineering team realised that it would be possible for 
OPHC to provide cloud services, so they added the cloud environment to the HLA. Another 
example is the ‘edge computing’25. The idea of incorporating ‘edge computing’ existed at 
                                                     
24 The SDN controller is logically centralised controller to manage the hardware components within a 
network. It provides a platform to develop different application on top of it, and passes their results to 
the components through the interfaces using a standardised protocol. It enables the behaviour of the 
components and control the network based on an intelligent manner.  
25 What is ‘edge computing’? A good way to understand ‘edge computing’ is to compare it with “cloud 
computing”. Cloud computing centralises computing power and data in cloud and delivery on demand 
computing resources and services over the Internet on a pay-as-you-go basis. It is often hosted in big 
data centres which distributes it around the world. “Edge computing” does the opposite. It pushes 
applications and computing power away from centre. This enables analysis and data gathering at the 




the early stage of the platform development, but it was formally added to HLA in February 
2016. The rationale to incorporate edge computing in OPHC was that it might enable creative 
digital workers in Harbour City to do creative things, such as enabling initiatives like the 
‘Fun City’ 26 . Why did the engineers constantly modify the design? This reflects an 
engineering philosophy called “technology agnostic” that is shared by some engineers of 
OPHC. The “technology agnostic” approach means that when engineers design an 
infrastructure, they do not just ‘prescribe’ functions, but also want to build a “live” 
infrastructure that can constantly integrate different types of the latest technologies into it. 
In another words, an infrastructure is not only designed for today, but can also constantly 
adapt to tomorrow’s needs. As David comments, “whenever something is useful and 
available, it has to be integrated as part of the platform” (Interview with David, 10 
September 2016).  
 
From the engineering story of building a programmable infrastructure, we can see that the 
vision of OPHC has a role to play in the process. It coordinated the OPHC engineering 
team’s actions towards realising the programmable infrastructure. David and the team took 
up the role that the vision of OPHC assigned to them and gradually built agendas to realise 
it. However, the testbed had not been properly designed due to the funding deadline. The 
engineers had to connect the physical components as well as design the platform (e.g. HLA). 
So, on one hand, they created task divisions to set-up a series of physical infrastructures. On 
the other hand, they sought to develop a platform to control the physical infrastructure and 
made it programmable. The work of setting-up the physical network was easier than the 
development of the platform. This was partly because the management did not have an 
agreed idea about what the project’s priorities were. It was partly because of technological 
bugs that the engineering team met in the process. For example, they developed several 
versions of the SDN controller. It was partly because of the engineers’ ambition to keep the 
programmable testbed state-of-the art. As a result, the OPHC engineering team successfully 
developed some aspects of the programmable infrastructure, such as a Wi-Fi network, an 
optical network, an SDN controller, and a cloud service, but, at the time of this writing, they 
had not been able to deliver the programmable testbed.  
 
                                                     
26 Fun City is a local initiative generated from the DOCK. It aims to use digital technology to help people 





6.1.2 The actual users of the Programmable Testbed 
 
The vision of a programmable testbed imagined that an ecosystem of users could use it.  The 
vision statement of OPHC specifically scripted four categories of users, including academic 
researchers, business communities, local host partners, and other cities (Chapter 5). 
However, during the observation period, the vision statement only mobilised two categories 
of users to use the OPHC infrastructure. They were the research and business community. 
Below, I provide more information about both types of users. I will explore why other user 
categories did not experiment with OPHC in other parts of this thesis (see more in section 
6.2, section 6.3, and Chapter 7).  
 
(1) Mobilising the academic users 
 
The vision of OPHC successfully mobilised some researchers to use the experimental 
testbed. Those researchers were mainly engineers who come from the NEXT Lab and 
Harbour City University. They took the roles that the vision of OPHC allocated to them and 
conducted various experiment with the OPHC testbed, ranging from big European research 
projects to small research projects in the NEXT Lab. For clarity, I list those research projects 
in Table 3. As we can see from the table, there are three types of research projects that use 
OPHC testbed and I use colour to distinguish them. The first type is EU research projects. 
From September 2015 to July 2016, engineers in the NEXT Lab submitted several bids to 
the European Horizon 2020 project. In those bids, they all included the element of the OPHC 
testbed as part of the proposal. In the end, four bids were successfully allocated funding. The 
second type of research project was existing research projects in Harbour City University. 
One example is the QCT project which was carried out by the quantum computing research 
group in Harbour City University. It uses the OPHC testbed to test its quantum key 
distribution (QKD27) knowledge. The third type of research project was a small research 
carried out by researchers in the NEXT Lab. There were two examples. One was an urban 
traffic control project. The researcher Charlie wanted to use OPHC’s RF Mesh network to 
collect the data about the vehicles on the road. He chose OPHC’s RF Mesh network to 
conduct the experiment because it is more redundant than normal Wi-Fi network. Another 
example was an urban mobility pattern analysis project carried out by researcher Carlo28 
                                                     
27 QKD refers to quantum key distribution. It is a network security skill which uses quantum mechanics 
to guarantee secure communication. 




from the NEXT Lab. The project wanted use OPHC’s cabinets to install equipment to 
understand people’s mobility patterns in cities. 
 
Table 3. The Research use of OPHC 
 
However, as we might notice already, the vision of OPHC only mobilised certain groups of 
researchers and they were all engineers. The vision of OPHC was not able to mobilise non-
engineer researchers, such as social scientists. In other words, there is a gap between the 
OPHC testbed and non-engineer researchers. The issue of engaging non-engineers (e.g. 
social scientists) was put on the agenda at the beginning of the project in 2015. OPHC 
specifically recruited a researcher to explore what kinds of social research and civic 
innovation that might be facilitated by OPHC and how non-engineer researchers could be 
engaged. In the end, the researcher found that there was no one on the social science side of 
Harbour City University who could lead the smart cities research, so, she recommended that 
a multi-disciplinary collaboration (social scientists and scientists) is required on the topic of 
the smart city.  
 
(2) Mobilising big corporations   
 
The vision statement of OPHC also mobilised business groups of users to use OPHC. The 
OPHC business team took the responsibility to align big corporations to use OPHC. Chris 
Project type 
Title of the 
research 




Using OPHC test-bed to evaluate the optical and wireless 
elements of 5G technologies. 
EU project COPY 
Using OPHC infrastructure to test smart city applications 
such as, smart energy and smart transportation. 
EU project BALL 
Using the heterogonous network infrastructure of OPHC to 
test the converged optical and wireless networks. 
EU project EDGE 
Using OPHC infrastructure to explore big data and cloud 
computing 
University of Harbour 
City 
QCT 
Using OPHC infrastructure to test quantum key distribution 
(QKD). 
Lab research project 1 
Urban traffic 
control 
Using OPHC’s RF mesh network to collect data about 
vehicles. 
Lab research project 2 
Urban mobility 
pattern 




was in charge of the business team and Rufus joined him in 2016. At the end of the fieldwork 
(October 2016), the OPHC business team had successfully aligned three big corporations for 
OPHC, including, a SDN expert company JEP, a mobile technology company EXTRA, and 
a communication device/service provider NORMAN (Table 4). There are at least three 
different reasons behind why these big corporations were willing to partner with OPHC. The 
first reason is that they wanted use OPHC’s testbed to test their products. For example, JEP 
uses OPHC infrastructure to develop its waste management system. The second reason was 
to sell their smart cities applications back to Harbour City Council. This is especially the 
case with JEP. As a member of OPHC business team comments, “Strategically what JEP 
wants to do is conduct development for their product and co-engineer across the network. 
But, they also want to sell their products back to the City Council…” (Interview with a 
member of OPHC business team, 23 August 2016). The third reason was to raise the 
companies’ reputations in the smart city world. This motivation can be seen in the case of 
NORMAN. As a member of the OPHC business team said, “they [NORMAN] want to 
associate with a global smart city innovator (Harbour City and OPHC). That means 
NORMAN is in the smart city world” (Interview with a member of OPHC business team, 23 
August 2016). It is worth noting that NORMAN is not the only company who has this 
mindset. There are a “pipeline” of technological companies who want to partner with OPHC 
for this purpose. 
 
Table 4. Big corporations partnered with OPHC 
Big business partners The reason to partner with OPHC 
JEP 
- Testing its waste management system through OPHC. 
 
- Regarding the connection with OPHC as an opportunity to sell its solutions 
back to the Harbour City Council. 
 
EXTRA Testing its technological solutions in a real-life environment.  
NORMAN For the purpose of public relationship.  
 
Similar to the research use of OPHC, only certain people within the business category could 
use OPHC. As we can see above, the three aligned companies were all big businesses and 
there were no SMEs or independent developers to conduct experiments through OPHC. This 




envisaged a wide range of businesses who could experiment with OPHC, ranging from large 
international telecommunication corporations (e.g. JEP) to small start-ups in the Harbour 
City (e.g. SMEs in the BOX and DOCK) (see more in Chapter 5). Why was the vision of 
OPHC not able to mobilise SMEs and developers? Based on my interviews with various 
developers in the field, I have identified three reasons.  
 
First, most SMEs do not have ready-to-experiment technologies. Take the BOX for example, 
according to the vision statement of OPHC, SMEs in the BOX can use OPHC infrastructure 
to test their technologies, ranging from technological readiness level one (technologies close 
to market) to technology readiness level nine (technologies that are far from market). 
However, what has happened in reality is that most SMEs in the BOX are start-ups. If we 
put them on the technology readiness scale, they might belong to technology readiness four 
or five (Interview with Sam, 15 August 2016). Although the vision statement suggested that 
all business readiness levels can test their products through OPHC, in reality most companies 
were not at the stage to test their products.  
 
Second, the lack of middleware stops developers using OPHC. What is middleware? It is a 
piece of software that abstracts all technological details and network resources. The 
abstraction helps users who are not network experts to interact with network resources. In 
the vision statement, developers who have certain technological skills are considered more 
likely to use OPHC infrastructure than average citizens. However, these developers are not 
communication network experts and they do not know how to interact with OPHC 
infrastructure without middleware. This was reflected in an interview with a local developer: 
 
             JW: Do you know SDN? 
  
                   A developer:  I do not know who wants to mess with that level of things. 
 
JW:  Without that level of understating, do you think it is possible for  
         you to use it? 
 
                  A developer:  Yeah, I guess to have this virtual machine and cloud is my normal  
                                         way of doing things. Any extra work for me to use it are  
                                         barriers. I do not want to understand the way they build their 
                                         network or anything like that. What is the benefit for it? 
 
                                           Interview with a local developer, 03 October 2016 
 




network knowledge in order to use OPHC. So, there needs to be ‘middleware’ between 
developers and the OPHC infrastructure. However, according to David, this ‘middleware’ is 
not going to be built in the near future. This is because ‘middleware’ is normally specific to 
applications. For example, a ‘middleware’ for telehealth management is different from a 
‘middleware’ for energy management. Since there is no specific application build on top of 
the OPHC infrastructure at the moment, the OPHC engineering team have not considered 
developing middleware as a priority.  
 
The third reason is that SMEs and individual developers tend to think of the short-term 
future. Unlike large companies and research communities who can spend 3 to 5 years 
conducting development, SMEs and start-ups cannot afford to wait and invest their time in 
experimentations. What they want is the “future now”. SMEs tend to invest in something 
that can pay back very quickly. As one developer expressed it, “I think experiments are more 
appealing to bigger businesses, because they can think ten years. So, I think for us, we need 
to survive in the next two or three years. It is much shorter-term thinking” (Interview with a 
local developer, 03 October 2016). Large companies can think about the longer-term future; 
although experiments do not bring them any immediate benefit, they can still invest time, 
money, and the workforce to do it because they will get a return in the future. We can see an 
example of this thinking, the case of MiniCat later (see section 6.3).   
 
6.1.3 Learning, pressure, and innovation outcomes 
 
The development of the open programmable infrastructure and the alignment of users were 
not separate activities. The interactions between users and the OPHC engineering team also 
generated impacts on the overall development of the project. The effect was both positive 
and negative. The positive effect refers to learning process that was triggered by interactions. 
Learning is one of positive effects that nurture a novel innovation. According to Strategic 
Niche Management (SNM), learning is one of three niche internal development mechanisms. 
Hoogma (2000) further distinguishes learning as first order learning and second order 
learning. First order learning means learning that accumulates knowledge for pre-
established assumptions. While, second order learning refers to learning activities that 
challenge the initial cognitive frames. Both types of learnings can be identified in this 
interaction process. First order learning covers many aspects. For instance, the OPHC 




better fit into users’ test requirements. The OPHC business team learnt how to deal with 
some tricky issues while cooperating with partners, such as the issue of copyright29. This 
type of learning enriched the programmable infrastructure in terms of its design and project 
management skills. Second order learning happened occasionally in the process. One good 
example is that it triggered OPHC business team to re-think the business model. In the initial 
business model (Table 2), large corporations needed to pay membership fees to use the 
OPHC infrastructure. For example, OPHC’s first business partner JEP paid £1 million in 
membership fees in five years to use the OPHC infrastructure. However, through observing 
the interaction between JEP and the OPHC infrastructure, the OPHC business team gradually 
realised that the initial business model was not fair for OPHC because the membership fees 
were very low compared with the amount of money big companies were going to make from 
experimenting through OPHC. So, they learned from the real experimental experience and 
this learning challenged their original assumption of the business model. At the time of this 
writing, the OPHC business team had already started to re-design the business model for 
OPHC. 
 
The interactions between the users and infrastructure also generated negative effects to the 
OPHC infrastructure development. This was mainly due to the increasing workload it 
brought to the already busy engineering agenda. I visualise the engineering team’s workload 
in Figure 23. As we can see from the figure, apart from the workload of developing a 
platform, the engineering team also had to make sure that the infrastructure supported the 
partners’ experiment requirements. As a result, between the end of 2015 and the early part 
of 2016, the OPHC engineering team faced a heavy workload. At its peak time, there were 
five engineers who dealt with both the engineering work and user commitments. However, 
two engineers left the OPHC engineering team in early 2016. The number of engineers 
reduced from five to three people making the engineering work difficult to carry on. So, in 
May 2016, David made a decision to stop the engineering work because it was impossible 
for three engineers (including himself) to deliver the programmable infrastructure, to support 
research projects, and to fulfil the contract commitments to the partners. In the interview, 
David used the phrase “engineering freeze” to describe the pause of engineering work 
(Interview with David, 10 September 2016). The imbalance between too much user 
                                                     
29 In order to cooperate with partners, the engineering team had to open up some of OPHC’s technologies. 





commitment and too few engineers shows that there was a lack of coordination between the 
OPHC engineering team and OPHC business team. The OPHC business team focused on 
aligning business partners. But it should have been more aware of the availability of the 
engineering team. Otherwise, the alignment of users would cause stress for the OPHC 
engineering team and delay the overall project.  
 
 
Figure 23. The workloads of OPHC engineering team 
 
At the end of the period of fieldwork (October 2016), neither the infrastructure development 
or the user engagement had realised the vision of making an open programmable testbed. It 
could not be considered open because only certain people used it; mainly engineers and big 
corporations. Although the engineering team had set-up most parts of the physical 
infrastructure of OPHC and developed some aspects of the HLA, the testbed was not fully 
programmable. However, the experiment of delivering an open programmable infrastructure 
is not seen by the OPHC team as a failure. I will elaborate on this point in the discussion 
section. 
 
6.2 Making the first application Data Dome 
 
6.2.1 The expectation of the Data Dome 
 
The second OPHC related innovation activity that I am going to talk about is the making of 
OPHC’s first application, Data Dome. Before we go into detail about the actual 
implementation process, it is necessary to revisit the expectation. In the vision statement of 
OPHC, the Data Dome was described as an urban data visualisation device (see Chapter 5). 





                  
Figure 24. A scenario for Data Dome 
 
As we can see from the figure, sensors hung on the lampposts in Harbour City created an RF 
Mesh network. They harvest real-time data in the City (see ①). This data will be collected 
and passed to supercomputers in Harbour City University. Supercomputers have the capacity 
to process and draw 3D visualisations about the real-time data (see ②). Then, the data 
visualisation will be streamed to the Data Dome through OPHC’s high speed fibre network 
(see ③). Susan used air pollution data as an example to help people at an event imagine this 
idea. 
 
“To give you, for instance, an example of a use case. We have connected this 
digital visualisation facility [Data Dome] to pollution monitoring sensors, and 
to the supercomputer on the other side. So, we are going to be able to actually 
collect pollution data in real-time. Analysing and processing the data in real-
time. The supercomputer is actually able to create 3D visualisation of this 
pollution levels in the city at the same time. So, somebody that is going to enter 
this visualisation facility [Data Dome] is going to be able to see how pollution 
in the city evolves in real-time and they are going to be able to interact with 
this as well eventually.” 
 
Susan presented at a 5G conference, March 2015  
 
 
The Data Dome is important for the OPHC not because it is a data visualisation device. More 
importantly, it carries out OPHC’s citizen engagement mission. As the interview extract 
above shows the OPHC wishes citizens to enter the dome and interact with urban data. The 
reason the dome was assigned for this function was because of its location in the Science 
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urban data visualization (Interview with a member of Data Dome team, 23 February 2016; 
Interview with Brown, 10 May 2016). It is worth noting that the Science Museum is actually 
a private space that citizens have to pay to enter.  
 
6.2.2 The implementation process of the Data Dome 
 
In order to materialise the expectation of the Data Dome, a Data Dome team was formed. 
The team consisted of several innovators from two institutions: The Science Museum and 
the Harbour City Council. Harbour City Council were interested in the Data Dome because 
it was the fund holder of the project. From a civil services point of view, it wanted to 
understand how the immersive environment of the dome can trigger emotional responses of 
citizens to make changes (Fieldnotes, 24 May 2015). And how the Data Dome can create 
more jobs for local people. This Science Museum sent staff to the project because the dome 
is the property of the museum and it regarded the Data Dome as an opportunity to upgrade 
its dome facility (Interview with a member of Data Dome team, 05 October 2016). 
 
(1) Configuring the physical features for a Data Dome 
 
Similar to the OPHC engineering team, the Data Dome team also had to design and 
implement the idea from scratch, because there was nothing like the Data Dome available on 
the market to be purchased and installed. But compared with the OPHC engineering team 
who were technology specialists, the Data Dome team did not have Dome related background 
knowledge, such as data visualisation or data analysis. So, the Data Dome team had to rely 
on advice from different experts all the way through the innovation process. They first 
decided to configure the physical features of the Data Dome. They replaced the old optical 
projection system 30  with a 3D digital projection system that was provided by a digital 
planetarium solution provider called Digital Moon. The projection solution consists of two 
projectors, 17 computers, and an archive of planetarium show contents. There were two 
reasons to choose the Digital Moon’s solution. First, Digital Moon is an expert planetarium 
show equipment provider and its solution satisfied the Science Museum’s long-time 
expectation of upgrading its dome. Second, the solution could provide two projectors to 
create a 3D dome31. 
                                                     
30 The old projection system was a “starboard” projector (See more in Chapter 5). 





The purchasing of the Digital Moon system took a step closer to the expectation of making 
a Data Dome, because the dome could now be used to view digital contents. The Data Dome 
team were excited to take the next step which was to explore what types of data can be 
visualised in a dome environment. They commissioned I-LOOK, a digital content design 
company, to explore the possibilities. The research output ends up with a beautiful trailer 
video of OPHC (Figure 25). This video optimised 300 data-sets in Harbour City, including, 
environmental, public service, and transportation data. The video seeks to demonstrate that 
various types of urban data can be viewed in the dome. However, the trailer video was merely 
a film of data visualisation, not the real-time data visualisation that was envisioned by 
OPHC. As a member of the Data Dome team comments, “I-LOOK did great work. But the 
practicality is that if you want to do data visualisation. You cannot make a film about that 
data visualisation because it is not up-to-date. You want the data visualisation to be 
immediate, relevant, and able to adjust. It is not a film. It means interactive, and that’s really 
the journey we started to explore interactivity” (Interview with a member of Data Dome 










Based on I-LOOK’s research, the Data Dome team soon realised that they needed to explore 
the interactive aspect of real-time data projection (Interview with Peggy, 05 October 2016). 
However, the Digital Moon system does not support interactive content. I-LOOK suggested 
buying additional servers. The innovation team took the advice and purchased two servers 
from a provider calls WISO. The choice of WISO was not random. Innovators thought that 
the WISO system might enables developers to produce contents for the Dome because WISO 
supports the game development platform Unity32 and this might help to attract local creative 
content developers. 
 
We have seen that the vision of OPHC (especially its expectation of a Data Dome) has a role 
to play. It coordinated the Data Dome team’s actions. The Data Dome team bought in to the 
expectation of the Data Dome and sought to configure physical features for a Data Dome. It 
was not straightforward to find the right components to build a Data Dome. In order to 
nurture this new idea, two niche internal mechanisms can be identified in the process. One 
is building social networks around the expectation. As we can see from above, the Data 
Dome team aligned a series of technology providers around the expectation, such as Digital 
Moon, I-Look, and WISO. Those actors contributed their products to make up the physical 
aspect of the Data Dome. Another mechanism was learning. There were some first-order 
learnings (Hoogma, 2000) that can be identified in the process. For example, the Data Dome 
team gained technology related knowledge about the Data Dome, such as the kind of server 
enables it to display creative content, and how to use WISO to project the interactive 
contents. As a result of this stage of exploration, the Data Dome team assembled various 
components to make up the Data Dome. Figure 26 illustrates the different components that 
made up a Data Dome. As we can see from the figure, the key elements of the Data Dome 
are distributed in two rooms. Room 1 is a display room which contains a sphere dome screen, 
around 90 seats, two digital projectors, and two computers. The Room 1 connects to the 
Room 2. In Room2, there are 17 computers from Digital Moon, two WISO servers, and an 
OPHC ‘active node’. The Digital Moon’s 17 computers are mainly used for the planetarium 
show, while the WISO servers and the ‘active node’ are prepared for the purpose of the Data 
Dome. 
 
                                                     
32 Unity is a platform that many developers use to design creative contents, such as Virtual Reality 






Figure 26. The physical layout of the Data Dome  
 
(2) Data Dome workshops: seeking content for the dome 
 
After roughly figuring out the physical features of the Data Dome, the Data Dome team 
decided to move to the next stage which was to explore suitable content for the Dome 
(Interview with Peggy, 05 October 2016; Interview with Jim, 20 October 2016). Several 
actors from the DOCK and Future City Radar (FCR) also joined this stage of the exploration. 
DOCK is a local digital centre who has rich experience in fostering creative projects. It 
assigned one member of staff to the Data Dome team. Future City Radar (FCR) is a UK 
government supported agency who is keen to work with local cities to find good smart cities 
demonstration cases. Data Dome attracted FCR’s attention and it sent several members of 
staffs who understand data to the Data Dome team. 
 
In order to find good real-time data contents to project in the dome, the Data Dome team 
decided to open-up dialogue with wider groups of people in Harbour City. Workshops were 
regarded as the best way to foster this dialogue. In the end, two workshops were hosted 
between May 2015 and July 2015. The workshops attracted around fifty people from various 




reality33 game), and data analysis (Fieldnotes, 24 May 2015). In order to align actors, niche 
internal mechanism articulation of expectation can be found at the beginning of each 
workshop. The mechanism of articulating expectation is supposed to contribute to attracting 
resources and necessary support for the Data Dome (Schot and Geels, 2008). Speeches were 
the main method of articulating the vision of Data Dome. In many speeches, the Data Dome 
was introduced as part of the city-scale OPHC infrastructure. Participants were encouraged 
to use available open data to design creative content that reflected urban issues (Fieldnotes, 
24 May 2015). £60.000 of prize money was prepared by FCR for successful prototypes.  
 
The activities in relation to the articulation of expectation and the prize money motivated 
many people to participate at the beginning of the workshops. Participants came up with 
many ideas about what could be done in a dome environment. Below, I have provided 
extracts from two interviews with workshop participants. They provide us with an idea about 
those imaginations. The first idea comes from a data analyst. He wanted to develop a system 
for the dome that allowed the dome to run different types of data. The second idea comes 
from a programmer who wanted to make the dome a space for people to discuss data 
collectively. 
 
Designing a system for the Data Dome 
 
“You can say to the dome, ‘dome, show me a graph of X against Y’, and then 
the graph appears above your head. You just speak, command, and it shows 
the graph above your head. And you can go like that [wave hand], then the 
graph disappeared. And there is a Twitter stream about people’s discussion 
alongside it. You can sort it when it [data] moves towards you. Like the 
Minority Report. When you are finishing looking at the data, and you said, ‘we 
should have a vote. Who think this is useful?’ People put their hand up, and it 
counts automatically…” 
 




Data Dome as a place for collaborative discussion about data 
 
“My expectation is that it could be a great shared space where people could 
do data visualisation and talk about data visualisation. I hope it could be a 
very social space to discuss data (…). I thought it could be an open space that 
it could have three or four data visualization distributed in the dome (…). 
Maybe a group of 3 or 4 people, wondering around and talking about the 
visualisation. They can also walk across the room and have discussions with 
                                                     
33 It is a computer generated simulated scenario that can be interact with by a person using specific input 




another group. At the moment people often look at data on their laptops in 
their office. There is no human contact and it is a very lonely experience (…).” 
 
Interview with a programmer, 05 October 2016 
 
Although there were many great ideas about what could be done in the dome environment, 
only a few developers sent their bid documents to the steering group and two unfinished 
prototypes won the competition. One prototype was a planning tree game that allowed 
audiences to interact with contents on the dome screen with their phones. This interaction 
aims to increase people’s environmental consciousness. The real-time data in this prototype 
came from audiences’ real-time input, but it is worth noting that this data was not coming 
from the OPHC’s RF Mesh network. Another prototype was a 3D data visualisation of urban 
air pollution. The prototype would extract data from a platform called open data street map34. 
Then, it built a model of Harbour City and visualised the pollution levels in Harbour City. 
In this prototype, there were no significant interactivity functions. It did not use the RF Mesh 
network either.  
 
Why was the alignment of local developers not very successful? One reason is the 
insufficient articulation of expectation. It was insufficient for two reasons. First, there was 
a contradiction between saying and readable action.  What is readable action? According to 
Van Lente (1993), vision statements are not only words that can be read, but also actions 
that can be interpreted. He calls these non-words vision statement as readable action. Similar 
to words, readable action also does something by positioning itself, others, and artefacts. 
When articulating the expectation of the Data Dome, on the one hand, the Data Dome team 
used their speeches (words) to encourage developers to conduct development for the dome. 
While on the other hand, their actions manifested in reality, showed the opposite. The 
contract that they sent to participants said that the copyright of the successful bids and all its 
products would belong to the FCR. The readable action in the contract contradicted what 
innovators had told the developers about IP arrangement at the beginning of the workshops. 
The contradiction confused developers. The data analyst that I mentioned above, had planned 
to develop a system for the Data Dome, but he lost the motivation when he read the copyright 
arrangement. He did not want to develop a system which would allow FCR to make money 
from it. Another workshop participant felt the same, as he comments “if they tell us it is a 
commission for FCR, that is fine. But they did not tell us, until I read the contract I started 
                                                     




to realise that (…)” (Interview with a workshop participant, 03 October 2016). As a result, 
the contradiction between saying and readable action put off lots of potential developers, 
and not many people submitted bids to the steering group. Another reason for the 
insufficiently articulated expectation was the level of interpretation flexibility the 
expectation left for people. According to Schot and Geels (2008), expectation should leave 
a certain degree of interpretation flexibility for people. If the interpretation is too narrow, it 
cannot encourage people to participate. If it is too general, it cannot provide guidance for 
research directions. In this instance, innovators did not provide enough space for workshop 
participants to interpret the idea.  As we can see from the two interview extracts above 
participants had many ideas about what could be done in the dome. However, Data Dome 
innovation team overly focused on finding suitable prototype contents for the dome, rather 
than opening it for other interpretations. As a result, very few people signed up to the idea 
of the Data Dome.  
 
Apart from insufficient articulation of expectation, other practical reasons also restricted the 
formation of networks to produce content for the Data Dome. First, developers were given 
a very short time to develop prototypes and there was no skill training for conducting 
developments in a dome environment. As a result, developers spent a great amount of time 
learning how to use the technologies before being able to develop content. For example, it 
took participants a long time to find out how to synchronise content from two projectors. 
Second, there was limited time for people to get into the dome is used for the planetarium 
show during the daytime (9 am - 5 pm) (Interview with a member of the Data Dome team, 
23 February 2016; Interview with a workshop participant, 13 September 2016). Third, the 
layout of the dome restricts human movements, because there are around 90 seats and many 
steps in the dome (see Figure 26). So, any design ideas that involved body movement in the 
dome would be restricted by this layout.  
 
(3) Launch event: enrolling potential users 
 
After finding two possible prototypes, the Data Dome team started to prepare for the official 
Data Dome launch. They aimed to attract clients to hire or conduct development for the 
dome. When preparing contents to show at the launch event, they gave additional money to 
two prototype developers to let them finish their designs. However, neither prototype was 




quickly found an alternative content from a designer in the DOCK (Figure 27). The OPHC 
engineering team and the OPHC business team also joined the preparation work. The OPHC 
engineering team connected the Data Dome to the OPHC infrastructure. Chris structured the 
price system for the Data Dome which is £1000 per hour. He also persuaded a big company 
H&C, a British multinational company, to use the Data Dome. In the end, H&C made a 3D 




Figure 27. Dome content made by a developer in the DOCK  
 
 
The launch event of Data Dome was hosted in a winter night in November 2015. When 
audiences walked into the Dome, they saw a live video streaming in the dome. In the video, 
two engineers from the NEXT Lab were talking to them in real-time (Figure 28). For most 
people, the experience might feel like no more than making a long-distance Skype call. 
However, from an engineering point of view, the streaming was significant! To send high-
resolution live video from the lab without compressing requires a lot of bandwidth. The live 
video successfully demonstrated the capacity of the OPHC network (Interview with David, 






Figure 28. Audiences watched live video in the launch event (The smiling faces are applied 
to anonymise engineers’ real identity) 
 
Before viewing the pre-arranged contents, Chris tried to use his speech to articulate the 
expectations of Data Dome. He told audiences that the Data Dome was the first 3D Dome in 
the UK, that it was part of the OPHC project and that it was connected to OPHC through the 
high-speed network. This idea also attracted some interest from big companies, such as 
H&C. People were welcomed to use the dome and it would cost people £1000 an hour to 
hire it. 
 
However, the articulation of expectation suffered. Through interviews with the audience and 
Data Dome team it was clear that not too many people bought-into the expectation. In 
reflecting on the failure in articulating the expectation, a member of the Data Dome team 
commented: 
 
“The launch event suffered because we have no story sorted out. One day, we 
said to developers that we want developers for this project. And all the stuff 
we show really was quite experimental. On the other hand, it was really 
expensive [to hire the place]. And we did not seem a match-up between 
audiences. What we say is not developed enough to say to corporate clients 
‘look at the stuff we can do’. It also was saying to developers you cannot afford 
to. Also, OPHC has not figured out how to sell the Dome (…).”  
 





From the comment above, we can see that there are two reasons that affected launch event 
participants buy-in to the expectation. One reason is that the pre-arranged contents were not 
convincing enough for corporate clients to invest. Another reason is the contradiction 
between saying and readable action. In Chris’s speech, he encouraged people to hire the 
dome. But, most developers cannot afford to pay £1000 per hour to rent the dome. As a 
result, they felt the expectation of Data Dome was not an invitation for them. Instead, it 
seemed to say, “you are welcome if you can afford it” (Interview with a member of Data 
Dome team, 20 October 2016).  
 
(4) May Digital Week: enrolling VR and 360-Degree content developers 
 
The Data Dome team learned many things from the launch event. They conducted a series 
of first order learning which was mainly about project management. For example, they 
learned that the Data Dome should be free for developers to experiment with their designs 
and there should be more time for developers to conduct experiment in the dome. They also 
identified the most easily aligned group for the dome which were the Virtual Reality and 
360-degree content35 developers. Moreover, they noticed that there needed to be tools to 
make it easier for those developers to produce content for the dome. I will return to the tool 
later.  
 
Apart from accumulating knowledge to achieve the goal of the Data Dome, the Data Dome 
team started to realise that the expectation of the Data Dome as an urban data visualisation 
device to engage citizens would be difficult to achieve. From an infrastructure design point 
of view, the Data Dome was not built for real-time data coming through the RF Mesh 
network and waiting to be projected onto the dome. Instead, it was an opportunity to build. 
Therefore, the OPHC infrastructure was not intentionally set-up for the purposes of the Data 
Dome. From a citizen engagement point of view, the Data Dome as a public space to engage 
citizens was challenged. First, the dome is a public space, but it is not an open public space 
that people can access at any time. In the daytime, the dome’s purpose is to serve the 
planetarium show. So, there is only a short time in the day for people to view data. Second, 
not everyone in Harbour City can enjoy the data show. Because the dome is located in the 
centre of the Harbour City, making it difficult for people who live in other parts of city to 
access the dome. Moreover, even if people can travel to the dome, seeing some air quality 
                                                     




data fly over their heads is not going to have a great impact (Interview with a member of 
Data Dome team, 05 October 2016). However, the “not right” feeling was not strong enough 
to challenge the original assumption of the Data Dome, and generate the second order 
learning. 
 
Although the innovation results were not positive, the Data Dome team did not claim the 
project is as failure. Instead, they decided to continue the experiment and build an agenda to 
align Virtual Reality and 360-degree content developers. In order to encourage them to 
develop contents for the Dome, the Data Dome team removed the entrance barriers that had 
been identified in the previous stage. For example, the Science Museum agreed to make the 
dome free for developers to conduct development. They also built tools to bridge the 
VR/360-degree contents and dome contents (Interview with a member of Data Dome team, 
05 October 2016). As we can see above, VR/360-degree content and the dome content both 
share a developing tool Unity. However, the projection environment of the dome is different 
from the projection environment of a VR device. So, in order to make Virtual Reality and 
360-degree content developers more willing to develop content for the dome, the Data Dome 
team decided to develop conversion tools that can easily convert VR/360-degree contents 
into dome contents. Moreover, they specifically commissioned a local VR company (Orbit 
Game36) to design a game demo. This ended up with a VR game called Splat Harbour City. 
Audiences can download an application on their phones and play the game collectively with 















                                                     
36 The reason to choose Orbit Games was because the company has a second screen technology (the dome 
could be regarded as the first screen and the phone screen as the second screen). The second screen 
technology allows participants in the dome to use their phones as input devices to interact with content 







Figure 29. Audiences playing Splat Harbour City in the Dome  
 
 
These efforts of this new approach were presented in an annual digital event in Harbour City 
called May Digital Week. The Data Dome team tried to articulate expectation again at this 
event. Compared with the launch event, the message sent out at this event was very clear. 
The central message was that the dome welcome developers in local communities to conduct 
development. As one member of the Data Dome recalls, “this May event is trying to re-
structure the story around the dome and say to digital communities that we want to make 
this dome for you to use. We have stopped talking about products and big prices. This is a 
development project and we want you to come to the Dome.” (Interview with a member of 
the Data Dome team, 20 October 2016) 
 
However, the event was still not able to align developers to make content for the dome. As 
another member of the Data Dome team commented, “people do VR, we said to them could 
we just transfer stuff you do into the dome? They said no. So, sometimes this tool might help, 
but the question for them is why I am going to do that?” (Interview with a member of Data 
Dome team, 05 October 2016). The interview with Tim from the Orbit Game provides 






           JW:  Are you going to continue do something for the Dome in the future? 
        
          Tim: These types of project (Data Dome) are good. But, we are doing 
business. I want to know the product that I made. How much is  
it going to sell? How much it costs me to make it? To make a  
demo is fine [Splat Harbour City]. But, (smile), if I spend one year     
to develop some excellent product in the dome, how can I recover  
my cost and who going to invest in it? 
 
An informal interview with Tim, 15 May 2016  
 
So, although the conversion tool exists, VR entrepreneurs have tended to make a rational 
decision not to develop VR content for the dome. This resonates with the findings in the 
previous site that developers were less likely to test through OPHC because they tend to 
think short-term in order to survive. 
 
Despite the unsuccessful alignment of developers, the action of lowering the entry barriers 
has gradually fostered an ecosystem around the dome. This ecosystem consists of a wide 
range of actors, such as big corporations (e.g. MiniCat, UK BROADCAST), local 
institutions (e.g. Straw House), and individuals (e.g. artists, scientists), etc. Apart from 
MiniCat who developed a gesture control application for the Data Dome, other users all 
creatively used the dome to suit their own private expectations. For example, UK 
BROADCAST uses the dome to further their knowledge of the 360-degree video. Straw 
House uses the dome space to conduct an art performance (Figure 30). A medical scientist 
hired the dome for a Virtual Reality Brain lecture. Visual artists use the dome for art 
performances and so on. The case of MiniCat is special. MiniCat is a U.S multinational 
technology company who sent eight engineers to design a gesture control application for the 
dome (See appendix 8 (3)). The reason MiniCat conducted development for the dome for 
free was because the company is big enough to invest money long-term and do charitable 
work to increase the company’s public reputation. But, most other developers use the Data 
Dome for their own purposes. To see actors freely translate the dome according to meet their 
individual expectations is fascinating, because it demonstrates that local people can 
creatively make use of local assets. But for the expectations of Data Dome, too much 
interpretation flexibility might influence the innovation direction. As discussed above, too 







Figure 30. People playing balloons inside the Dome 
 
6.2.3 Innovation mechanisms and results 
 
The stories above presented the implementation process of the Data Dome. The vision of 
OPHC coordinated the Data Dome team’s actions. They built agendas gradually in the 
process. For example, they started with configured physical features for the Data Dome. 
Then, they hosted workshops to seek contents for the dome. They also made efforts to align 
clients and developers for the dome. During the process, three niche internal mechanisms 
helped to build up a protected space to experiment with the idea. As we see above, innovators 
built a network of suppliers for the Data Dome (e.g. Digital Moon and WISO) and aligned 
developers around the dome (e.g. the developers for two prototypes). The Data Dome team 
attempted to attract resources through articulating the expectation of the Data Dome. 
However, it was not very successful due to the contradiction between saying and readable 
action, and the lack of interpretation flexibility. The Data Dome team also achieved a lot of 
first order learning. That first order learning formed a positive feedback loop which allowed 
innovators to adjust their actions in the innovation process. There are some second-order 
learning in the process. For example, the Data Dome team noticed the initial assumption of 
the project might not work. But, their doubts were not able to challenge the original 
assumption of the project.   
 




the Data Dome team, the OPHC engineering team, and the OPHC business team. As we see 
above, the three teams only briefly cooperated in the launch event. The lack of coordination 
between the Data Dome team and the OPHC business team ended up with the announcement 
of a price that people could not afford. This eventually influenced the articulation of vision. 
The lack of coordination between the Data Dome team and the OPHC engineering team 
made the Data Dome a dead end. As we see above, the innovation results in this site were an 
upgraded 3D Dome and several prototypes of content. The innovation results were far from 
realising the original expectation of the Data Dome that was scripted in the vision of OPHC. 
I have visualised the innovation results in Figure 31. As we can see from the figure, there 
was only a high-speed network connecting the dome to the OPHC infrastructure, there was 
no real-time data collecting from the RF Mesh network or calculating by the supercomputers. 
To better understand the actual relationship between the dome and the OPHC infrastructure, 
I would like to provide an analogy of a glass and a pipe37. If we say the dome is a glass. Then 
the high-speed network between the NEXT Lab and the dome could be regarded as a pipe. 
All the prototype content displayed in the dome were like pouring different types of water 
into the glass (the dome) to let people see that it is possible to have water come through the 
pipe. However, in fact there were no real water running through the pipe into the glass. The 
water poured into the glass was just a way to demonstrate what would happen if there were 
water running through the pipe. In order to make the dome a data visualisation device for the 
OPHC infrastructure, there needed to have been coordination between the development of 
the Data Dome (Data Dome team) and the development of Programmable infrastructure 
(OPHC engineering team). For instance, OPHC’s RF Mesh network would need to be open 
for people to hang different type of sensors on the lampposts to collect real-time data. The 
collected data would be analysed by the supercomputers before being streaming to the dome. 
Although the OPHC vision coordinated innovation activities within each site, it was not able 
to coordinate innovation activities between sites. I will explore what I call the paradox of 
vision later. Similar to the previous site, although the niche experiment of the Data Dome 
was not able to deliver the original expectation of an urban data visualisation device, the 
Data Dome project was not seen to be a failure. A series of negative experiments results 
were interpreted as obstacles that could be overcome in the future. I will further elaborate 
the point of failure in the discussion section.  
 
                                                     





Figure 31. The innovation results of the Data Dome 
 
6.3 Making the Citizen Sensing application (Toad) 
 
6.3.1 Straw House buy-in to the vision of OPHC and creating a guiding 
expectation  
 
(1) Straw House buy-in to the OPHC vision  
 
The last OPHC innovation activity in relation to implementing OPHC I am going to talk 
about in this chapter is the making of a Citizen Sensing application. This application was co-
produced by Straw House and local communities. Before describing the innovation process, 
I will briefly introduce how Straw House joined this journey. The OPHC vision statement 
imagined the local community organisation Straw House 38  co-producing an OPHC 
application with citizens. The vision statement did not say exactly what the application 
would be, it indicated that Straw House could take up this role. Straw House has a long 
history of using media as a tool to engage citizens (Interview with Camila, 30 June 2016). 
In the past twenty years, it carried out a series of technological projects with local 
communities (Interview with Stein, 28 June 2016). Following the global trend of the smart 
city, Straw House has recently developed an agenda to explore the element of citizen 
                                                     
38 Straw House is based in the southern part of Harbour City a place recently faces with many challenges, 
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engagement in a smart city. This agenda naturally led them to the idea of smart citizens. As 
Stein, a co-director of Straw House, emphasised, “you cannot have a smart city without 
smart citizens” (Fieldnotes, 24 February 2015). The organisation also actively participated 
in the negotiation process of the Super Connected City (SCC) competition. So, it witnessed 
how Gigabit Harbour City morphed into OPHC. Although neither directors of Straw House 
were quite sure about what a programmable infrastructure was, they still decided to take on 
the role that OPHC assigned to the organisation.  
 
Opportunity and fear were two reasons why Straw House decided to buy-in to the vision of 
OPHC. On the one hand, Straw House heard that OPHC regarded citizen engagement as one 
of its principle aims. Straw House has many years of experience of working with local 
communities. Straw House naturally thought it could contribute its expertise of citizen 
engagement to OPHC. On the other hand, the image pressure (Konrad, 2006) of OPHC made 
Straw House worried not to be part of it. Straw House heard that many important local 
institutions (e.g. the Harbour City University, DOCK, BOX, and Science Museum) had all 
signed up the OPHC project and were having OPHC’s physical nodes installed in their 
buildings. A sense of not wanting to fall behind made Straw House also want to become a 
local partner. One co-director of Straw House expressed the anxiety of not being a part of 
the OPHC project, “you have to be at those tables and say, ‘I want one of those nodes, 
please'. You have one in Harbour City University, and you have one in the DOCK. You have 
one in the BOX. You have one in the Science Museum. OK, now you have one in the Straw 
House” (Interview with a co-director of Straw House, 30 June 2016). This phenomenon is 
similar to Konrad’s (2006) observation about e-commerce. She found that large numbers of 
companies signed up to the vision of e-commerce not necessarily for specific benefits from 
the business, but often, because they were following collective expectations. Collective 
expectations can produce image pressure which motives actors to engage in collective 
expectations.  Based on this observation, Konrad (2006) argues sometimes actors sign up a 
vision not because they could benefit from it. Instead, they are influenced by the image 
pressure that caused by the collective expectation. In line with Konrad (2006), I argue that 
because many main actors in Harbour City signed up to the vision of OPHC, this made 
OPHC a collective expectation at the local level, and this collective expectation created 
image pressure for Straw House. This image pressure made Straw House feel obliged to 





(2) Creating a guiding expectation: A commons approach of Citizen Sensing 
 
After Straw House bought-into the vision of OPHC, it needed to build an agenda and take 
actions towards realising the role that OPHC vision assigned to it. Camila started to think 
about what kind of technology could easily to engage citizens. She began to pay attention to 
off-the-shelf sensor technology and wanted to develop a citizen sensing application for 
OPHC. In an international living lab meeting, she met a PhD researcher from Barcelona 
called Maria who was doing research about technology and citizens. Camila invited Maria 
to Harbour City to help Straw House to develop the Citizen Sensing project. Maria accepted 
the offer and mapped out the worldwide Citizen Sensing project for Straw House.  
 
Maria’s research informed the expectation formation of the Citizen Sensing project. In order 
to build a unique Citizen Sensing project. Straw House needed to find a guiding expectation 
and this expectation should have an underpinning value that would appeal to local 
communities. In the end, they highlighted the philosophy of the ‘commons’ as an 
underpinning value. Although there is no agreed definition about what a ‘commons’ is, Straw 
House defined ‘commons’ as resources that people create based on collective agreement. 
The resources will also be used for the common good (a leaflet produced by the Straw House, 
2016). Wikipedia is often used as an example to explain the idea (Fieldnotes, 05 March 
2016). As Maria explained at one event, “It is like Wikipedia, one person builds the 
infrastructure, and nine people edit things. Then, you get ninety people who use it. All those 
people are vital for the ecology” (Fieldnotes, 19 April 2016). The idea of a ‘commons’ was 
adopted by Straw House and it became the core value for the expectation of the Citizen 
Sensing project. This expectation was called a commons approach to Citizen Sensing. It 
hoped that people from different backgrounds would come together to co-produce something 
for the common good.  
 
6.3.2 Producing a Citizen Sensing application 
 
Following the expectation of a commons approach to Citizen Sensing, Straw House started 
to take actions to produce the application. Several staffs from Straw House formed a Citizen 
sensing team, including Camila, Stein, Judy, Lucy, and some other member of staff from 
Straw House. As with the Data Dome, the Citizen Sensing project was also a novel 
innovation idea in Harbour City. So, it required a protected space (niche) to be built around 




from the Data Dome niche, because it was formed by a community organisation. Grin et al, 
(2010) argue that niches can not only be formed by policy makers, but also by social groups, 
such as community organisation. Citizen Sensing is a bottom-up niche that was created by a 
community organisation. Compared with niches formed by actors in authorities, niches 
formed by community organisations have different characteristics in their internal process. I 
will address those characteristics within the context later.  
 
(1) Identifying problems and network formations around the expectation 
 
In winter 2015, the Citizen Sensing team decided to identify problems that mattered to local 
people and could be solved by sensor technologies. They conducted a broad city-wide 
network analysis. They talked to people in local barber shops, laundries, and community 
centres, etc. In the end, they came up with three local issues that could be addressed by 
sensing technologies: biodiversity and health, the use of the high street, and issue of damp 
in houses.  
 
Then, the Citizen Sensing team started to form social networks around Citizen Sensing. 
Building social networks around innovative ideas is important for developing a niche 
because actors in the social networks can provide necessary resources to the project, such as 
money, people, expertise to support the realisation of the expectation (Schot and Geels, 
2008). Network formation is especially important for social niches (Verheul and Vergragt, 
1995) like Citizen Sensing project, because unlike niches formed by big business or policy 
makers that can easily access many resources, social niches relies more on volunteers to 
bring a mix of skills and resources (Seyfang et al., 2014). In the case of Citizen Sensing, 
Straw House uses a social networking event and workshops to foster social networks around 
the Citizen Sensing project. Within those events, many artistic methods were applied to help 
identify the skills and capabilities of participants. For example, at a networking event in 
January 2016, Judy designed a big eyeball like wall chart and hung it in the entrance hall of 
Straw House (Figure 32). The chart was divided into different section and each section 
indicated aspects that participants could offer to the project, including development, 
workshops, commons license. When participants walked into Straw House, they were asked 
to cover the chart with pink post-its. Those pink post-its helped Straw House to spot local 







Figure 32. Using a big wall chart to identify available resources within local communities  
 
(2) Articulating expectation and learning 
 
In the Spring 2016, Straw House ran a workshop to refine issues and build alliances. The 
workshop attracted around 60 people from different sectors. At the beginning of the 
workshop, Judy, Lucy, and Maria tried to use speeches to articulate the expectation of 
Citizen Sensing. This helped to attract the necessary support. Below, I have provided an 
extract of their speech: 
 
“So, why we are here? I guess the starting point is that I believe people really 
have a minimal role in how we design and imagine our cities. The real danger 
at the moment is that we have got a command and control vision of what a 
smart city is going to be. Energy, water can be sucked into private 
corporations and big government. Really not too many spaces left for human 
agency and imagination. So, commons approach to Citizen Sensing, we really 
have to do a bottom-up approach for the smart city and think about what are 
tools? and what kinds of issues people care about at their community level 
(…). In the spirit of ‘commons’, a large part of this project is to create 
participatory urban ‘common’ where citizens generated data becomes a 
‘common’ good for cities…” 
                                                                               
Fieldnotes, 05 March 2016 
 
As we can see from the fieldnotes, when introducing the expectation of Citizen Sensing, the 




is dominated by the “command and control” of big corporations and has little space for 
“people’s imagination”. To provide an alternative, the project suggested a commons 
approach to smart city making that aims to co-produce smart applications for local 
communities. The introduction of the ‘commons’ as the core of its expectation contributed 
to articulating the vision of Citizen Sensing in two ways. First, the ‘commons’ as a value is 
important for a niche that is to be built by social groups. As Verheul and Vergragt’s (1995) 
research shows, bottom-up niches built for social organisations always contain some values. 
They call these social niches. Social niches may not be primarily based on the profitability 
future. Instead, their expectations are to pursuit some other values. For example, in their 
study, they find that environmental awareness is the core value of expectation in their studies 
and it helps to motivate actors to participate in the project (Verheul and Vergragt, 1995). In 
the same vein, Citizen Sensing is a bottom up social niche. The alignment with the value of 
‘commons’ shows the organisation’s intention to incorporate social value to the project. This 
helped the project to build alliances. Second, the concept of ‘commons’ moralised the vision 
of the project. As Berkhout (2006) points out “vision of future tends to be moralised”. People 
often use positive moral value or visualise the negative consequences of not doing it to 
persuade people to sign up to a proposed vision. This is especially the case with Citizen 
Sensing. As we can see from empirical data above, the Citizen Sensing team talked about 
the negative consequences of current mainstream smart city making, and then they suggested 
a commons approach to Citizen Sensing.  
 
The moral values associated with ‘commons’ were very important for Citizen Sensing team 
to articulate the expectation of the project. Participants found the idea of ‘commons’ hard to 
understand at the beginning. But through an iteratively articulated process, the expectation 
was gradually accepted by some people as an interview with a workshop participant shows, 
“I did not get [the idea of commons] the way at the start, but the more I learn it, it sounds 
very appealing (…). The main reason I like it is because it thinks about people’s role. For 
example, they break down this commons approach. People are sort of data contributors. 
That is a personal role. We found, I cannot remember the name, the person does the 
networking thing. The person does the funding. In the beginning, I did not get it, but in the 
process, I get it” (Interview with Zack, 03 October 2016). So, in general, the articulation of 
expectation in this setting was quite successful. It helped to attract many participants to 





After the articulation of expectation, participants were also encouraged to express their ideas 
about the data and the project. Then, they were divided into three groups to discuss three 
pre-established issues: the biodiversity and health, the use of the high street, and the issue of 
domestic damp (Figure 33). Much first order learning could be observed in the process. The 
Citizen Sensing team accumulated many ideas that shaped their future agendas. For example, 
based on notes and observations from the workshop, the Citizen Sensing team realised that 
the issue of damp in homes attracted more interest than the another two. So, they decided to 
narrow down the focus to build an application that tackled this issue. 
 
 
Figure 33. Participants were discussing the issue of damp  
 
(3) Designing an application for the issue of damp 
 
After narrowing down the focus, the Citizen Sensing team hosted a workshop in the summer 
of 2016 to develop a sensing application for the issue of domestic damp. Based on the 
previous event, a specific social network was formed around this issue. This included people 
who have damp houses, data analysts, big landlords, programmers, etc. In the workshop, 
participants talked about the issue of damp, relevant sensors technologies, scenarios, and 
possible design (see more details in Figure 34). In the end, two types of data were identified 
relevant to the damp issue: indoor temperature and indoor humidity level. In order to collect 
those two types of data, a temperature sensor and a humidity sensor were chosen by 





Figure 34. Questions discussed in the workshop 
 
 





After a series of learning episodes around the damp issue, another workshop was hosted to 
create a sensing application for the issue. Only a local freelance data analyst, John, turned 
up to the workshop with a technological design. John’s design was informed by a series 
workshops. He showed his design to other participants and this design was quickly adopted 
as the prototype without facing any competitions. A curious incident occurred at the 
workshop which determined the look and the name of the sensing device. John put the 
Raspberry Pi39 and its box together on a table (Figure 36) and a workshop participant 
accidentally put two paper eyes on the box. This made the box look like a Toad. Participants 
agreed that the shape of Toad was suitable for a damp sensing device because “toads 
normally live in a damp environment” (Interview John, 13 September 2016). Then, a 
designer from the Straw House helped to craft the look of the Toad. Finally, the Toad became 




Figure 36. John’s sensor box and Raspberry Pi (Left) and the Toad (Right) 
 
(4) Seeking to deploy the Toad 
 
After configuring a sensing device, the natural next step was to find people with damp houses 
willing to accept the Toad to collect data for two weeks. In order to find local houses to 
                                                     




participate in the experiment, Straw House turned to its own social networks. Straw House 
has good pre-existing connections in the city, and this network made it easy to quickly 
identify and bring together people with certain skills, and knowledge (Martiskainen, 2016: 
13). In the end, Straw House contacted one of its previous partners, a local energy company, 
to find damp houses in local communities. A man from the local energy company called 
Michael, who had 30 years working experience in the social housing, heard about the Citizen 
Sensing project and shared the aspiration of the project. Through his social network, he found 
five houses in local communities that were willing to experiment with the Toad. 
 
Because the Toads were not connected to the Internet, John went to each home to upload the 
data manually two weeks later. The question in front of John was what if there were more 
Toads in people’s home in the future? It would be impossible to upload the data manually. 
So, the Toads have to connect to the Internet to upload the data automatically. Wi-Fi was 
one way to connect the Toad to the Internet. However, about 30 per cent of households in 
the eastern part of Harbour City do not have Wi-Fi. The lack of Wi-Fi in these residential 
homes made John look for the alternative network, the RF Mesh network. The RF Mesh 
network is a communication network using radio frequency to send data. So, he thought if 
he put an RF card in the Toad, the Toad could send data to the RF Mesh network even for 
families without internet connections. So, this meant the Toad could be used in almost all 
areas in Harbour City. 
 
Since Straw House became one of the local host partners of OPHC, it always had the idea of 
utilising OPHC infrastructure. At the beginning of the Citizen Sensing project, Straw House 
had the idea that Citizen Sensing could generate an application for the OPHC. The interview 
extract below captures how a co-director of Straw House perceived this opportunity: 
 
  JW: When you launched the citizen sensing project, did you have an idea to 
use the OPHC infrastructure or not? 
 
Stein: I think so, we already started to use the Data Dome (…). For us, the 
question is how we can use it [OPHC] rather than what will happen. We 
were told it [the OPHC infrastructure] would be there. So, what the 
application of that within a community context will look like? What does 
it mean? 
       





But Straw House did not know what application it was going to produce and how it might 
use the OPHC infrastructure. Straw House had a meeting with Harbour City Council at the 
beginning of the Citizen Sensing project. One question from Harbour City Council was how 
could the Citizen Sensing project utilise the existing City Council infrastructures? Given 
OPHC is a joint venture between the Harbour City council and Harbour City University, 
OPHC was naturally on the list of City Council’s infrastructures. For Straw House, the 
questions were “what kind of things might mean the need to create lots of sensors for people 
to use and how can the RF Mesh network support it? What kind of licenses and protocols 
would put in place?” (Interview with Judy, 09 July 2016) These questions were brought up 
many times by Judy during the workshops. However, how to use the OPHC infrastructure 
was not clear until the Toads were placed in residential homes to collect data.  
 
In order to find an RF Mesh network in Harbour City for the Toad to use, John immediately 
thought about the OPHC’s RF Mesh network. According to the official OPHC website, the 
RF Mesh network was supposed to open in April 2016. John had a high expectation of using 
the OPHC’s RF Mesh network because he had heard that there was around £20,000 for 
companies to use OPHC’s RF Mesh network (Interview with John, 13 September 2016). But 
in summer 2016, there was still no news about the OPHC RF Mesh network’s opening. In 
order to confirm the launch date of the OPHC’s RF Mesh network, John contacted Chris. 
Through Chris, he found out that the RF Mesh network would be installed in August 2016. 
And, John started to sketch a plan about the Toad and the RF Mesh network. I still vividly 
remember the moment that he illustrated his plan to me in a pub. He thought the Toad could 
connect to the OPHC RF Mesh network in the autumn of 2016. However, his dream was 
shattered when he heard that Chris had resigned, and the launch date of the RF Mesh network 
had become uncertain.  
 
The official explanation about the delay of opening the RF Mesh network was because the 
RF Mesh network solution provider Gold Autumn was very protective about its technology. 
It was not willing to open its RF Mesh for OPHC to re-configure and make it programmable. 
What Gold Autumn’s RF Mesh solution could do was to remotely control streetlights. 
According to the OPHC’s vision, the RF Mesh network should become a programmable 
network that would allow users to integrate whatever sensors they want. In order to find a 




network, the OPHC engineering team came up with an idea to build an IoT Router40. At the 
end stage of fieldwork, the OPHC engineering team were still at the stage of testing the IoT 
Router. 
 
6.3.3 The innovation results and the issue of lack of coordination 
 
Citizen Sensing team successfully articulated the expectation to its audiences from local 
communities and attracted many interests and supports. A specific social network formed 
around the project, including developers and people who have damp issue. The learnings 
from the workshops help the Citizen Sensing team to narrow down the research direction to 
the damp house and sensor technology. Through John’s personal experiment and Straw 
House’s design, the Toad was produced as an outcome of niche experiment. The Toad was 
a potential to bridge the Citizen Sensing project and OPHC. However, the Toad also brought 
up the tension between Citizen Sensing and OPHC infrastructure development. This because 
although there was an existing application, people still cannot use the OPHC infrastructure.  
 
Why could the Toad not use OPHC’s infrastructure? In appearance, this was because Gold 
Autumn was not willing to open up its technology for the OPHC engineering team to 
reconfigure. But the deeper reason behind it was that there was no coordination between the 
innovation activities of the programmable infrastructure (the OPHC engineering team) and 
the innovation activities of Citizen Sensing (the Citizen Sensing team). As we saw in section 
6.1, the OPHC engineers conducted experiments on the infrastructure. They built agendas 
for the infrastructure development and continued to update the agenda to keep it state-of-art. 
However, people normally understand OPHC through its marketing agenda produced by the 
OPHC business team. The marketing agenda circulated in public mainly through the official 
website. According to the OPHC marketing agenda, the IoT Mesh (another name for the RF 
Mesh network) should have launched in April 2016. The marketing agenda was created at 
the beginning of the project. To some extent, it was how the OPHC business team envisioned 
what the OPHC platform could provide as marketing products. As seen above, what 
coordinated John’s expectation was this marketing agenda of OPHC, not the engineering 
agenda of OPHC. We can also see above, that John received information about the RF Mesh 
network either through reading the official website online or chatting with a member of the 
                                                     
40 Through the bridge an IoT Router, the IoT Router seeks to make the RF Mesh programmable. The idea 
is that one end of the IoT Router would connect the RF Mesh. And people can add whatever sensors 




OPHC business team. However, the messy engineering process and continually evolving 
engineering agenda were never reflected in the marketing agenda. I visualise the lack of 
coordination in Figure 37. As can be seen from the figure there were no linkages or 
communication channels between the OPHC engineering agenda and OPHC’s marketing 
agenda. As a result, Straw House’s innovation activities were coordinated with the OPHC’s 
marketing agenda and not with the engineering agenda. This is why the development of the 
Toad was faster than the infrastructure development and the Toad was not able to connect to 
the OPHC infrastructure. The Toad not being able to use the RF Mesh network generated 
disappointment for Straw House and other participants. I will come back to the point of 























Figure 37. Understating the lack of coordination between Citizen Sensing innovation and 
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This chapter has investigated the roll-out of the vision of OPHC. The research shows that 
the implementation of OPHC occurred in three parallel sites in Harbour City. Above, I have 
drawn on relevant conceptual tools to conduct some analysis about innovation activities in 
each site. Below, I would like to look across the three sites to summarise four key features 
in the implementation process. These are innovation mechanisms, the role of vision, the 
challenges of citizen engagement, and the “impossibility” of failure.  
 
6.4.1 The three parallel niche experiments  
 
From the empirical data above, we have seen that the materialisation process of OPHC 
happened in three parallel sites: a programmable infrastructure, an urban data visualisation 
application Data Dome, and a Citizen Sensing application. The programmable infrastructure 
and the Data Dome are features that were scripted in the vision of OPHC. In the case of the 
Citizen Sensing project, Straw House took up the role that the vision of OPHC allocated for 
it and tried to enact it. If we say that OPHC is a local smart city niche, then the three 
innovation activities can be regarded as three sub-niches of OPHC. They are niches because 
they were all protected spaces (niche) formed by different innovators (OPHC engineering 
team, OPHC business team, Data Dome team, and citizen sensing team) around novel ideas. 
We can refer them as sub-niches because they were all protected by the overarching niche 
of OPHC.  
 
In order to experiment with those three novel ideas and attract resources around the ideas, 
the three niche internal processes (articulation of expectation, building social networks, and 
learning) were found in all three sites. For example, innovators trying to articulate 
expectations in order to attract attention. They all sought to form social networks around the 
ideas and conducted many levels of learning. Those niche internal mechanisms contributed 
to nurturing innovation in three sites. They helped the innovators explore three novel ideas, 
but not all the mechanisms were conducted properly in the process. I have highlighted how 
those mechanisms contributed to the three sub-niche developments: 
 
- The activities of articulation of expectation can be especially found at the site of the 
Data Dome and Citizen Sensing, used to attract support. At the Citizen Sensing site, 




to attracting developers and people with in their home around the project. However, 
not all articulations of expectation processes were successful. In the case of the Data 
Dome, the articulation of expectation suffered in various stages. There were two 
reasons. One reason is the contradiction between saying and readable action (e.g. the 
IP arrangement and the £ 1000 an hour rental fee). People were confused about the 
messages that innovators sent out and decided not buy-in to the expectation. Another 
reason is the issue of interpretation flexibility. As I have discussed above, sometimes 
the expectation was too fixed that people could not convert the expectation to their 
own desires, and sometimes the expectation was too flexible so that it lost the function 
to guide the direction of innovation.  
 
- The mechanism of building social networks happened in all three sites. In all sites, 
innovators sought to allocate different types of actor networks around the 
expectations. For example, in the case of the programmable infrastructure, the OPHC 
engineering team and the OPHC business team aligned technological components 
suppliers and users (e.g. engineers and big corporations) around the programmable 
infrastructure. At the Data Dome site, the Data Dome team formed a network around 
the idea, including technological suppliers, content developers, and a big corporation 
(H&C). At the Citizen Sensing site, the Citizen Sensing team built a social network 
around the idea. This included people who have damp issues in their homes, 
technology developers, and data experts. However, not all social actors were willing 
to enrol in the project. For example, in the setting of the programmable infrastructure 
site, there was a lack of involvement of non-engineer researchers, SMEs and ordinary 
developers. In the case of Data Dome, SMEs and content developers were not willing 
to develop contents for the Dome.  
 
- The mechanism of learning, and especially the first order learning, can also be 
identified across all three sites. First order learning is a type of learning that 
accumulates knowledge to reach a pre-established goal. For example, through 
observing the interaction between users and the infrastructure, the OPHC engineering 
team were able to learn more about users’ needs and the OPHC business team learnt 
how to deal with the tricky issue of copyright in the cooperation process. At the Data 
Dome site, the Data Dome team accumulated a lot of knowledge, such as technology 




can be identified in the process. It could have taken place in the Data Dome site, but 
the negative experiment results did not reach a level that could challenge the original 
assumptions of the Data Dome.  
 
6.4.2 Vision’s paradoxical coordination function 
 
In Chapter 5, I argued that the vision of OPHC was a prospective structure which created 
task divisions and assigned roles for different people and artefacts. It clearly stated what a 
programmable infrastructure would look like, what a Data Dome would do, how local 
community organization, Straw House, would help to engage citizens, and what the business 
agenda of OPHC was to be. In this Chapter, we can see how this prospective structure 
coordinate four different innovation teams (OPHC engineering team, OPHC business team, 
Data Dome team, and Citizen Sensing team) in the three sites. They all took up the roles that 
the prospective structure assigned to them; built up agendas; and created relevant task 
divisions to enact those roles.  
 
However, the vision statement of OPHC (prospective structure) was insufficient to 
coordinate actions between the different innovation teams. There were no coordinated 
innovation activities between sites. As we have seen from above, the four innovation teams 
conducted rather lonely innovation journeys. There were no interactions between them and 
the lack of interactions created barriers to the realisation of the OPHC vision. For example, 
the OPHC business team did not coordinate with OPHC engineering team at the 
programmable infrastructure site. As a result, the OPHC business team continued align users 
which then created pressure on to OPHC engineering team. At the Data Dome site, the lack 
of coordination between the OPHC business team and the Data Dome team made the 
articulation of expectation suffer, that is, by saying as opposed to readable action. At the 
same site, the lack of coordination between the OPHC engineering team and the Data Dome 
team made the Dome a dead end and not able to realise the initial vision of use as an urban 
data visualisation device. At the Citizen Sensing site, the lack of coordination between the 
OPHC business team and the OPHC engineering team allowed the Citizen Sensing team to 
proceed with a “wrong” expectation. This “wrong” expectation eventually caused 
disappointment at Straw House and effected the trust relationship between the OPHC and its 
local host partners. The lack of coordination between the OPHC engineering team and the 




the OPHC’s RF Mesh network as they had planned. 
 
Why did the vision statement not provide coordination between the different innovation 
teams in the different sites? The cause of this paradox of vision has historical roots. As we 
see in Chapter 5 the vision of OPHC was not created in a vacuum by visionaries or prophets. 
Instead, it was created at the end of a birth process that bundled together various local 
expectations; there were both pre-existing and new agendas within the vision of OPHC. The 
actors who took up the roles that the vision of OPHC assigned to them were just doing what 
they were good at doing and not necessarily thinking of building mutual agendas with each 
other. As a result, the innovators in each site just focused on their own tasks. For example, 
the OPHC engineering team constantly modified the HLA according to the latest 
technologies. They focused on keeping the programmable infrastructure state-of-art rather 
than thinking about how to work with innovators producing applications for OPHC (e.g. the 
Data Dome and the Citizen Sensing teams). The Data Dome team came from two 
institutions: Harbour City Council and the Science Museum. On one hand, they upgraded 
the dome and this satisfied the need of the Science Museum. On the other hand, they focused 
on aligning developers to develop content for the dome. This was because one of council’s 
jobs is to create jobs for local innovators. Innovator at the Citizen Sensing site mainly come 
from Straw House. As a community organisation, its main expertise was to co-produce 
applications with citizens. So, its priority was to explore the citizen engagement 
methodology, rather than make sure the application could use the OPHC infrastructure. So, 
creating an OPHC vision statement which bundled different innovators together did not 
guarantee innovators in different sites would coordinate with each other naturally. In order 
to make a system innovation like OPHC work, different innovation teams needed to build 
mutual agendas with each other. Otherwise, as we have seen, each focused solely on what 
they were good at and ended up generating different innovation speeds within the system 
innovation. 
 
It is worth noting that the organisational structure of OPHC did not provide sufficient 
coordination mechanisms between the innovation teams and sites. OPHC is a joint venture 
between Harbour City Council and Harbour City University. There were four members on 
the board panel of OPHC: two from Harbour City University and two from the Harbour City 
Council. However, there was “no a belt” tying the four board members together (Interview 




the Chief Technology Designer, the Chief Manager, the Chief accountant, and the Chief 
Director. However, none of them had the executive power. OPHC believed the magic that 
linked everyone together, would make things happen naturally. But, unfortunately this was 
not the case. The reality was that there was no one coordinating the holistic innovation 
process. In each site, innovation activities were driven by different innovation teams which 
did not necessarily know each other. It required a system niche actor or system manager to 
oversee and coordinate the innovation activities between different innovation teams in 
different sites.  
 
6.4.3 The challenges of citizen engagement 
 
OPHC claims to put citizens at the core of its innovation. The overall goal of the project was 
to build a programmable platform that would allow an ecosystem of users to use the 
infrastructure, and it clearly stated that citizens, developers, and SMEs could test their 
products using the OPHC testbed. Apart from this configuration, it also proposed two citizen 
related smart city applications. One was OPHC’s first application the Data Dome. The 
application was meant to enable local citizens to interact with their urban data and allow 
local developers to produce content for the Dome. The other was an opportunity for citizens 
with less technological know-how to co-create an application with local community 
organisation Straw House. The empirical data in this chapter captured what happened in 
reality in those citizen related imaginations.  
 
Engineers and large business were the main user groups of the OPHC infrastructure at the 
programmable infrastructure site at the time. SMEs and individual developers had a limited 
role to play in this setting. Although they had a greater degree of know-how skills than 
ordinary citizens, it was still difficult for them to use OPHC. The gap between SMEs and 
individual developers and the OPHC testbed could not be solved immediately because it not 
only involved engineering issues, such as the lack of middleware, but also other issues. For 
instance, it emerged that SMEs did not have ready-to-test products, and that they have a 
tendency to work towards the short-term future and cannot afford to conduct experiments.  
 
At the Data Dome site, at the time of this writing, the Data Dome team had not been able to 
deliver the idea of the Data Dome as an urban data visualisation device. There was no real-




future this imagination was realised. The idea of the Data Dome as a citizen application faces 
challenges. For example, the dome is not a public place that is free to access and not everyone 
in the Harbour City can easily come to the Dome to view the data visualisation. Moreover, 
the Data Dome team realised that letting people see data visualisation of their city would not 
have a great impact. Meanwhile, for local creative content developers, the original idea is 
that Data Dome was an opportunity for them to produce creative content. As we have seen 
the Data Dome team constantly adjusted alignment devices to attract local developers to 
conduct development for the dome. For example, they used money to encourage developers 
to make prototypes for the dome. They lowered the entrance barriers for developers to 
experiment in the Dome. They also built conversion tools for developers to convert their 
VR/360-degree content into dome content. However, in reality developers were not willing 
to develop content for the dome. This was partly due to the insufficient articulation of 
expectation that put them off. Another reason, similar to that observed at the programmable 
infrastructure site, was that developers tend to work toward the short-term future. They 
preferred to do business that brought immediate benefit, rather than spending time 
developing content for the Data Dome.  
 
At the Citizen Sensing site, Straw House was regarded as a middle actor between citizens 
who had few technological know-how skills and the OPHC infrastructure. However, as we 
have seen there was weak coordination between the Citizen Sensing development and the 
OPHC infrastructure development. As a result, citizens were not able use the OPHC 
infrastructure. Although an application, Toad, was generated in this setting, it could connect 
to the OPHC infrastructure.  
 
In sum, we see that although OPHC scripted many roles for citizens in its vision, in reality, 
citizens, individual developers, and SMES had limited role to play in the smart city 
innovation process. The OPHC infrastructure ended up serving the interests of engineers and 
big corporations. 
 
6.4.4 A failure is not a failure  
 
During the ethnographic research period, none of the three innovations had fulfilled the role 
that the vision of OPHC had assigned to them in the first place. As we have seen, the 




did not open as planned, and there was no a middleware for people to interact with 
infrastructure, the dome was not able to function as an urban data visualisation device for 
OPHC, as crucially, it did not connect to the supercomputer. There was also no real-time 
data collected from the RF Mesh network. And although the Citizen Sensing project 
produced a concrete outcome (Toad), it was not able to connect it to the OPHC infrastructure.  
 
Nevertheless, these negative innovation results do not immediately make OPHC a failure. 
This is partly because in early stage innovations, it is often difficult to judge whether an 
expectation has been met or it is merely a deception. Despite not being able to meet the initial 
goal, each site generated certain innovation outcomes. For example, the OPHC engineering 
team set up the physical infrastructure of OPHC and developed some aspects of an HLA for 
the programmable infrastructure. The Data Dome team configured the physical features for 
a Data Dome and explored content for the Dome. Straw House co-produced a Citizen 
Sensing application (Toad) with local communities. These innovation results do not 
fundamentally go against the scenario that was scripted in the vision of OPHC.  
 
Van Lente (1993) argues that expectation has a dual epistemology. There are two possible 
directions between the epistemological status of expectation statement and actors’ activity. 
When an expectation is regarded as strong, promising, and workable, actors may prepare to 
act according to it. In an extreme case (e.g. Moore’s Law), they realised the expectation, and 
the expectation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. When an expectation is weak and 
experimental results are negative, actors might not be prepared to act on it. But, negative 
experiment results will not immediately effect the certainty of the project. This is because 
innovators have interpretation flexibility about the negative innovation results (Konrad, 
2006). Interpretation flexibility is the flexibility to interpret the innovation results (See 
Chapter 4). Innovators can interpret the negative innovation results as problems that can be 
overcome. Or, as failure this time, but success next time. 
 
So, although none of the three innovations was successful and OPHC was not as open as was 
intended, innovators can apply interpretation flexibility to interpret the innovation results. 
At the programmable infrastructure site, the OPHC engineering team argued that if they had 
had more engineers and better communication with the management level, they could have 
delivered the programmable testbed. At the Data Dome site, although the Data Dome team 




not make them immediately give up the innovation and kill the project. Instead, they kept 
trying by adjusting their expectations (e.g. attempting to align VR and 360-degree content 
producers), creating new agendas and aligning new actors (e.g. commissioning Orbit game 
to build prototype). Even when the adjusted expectation still hit the wall and the Data Dome 
remained a dead end, they still not claimed the project to be a failure. The Data Dome team 
applied interpretation flexibility to justify innovation results again. For example, although 
they did not reach the original goal due to the reason A.B.C..., the project is just weak at the 
moment but it is still promising if conditions X, Y, Z… are meet. Data Dome has not failed, 
it is just delayed. At the Citizen Sensing site, Straw House successfully produced an artefact, 
Toad. They blamed the OPHC for not opening its RF Mesh network in time. The project 
itself was not a failure. They can still make it work if the RF Mesh network opens. 
 
The experiments at the three sites will continue. As Konrad (2006) points out, as long as the 
vision of OPHC is still promising, the vision will continue to provide a protected space for 
future experiments. Innovators will use interpretation flexibility to justify current failures. 
This protection will continue until the expectation collapses. The collapse of the vision will 
make innovators interpret the same innovation results as negative.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has demonstrated the process of implementation of OPHC in Harbour City. 
Unlike many smart city projects that are implemented in a top-down manner and coordinated 
by hierarchical organisational structure, the implementation of OPHC was loosely 
coordinated by a network and a vision of OPHC. It occurred in three parallel niche 
experimentations: the programmable infrastructure, the Data Dome, and the Citizen Sensing. 
Around each niche, there was a group of innovators in charge the of experimentation.  
 
Drawing on the conceptual tool, force of vision, we can see that the vision of OPHC provided 
protection and coordination in the innovation process. However, the coordination function 
was restricted to coordinate each innovation’s activities and was not be able to provide 
coordination between sites. Drawing on the conceptual tool of niche internal processes, we 
can see that innovators in each site spread the expectations, aligned actors around the 
expectations, configured physical features for the expectations, conducted experiments and 




results, none of them reached goals scripted in the vision statement of OPHC. The research 
also shows that citizens had a limited role in the implementation process of OPHC.  
 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to call the innovation of OPHC a failure. This is partly because it 
is hard to evaluate what is failure at an early stage of an innovation. It is partly because all 
the sites produced some innovation outcomes which not-yet against the fundamental vision 
of the OPHC. It is partly that there is an interpretation flexibility to interpret the negative 
innovation results. And partly because the vision of OPHC provided a protected space for 
negative experiment results and failures. As long as the vision of OPHC is still promising, it 
will continue to provide protected spaces for niche experiments. So, we can conclude that 
the implementation process of OPHC is a loosely coordinated parallel niche 
experimentations with limited citizen participation. Alongside the three parallel innovations 
in Harbour City, some innovators of OPHC also seek to spread OPHC to the world. In the 









“I am clear about the development direction of the 
Operating System which is converging everything. 
The operating system they [OPHC] talk about is 
actually a network controller system. The name City 
OS confused me. I thought is it hardware or 
software? I asked him if it can control or define the 
sensors. He always talks about Wi-Fi. To be honest, 
Wi-Fi uses very little in a project. I am not very 
interested in that (…). I thought they know Li-Fi 
technology (...). My project in hospitals and prisons 
are looking for the Li-Fi solution. In a building, there 
are many individual signals, such as temperature, air 
conditioning, light, and building management all. 
The protocol we use now which is hard to define. I 
thought they (OPHC) could define all the signals. I 
asked, ‘can you define sensors?’ But he only talks 
about the operating system and Wi-Fi (…).” 
 


















“Today I interviewed an actor from Straw House. She 
expressed disappointment that the OPHC’s RF Mesh 
network is not as open as it promised. She regarded 
OPHC as a “digital fiction”. However, just few days 
ago, Harbour City was nominated by a Chinese 
telecommunication company as a smart city leader in 
the UK, and OPHC is a key reason for OPHC winning 
award. It is shocking for me to see this contradiction 
(…).” 
 











Chris, the Chief Manager of OPHC 
David, the head of OPHC engineering team. 
O3, a research firm in the UK which hired by Flower Action to produce a smart city report. 
Peggy, a member of Data Dome team. 
Ruby, a civil servant from Harbour City Council. 
Susan, the Chief Technology Designer of OPHC. 
Vertical Diffusion team, actors (Chris, Ruby, Peggy, David, Susan) spread OPHC to general global 








Andy, a policy professor from Harbour City University.  
Chen Yuan, a Chief Engineer from Delta City Industry and Information Commission (DCIIC). 
Director Ma, a civil servant from DCIIC (Delta City). 
Green, a staff from Light Speed. 
Horizontal Diffusion team, a group of actors (Chris, Green, Ruby) spread OPHC to Delta City. 
Lao Zhao, a senior engineer from Delta City. 
Li, a Chinese-English translator. 
Lulu, a staff from Chinese national supercomputer centre. 
Mary, a civil servant from Harbour City Council. 
Stein, a co-director of Straw House. 
Wan Yan, a civil servant from Delta City Municipal Government. 
 
 
Companies & institutions   
 
DCIIC, Delta City Industry and Information Commission. 
Data exchange company, a big data company in Delta City. 
Delta City Health Bureau, a health sector authority in Delta City. 
Flower Action, a Chinese multinational networking and telecommunication company. 
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK). 
Harbour City University, a local university in Harbour City. 
Light Speed, a spin-off company of Harbour City University. It provides ‘City OS’ to OPHC.  
National supercomputer center, one of national supercomputer centres in China which located in 
Delta City. 
SOFT, a software application research centre in Delta City 
Unicorn, a Chinese telecommunication company in Delta City 
 




Delta City, a city in China and a sister city of Harbour City. 
Harbour City, a middle city located in England (UK). 








The diffusion process of OPHC   
 
Apart from the implementation of OPHC, another type of activity that I noticed in the 
innovation process of OPHC is diffusion. This activity happened in a somewhat different 
from typical models of technology innovation, as diffusion only usually starts when the 
technology gets to a scalable size and is ready to move. In the case of OPHC, the diffusion 
happened at the beginning of the innovation and all the way through the process. This chapter 
aims to investigate this the phenomenon of diffusion. During the ethnographic research 
period, the diffusion of OPHC was a phenomenon that could be observed in two directions: 
vertical diffusion and horizontal diffusion. Vertically, OPHC sought to spread its vision to 
general smart cities audiences. Horizontally, OPHC wants to diffuse the vision of OPHC to 
audiences in another city.  
 
This chapter starts by investigating the vertical diffusion process (section 7.1). Data for this 
investigation mainly comes from documents and is supported by some of my participant 
observation. Drawing on Strategic Niche Management (SNM), it conceptualises the vertical 
diffusion process as aggregating the local smart city niche’s (OPHC) experience to the 
global smart city niche. It applies the performative role of expectation, especially the salient 
roles to understand the method of spreading the vision. It then turns to study horizontal 
diffusion of OPHC through a case Harbour City to Delta City smart city communication 
(Section 7.2). As a Chinese native, I particularly enjoyed the opportunity to follow this 
horizontal diffusion process and the empirical data in this section are based on my field 
observations and interviews.  
 






directions. It then applies and develops conceptual tools from SNM and SOE to understand 
two important themes that emerge in both diffusion directions. It develops the conceptual 
tool hype and disappointment cycle to understand the contradiction between OPHC’s 
increasing global reputation and the local hype. It then adopts Boschma’s (2005) four types 
of proximity (geographical proximity, cognitive proximity, organisational proximity, social 
proximity), and my conceptual tool proximity of expectation to explain the challenges of 
diffusing OPHC to Delta City.  
 
7.1 Vertical diffusion 
 
7.1.1 Aggregating OPHC to the global Smart City niche 
 
Since I decided to study OPHC, my first task every morning was to check news updates 
about OPHC. Because it was impossible for me to follow the key actors of OPHC around 
the world, online news provided me with a window to access events that I could not attend. 
Gradually, I noticed that several actors from OPHC (Chris, Ruby, Susan, Peggy, Richard, 
David) frequently attended smart cities related conferences hosted in Harbour City and 
beyond (e.g. India, China, Brazil). For example, between March 2015 to October 2016, they 
attended ‘smart cities’ events such as the connective cities conference (March 2016, UK), 
the smart city forum (September 2015, China), the smart city landscape conference 
(September 2015, India), the innovative cities conference (November 2015, Brazil). They 
also attended some OPHC infrastructure related technology events. Those technology events 
focused on technologies that have been used in OPHC, such as 5G technology, broadband, 
Internet of Things (IoT), wearable technology, and health technology. Why did these key 
OPHC actors frequently attend smart cities related conferences? What were these 
conferences for? What did they want to achieve through attending those conferences and 
events? 
 
Drawing on Strategic Niche Management’s (SNM) conceptual tool, the local niche and the 
global niche, I conceptualise the activities of attending smart cities related conferences as a 
way for OPHC to aggregate its smart city ideas and experiences to the global smart city 
niche. According to SNM scholars (Deuten, 2003; Geels and Deuten, 2006), niche 
development happens at two parallel levels: local niche and global niche. A local niche is 




innovations. A global niche is often not very stable at the beginning because the “rules of 
the game” have not yet been formed. Aggregation is the process to link a local niche and a 
global niche. It is the process of distilling valuable local lessons from local niches to a global 
niche (See more in Chapter 4). Gradually, rules at the global niche level will be formed and 
the global niche will become more and more stable. 
 
So, if we regard OPHC as a local smart city niche, then the smart cities related conferences 
it attended could be regarded as aggregation infrastructure that enables local smart cities 
niches such as OPHC to aggregate their experience to the global smart city niche. The global 
smart city niche indicates an emerging smart city field. At the moment, the field is still at a 
stage of formation without unified definitions and standards about what a smart city is. I 
illustrate the interactions between the local smart city niche (OPHC) and the emerging global 
smart city niche in Figure 38 below. From the direction of diffusion, I call it vertical 
diffusion. As we can see OPHC smart city is at a local niche level. Innovators of OPHC 
aggregate OPHC to the general global smart city niche. The global smart city niche is still 
not stable at this time. So, I use dotted-line in the figure to indicate its emerging and 
stabilisation process. It is worth noting, according to SNM, apart from the innovators of a 
project, (systemic) intermediary actors41 are another group of people who aggregate local 
smart city lessons to the global smart city niche. In this ethnographic research, I have 
identified five (systemic) intermediary actors that have contributed to aggregating OPHC to 
the global smart city niche. They are standard organisations, UK government agencies, 
community organisations, industry associations, and research institutions. However, due to 
the limitations on data collection, I have not been able to follow their aggregation activities 
in detail. So, in this section, I mainly focus on OPHC innovators’ aggregation activities. If 
readers are interested in finding out more about the intermediaries/system intermediaries, 
please see appendix 8 (4).  
 
                                                     
41 They are called intermediary actors because they act between a local niche and a global niche. They are 
actors who monitor multiple local projects and help circulate local knowledge (Schot and Geels, 2008). 
“System intermediary actors” means intermediary actors working at a network level according to Van 





Figure 38. Aggregating experience of OPHC to the emerging global smart city niche 
 
7.1.2 Inflating the vision of OPHC to attract attention  
 
OPHC was still at the vision stage, so articulating the vision of OPHC was the main way for 
OPHC innovators to aggregate OPHC to the global smart city niche. The vision statement 
of OPHC contains key messages that OPHC wants the global smart cities audiences to listen 
to, including messages about its programmable infrastructure, citizen participation, and 
embracing of ‘Fun City’. Chris was the main person to travel around the world to talk about 
OPHC. Occasionally Ruby, Susan and other OPHC actors took up this spokespersons’ role. 
I call them the vertical diffusion team. Although they came from different backgrounds, the 
way they talked about the vision of OPHC was very similar. For example, they all talked 
about elements such as “why was OPHC built?”, “What is the infrastructure of OPHC?”, 
“Who are the potential users of OPHC?”, “What OPHC aims to achieve?” In their speeches, 
they often used the examples of the Data Dome, Straw House’s Citizen Sensing and DOCK’ 
‘Fun City’ initiative to demonstrate possible use case of OPHC and its citizen engagement 
considerations. As we saw in Chapter 6 the Data Dome remained at the experimental stage. 
Citizen Sensing and ‘Fun City’ initiatives were also not using OPHC infrastructure at all. 
Van Lente (1993) noting this phenomenon pointed out that in the early stage of an 
innovation, the vision is often inflated in order to attract attention. So, the vertical diffusion 
team talking about those ‘not-yet’ realised examples as if they were real was a strategy to 
help OPHC attract attention.  
 
Moreover, there was another rhetorical skill that was used to inflate the vision, that of the 
pervasive use of the word “first” in their speeches. There were different types of “first” 
scripted in the discourse of OPHC and I select several examples below. They are extracts 
from the spokesmen’ presentations, public speeches, and slides. 
Emerging global smart city niche 







“We have the first open NFV test-bed. It is the first time that we propose to use 
SDN and NFV in a smart city.” 
 
Presentation at an SDN Workshop, March 2015 
 
 
“We are building the world’s first open programmable city. A ground-
breaking project aimed at providing a platform for the development of 
applications that will promote innovation and better quality of life.” 
 
Harbour City News, 5th March 2015 
 
“The revamped 100 seat planetarium will feature two 4K resolution projectors 
powered by 17 computers to deliver a 120Hz 3D model of the universe. It is 
claimed that this will convert the facility into the UK’s first 3D planetarium.” 
 
Local News, 10th October 2015 
 
“We are creating a 5G test-bed in Harbour City; we are probably one of the 
first places in the UK and Europe.” 
 
Fieldnotes, presentation at an IoT event, May 2015 
 
 
From the quotations above, we can see many “firsts” have been used in OPHC discourse. 
For example, “the first SDN and NFV smart city”, “the world’s first open programmable 
city”, “the UK’s first 3D Planetarium and Data Dome”, “the first 5G test-bed in the UK and 
Europe”. Why were so many “firsts” used in communicating the vision of OPHC? In order 
to understand the role of “first” in communicating OPHC, I draw on conceptual tools of 
vision’s salient role. Van Lente and Rip (1998) argue that expectation is performative in 
nature. Expectations are not merely descriptive, but also do something. One of its function 
is to help to raise attention and attract resources (see more in Chapter 4). When articulating 
the expectation, Van Lente (1993) finds that a vision often has a salient role to play at an 
early stage of innovation because at this stage promising technologies do not have unified 
standards and regulations. Relevant innovators from different places tend to compete with 
each other to get to the salient point for others to look at. This is especially true of 
technological and scientific innovations. Randall Collins (1975) vividly captured how 
scientists seek to become salient. He regards science as an open plain. Scientists are actors 
who stand on the plain and shout “Listen to me! Listen to me!” As Van Lente (1993: 224) 
quotes Collins (1975: 480), “the struggle for salience is not limited to technology. It has its 





To further understand how vision’s salient role operates, we need to briefly revisit its origin 
from game theory, the ‘coordination game’. Back in the 1960s, Thomas Schelling conducted 
a famous experiment. He asked people to meet one another in New York City without 
communicating with each other. Despite many possible meeting locations, a majority of 
participants choose Grand Central Station as a meeting place. This is because at that time, 
the Grand Central Station was the most salient traffic hub in New York. The case helped 
Thomas Schelling to generate the idea of the ‘coordination game’. Simply speaking, the 
‘coordination game’ means in a situation where people do not know where to go, they will 
do “A” because they think others will do “A”. They will do “B” because they think all people 
will do “B”. Inspired by the concept of the ‘coordination game’, Van Lente (1993) argues 
that innovators sometimes seek to make their vision like Grand Central Station, that is, the 
tallest, most visible, and most salient place. A place that people will go when they do not 
know the meeting place. In order to become a salient point, a vision of promising technology 
is often inflated by actors. By doing this, they aim to establish a salient role for others to look 
at and follow (Berkhout, 2006). Van Lente (1993) uses an example of a parachutist to 
describe vision’s salient role. He asks, when a group of parachutists meet in strong wind and 
cannot spot each other, how will an individual parachutist make choices when the choices 
of others are unknown to him? They might guess what others will do. The most likely answer 
in Van Lente’s example is the church tower: the highest point that is visible to everyone. The 
highest point is a place where everybody is likely to go. So, each parachutist might 
reasonably expect the others to go the church tower.  
 
After knowing how the salient role operates, we can see how the rhetoric of “first” used in 
OPHC discourse was seeking to help OPHC establish a salient position in today’s smart 
cities movement. In current worldwide smart cities making, there is no a standard way of 
constructing smart cities. Each city and their actors propose their own smart city solutions. 
Many smart city players show ambitions of becoming leaders in this movement and the 
OPHC project is not an exception. In order to attract attention, resources, alliances and 
support, the rhetoric of “first” was used to help OPHC establish a salient role for others to 







7.1.3 The contradiction between high rising global reputation and 
increasing local disappointment  
 
The inflated vision of OPHC helped OPHC attracted a lot of attention from audiences at the 
level of the global smart cities niche. OPHC’s global reputation was largely enhanced as the 
result of aggregation activities. At the time of writing (February 2017), the search engine, 
google, brought up 75,700 items about the project. Ruby described the OPHC’s change from 
invisible to visible,  
 
“for a long time, we kept things below the radar. In order to get things off the 
ground, it is a space to be. When you above the radar, you are very visible. 
Everybody looks at what you do. It is hard to be creative and take a risk (...). 
We are very visible now. Everybody is looking at us and at what we are doing 
(...).”  
 
Interview with Ruby, April 2016  
 
As evidence that the vision of OPHC was acknowledged by the global smart city niche, 
actors at the global smart city niche gave OPHC two prestigious smart cities awards. In 
summer 2016, Digital Forum42 gave OPHC a smart city innovator award because OPHC had 
demonstrated a positive impact on “the lives of citizens”, “the cost of delivering services 
within a city”, and “the applicability of the innovation to other cities around the world” 
(Digital Forum, May 2016). A week after OPHC received the smart city innovator award, it 
received another a UK smart city leader award from the Chinese telecommunications 
company Flower Action. The award was based on the research of O343, and it suggested that 
OPHC had shown distinctive thinking in the area of “open data accessibility”, “energy 
innovation”, and “community engagement” (Official report of O3, May 2016). Looking at 
the reasons that OPHC won both awards, we can see that the elements embedded in the 
vision of OPHC, such as the programmable infrastructure, ‘Fun City’, and citizen 
engagement were elements that OPHC contributed to the global smart cities niche. They 
brought new thinking and aspirations to the global smart cities niche. They have been 
inspirational because they have shown a smart city making approach which is different from 
the corporate-driven smart city vision or the surveillance idea of smart cities. Gradually, the 
                                                     
42  Digital Forum is an industry association intermediary actor. It hosts global scale smart cities 
conferences to attract smart city actors around the world to participate and share their experiences.  
43 O3 is an intermediary actor hired by other firms to compare smart cities experiences in different 
locations and draw some general conclusions. It produces a UK smart city index and it regards OPHC 




increasing reputation and the awards OPHC has won has helped it establish a leading 
position in the current ‘smart cities’ movement. One board member of OPHC reflected this 
leading position in interview, 
 
“There is a real value to be seen as a world leading in the area. The Chief 
Technology Designer is clearly a world leading academic. Clearly, lots of 
people think what we are doing here in the Harbour City is a cutting edge. 
There was a real value for Harbour City as a city to been known worldwide 
(...).” 
 
 Interview with a board member of OPHC, 19 May 2016  
 
An interesting phenomenon happened when OPHC won the two prestigious awards at the 
global level; the OPHC host partners in Harbour City experienced huge disappointment. The 
quotation at the beginning of this chapter expresses this disappointment. Local host partner’ 
projects were adopted as examples when introducing the vision of OPHC. For example, the 
citizen engagement and ‘Fun City’ elements were scribed in the vision of OPHC which 
contributed to raising OPHC’s global recognition. They were also the valuable lessons that 
OPHC contributed to the global smart cities niche. However, in reality none of local host 
partners were actually using OPHC. As we have seen in Chapter 6, Straw House bought-into 
the vision of OPHC, adopted the role of facilitating citizen engagement in OPHC, and co-
produced an application (Toad) with citizens. Straw House had the huge expectation that 
they could hang the Toad on OPHC’s RF Mesh network which according to the OPHC 
business agenda would be available soon. As a member of Citizen Sensing team stressed, 
“they talk as if the infrastructure [OPHC infrastructure] is there and waiting for people to 
use it” (Interview with a member of Citizen Sensing team, 30 June 2016). But, in reality the 
planned launch date of the RF Mesh network was postponed again and again and in the end 
citizen co-created application Toad was not able to use the OPHC RF Mesh network. This 
generated disappointment at Straw House. The inability to connect to the OPHC 
infrastructure was also true for other local partners, such as the DOCK. The ‘Fun City’ 
initiative generated by DOCK was considered as a possible application for OPHC and 
highlighted in many OPHC speeches. However, DOCK only received several packets from 
OPHC (Interview with the Director of DOCK, May 2016). Thus, OPHC winning two awards 
at the international level, was criticized at the local level where it was felt that OPHC’s 
promises were in fact empty promises. This also damaged the trust relationship between 






“OPHC is getting criticized about not actually delivering any of those 
experiments. And, certain partners are criticising us (…). People said that 
there were lots of promises, but we are not engaging and developing those 
ideas (…).” 
 
Interview a board member of OPHC, 9 May 2016 
 
In order to change the situation, I heard that local host partners (e.g. DOCK, Straw House, 
BOX, and Science Museum) had got together and established a partnership board in autumn 
2016. The partnership board’s aim was to strengthen the relationship between the local 
partners and OPHC, and to make OPHC actually work for local host partners (Interview with 
Rufus, 15 August 2016).  
 
7.2 Horizontal diffusion  
 
7.2.1 Diffusing OPHC to another local niche 
 
Alongside OPHC’s diffusion (aggregation) to the global smart city niche, the vision of 
OPHC also sought to diffuse to another local smart city niche, Delta City (China). If we 
regard diffusing OPHC to general global smart cities audiences as an aggregation process 
between the local smart city niche and the global smart city niche, diffusing OPHC to Delta 
City can be regarded as diffusing OPHC to another local smart city niche. I show the 
diffusion direction in Figure 39, and call it horizontal diffusion because of the direction of 




Figure 39. Diffusing OPHC to Delta City 
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As with the diffusion of OPHC to general global smart cities audiences, articulating the 
vision of OPHC has been the main way of diffusing OPHC to Delta City. However, the 
diffusion of OPHC to another local niche is not vertical aggregation, rather horizontal 
development. So, I turn to the spatial niche development literature (Coenen et al., 2010). As 
it is about diffusing a smart city project from one city to another, Boschma’s (2005) concept 
of proximity is useful. Coenen et al. (2010) incorporate Boschma’s (2005) five proximities 
into the concept of niche to understand the spatial dimension of niche development (See 
Chapter 4). In this research, I have adopted Boschma’s (2005) conceptual tools proximity to 
understand the diffusion process. I specifically focus on four types of proximity that they 
were identified in the iterative data collection and analysis process. Geographic proximity 
(the geographic distance between actors). Cognitive proximity (shared knowledge 
background that enables communication, understanding, absorbtion, and successfully 
processing new information). Social proximity (social relations between agents at a micro-
level based on friendship, kinship and experience). Organisational proximity (a set of 
interdependencies within and between organisations). Moreover, diffusing OPHC to another 
foreign place involved elements that Boschma’s (2005) proximity model did not cover, 
namely, the expectation of technology in another culture context. Drawing on Van Lente’s 
(1993) levels of expectation (macro-, meso-, micro-), therefore I further develop Boschma’s 
concept and argue that the proximity of expectation is another element that influences spatial 
niche development. 
 
7.2.2 The background of the case 
 
Before going into detail about the diffusion process, it is necessary to revisit some 
background information about the case. For example, what did OPHC want to diffuse? Why 
Delta City? and what diffusing infrastructure or channel is there? In the vision statement of 
OPHC, we can see that it imagined other cities around world could use the OPHC 
infrastructure to test their smart cities applications. Two quotations from OPHC vision 
statements reveal this ambition: 
  
“Cities like Delta City (China) or New York will be able to effectively simulate 
their own network traffic on the Harbour City’s network. This means engineers 
in Harbour City can help international authorities to predict the capacity they 
will need to connect their metropolis.” 
 






“We said to Delta City, ‘let’s make the network look like Delta City one day. 
You can come here (refers to Harbour City) and play around with things that 
are happing in Delta City. Using us (OPHC) as a testbed for Delta City’. They 
liked that (…).” 
 
Chris speak at a public event, May 2015 
 
 
The technology enabler behind this idea is the ‘Network Emulator’ explained in Chapter 5. 
Simply speaking, it is a piece of software developed by NEXT Lab that can replicate real 
physical nodes in Harbour City and simulate as many virtual nodes as needed in a virtual 
world. Through those virtual nodes, other cities can configure whatever network typologies 
they want through the ‘Network Emulator’ and test their products in a simulated environment 
from a distance (Harbour City Post, 11 March 2015). Neither quotation uses the Chinese 
city, Delta City, by chance. In 2016, Delta City and Harbour City had been sister cities for 
fifteen years. In 2012, the mayors of both cities signed a memorandum on Sustainable 
Urbanisation in Beijing (China) and a specific agreement was assigned to smart cities 
(Fieldnotes, 11 July 2015). Under the memorandum, the two cities started to have 
conversations around smart city development. In 2015, Chen Yuan, a Chief Engineer from 
the Delta City Industry and Information Commission (DCIIC), visited Harbour City. He 
heard about the OPHC project during his visit and was impressed by OPHC’s holistic 
approach. He expressed the potential for Delta City to learn and partner with OPHC. Since 
then, Chen Yuan’s comments had been interpreted by OPHC as “Delta City is an emerging 
partner of OPHC” (Harbour City Council News, 10 March 2015) and this is why Delta City 
was used as an example in the above quotations.  
 
The possibility of diffusing OPHC to Delta City was explored through a new linkage called 
the EU-China Harbour City-to-Delta City smart city programme. It was a one-year program 
funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the UK. The programme aimed 
to facilitate smart city interactions between the two cities and explores the collaboration 
possibilities (Fieldnotes, 11 July 2015). The programme was led by Mary who joined 
Harbour City Council in 2014 and had language skills in Chinese and rich work experience 
in the Chinese foreign office. In collaborating with her former colleagues in the Delta City 
British Consulate, she quickly found a key official partner on the Delta City side, the Delta 
City Industry and Information Commission (DCIIC). DCIIC is a Municipal government 




Technology (MIIT)44. As its name indicates, DCIIC is in charge of Delta City’s industry and 
information technology development. Compared with other smart cities authorities in Delta 
City, DCIIC shares more similarities with OPHC, because they both focus on network 
infrastructure and care about the use of data in smart cities.  
 
If we say conferences are a diffusion infrastructure between OPHC and the global smart city 
niche, then the, EU-China smart city Programme is a diffusion infrastructure for OPHC to 
spread its vision to Delta City. Mary took responsibility for designing the programme 
agenda. Because two cities have a thousand miles geographic distance, delegations visiting 
was considered as one option to reduce the physical distance barriers. However, Mary heard 
from her Chinese colleagues that a new regulation released by the Chinese government that 
meant Chinese official overseas visits could only last no more than five days (Fieldnotes, 11 
July 2015). In the end, Mary decided to have a series of three webinars to help both parties 
to narrow down their mutual interests and have a delegation visiting from Harbour City to 
Delta City at the end (Fieldnotes, 17 March 2016). Mary had heard my name from several 
people in Harbour City, and given that I am a Chinese student studying Harbour City’s smart 
city, Mary very quickly contacted me and welcomed me to observe the whole programme. 
My focus was to explore how OPHC diffused to Delta City. Not all the activities of the 
programme were related to this research focus. For clarity, I illustrate the key events in the 
programme and highlighted the OPHC relevant episodes (two webinars and the delegation 
visiting (Day 1, Day 2, and Day 5) in Figure 40. 
 
 
                                                     
44 In general, there are around eight ministry levels of smart city actors in China. MIIT focuses on 
integrating technologies in the urban infrastructure and upgrading local industries. MIIT’s approach to 
smart city is different from the other seven smart city authorities. Taking the Ministry of Housing for 
example, which focuses on exploring how the idea of the smart city can help solve the housing issue 






Figure 40. Events in relation to diffusing OPHC 
 
7.2.3 Diffusing OPHC to Delta City 
 
(1) Webinar 1: Encountering DCIIC’s Smart City niche 
 
The first webinar was hosted in July 2015. It was early morning in Harbour City but it was 
the last meeting for Delta City colleagues before going home for dinner. The aim of this 
webinar was to get to know each other’s vision, organisational structure and social 
networking. Participants on the Harbour City side included Mary, two civil servants (Ruby, 
Richard), the Chief Manager of OPHC (Chris), a-co-director of Straw House (Stein), and a 
policy professor from Harbour City University (Andy). They sat around a table in a room at 
DOCK with a huge TV screen in front of them. Using a digital conferencing system, 
colleagues in Delta City appeared on the screen, including Director Ma from DCIIC and 
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several of his colleagues, Lulu from the Chinese National Supercomputer Centre, and a 
translator Li. 
 
Ruby was responsible for introducing a wide range of smart cities components in Harbour 
City, including, energy, transportation, and the smart city infrastructure. OPHC was briefly 
mentioned as a flagship smart city project in the Harbour City. After Ruby’s introduction, 
Director Ma from DCIIC talked about DCIIC’s smart city niche. DCIIC’s smart city project 
was initiated top-down by local authorities. The key official document behind it is called 
Implementation of Constructing Delta City’s Smart City (2012). DCIIC as an authority in 
the technology sector took responsibility for leading a smart city project. Like OPHC, 
DCIIC’s smart city project also seeks to respond to the increasing urban population. But 
unlike OPHC treating the smart city as a marketing opportunity, DCIIC’s smart city project 
regards the smart city as a way to “intensify core competitiveness” (Fieldnotes, July 2015). 
DCIIC also has its own smart city vision. Director Ma used a tree structure to explain this 
vision: the information infrastructure (e.g. a supercomputer, networks, and mobile base 
stations) are regarded as the roots of a tree. The core technology and intelligent industries 
(e.g. e-commerce) are the trunk of the tree and the branches. Smart city applications are 
considered as the leaves of the tree, such as an e-government application “online 
administrative Hall”, a public service application “Future Hospital”, and a city management 
application “intelligent transport”. Like OPHC, the smart city niche in Delta City has also 
aligned a network of actors around it, including the Delta City Health Bureau, Data exchange 
company, a software application centre SOFT, smart city innovation research centre, 
national supercomputer centre, and many smart cities related companies. After both sides 
had spoken about their visions, there was about 30 minutes question and answer time. 
Participants on Harbour City side were keen to understand DCIIC’s role in Delta City, 
because they wanted to make sure that they contacted the right people. While the Delta City 
team, they asked questions relating to their concerns of building a smart city, such as data 
privacy, robotic labs, and incubators.  
 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the Delta City actors’ thoughts about OPHC at this 
stage. But based on my observations of the interactions, there were two factors that affected 
the articulation of the vision of OPHC to DCIIC colleagues. First of all, the Delta City 
officials did not share a similar knowledge background with OPHC. Boschma (2005) calls 




meeting, no one on the Delta City side picked up the most innovative aspect of OPHC, that 
is, the city-scale interconnected programmable testbed. In order to pick up this idea, Delta 
City colleagues would need to share the knowledge background of Software Defined 
Network (SDN). Although some participants on the Delta City side have engineering 
backgrounds (Director Ma and some colleagues from national supercomputer centre), they 
are not experts in the area of high performance networks, so they did not pick up on the 
network innovation of OPHC. Another factor is that officials on Delta City side had their 
own preference of technologies. I observed in the webinar that they were excited when 
Harbour City mentioned certain technologies (e.g. robotics). This unusual excitement 
reflected a cultural expectation of technology which I will unpack later.  
 
(2) Webinar 2: The Challenges of Articulating the Vision of OPHC to Delta City 
Officials 
 
Another webinar was hosted in August 2015. This webinar specially targeted digital 
infrastructure. This provided OPHC with a stage to spread its vision to DCIIC officials. 
Ruby, Richard, Mary, and Chris sat in the same room in the BOX. The meeting did not start 
as planned because the digital conferencing system met some connection problems. They 
were quite jolly and thought the bad connection was a sign of poorer network capacity in 
Delta City. For a city with a population of 16 million, it must difficult to manage their 
network in peak hours. So, they might need OPHC’s network solution. It took a while for 
Delta City colleagues to appear on the screen. They were some familiar faces, such as 
Director Ma, his colleagues, and translator Li. There were also some new faces, such as staff 
from a local software application centre SOFT and the national supercomputer centre.  
 
After the greeting, Chris was given 15 minutes to talk about the vision of OPHC. As usual, 
he began with introducing the components of the programmable testbed (e.g. optical fibre 
rings, Wi-Fi network, and RF Mesh network, etc.). This was followed by an introduction of 
the ecosystem of users. Then, he introduced two use cases: a sensor-enabled care-house and 
using IP cameras to capture nature. Both cases were news to me because I had not heard that 
OPHC had any real applications yet. Chris finished the speech by emphasising the promising 
SDN solution. However, Chris’s speech not as effective as it could have been. One reason 
was technology noise. The unstable webinar network connection caused a delay in the 




Chris was saying (Fieldnotes, 08 July 2015). Audiences in Delta City side had difficulty 
following Chris’s presentation. Second, there was a lack of cognitive proximity between 
Chris and the translator Li. Communication between two languages requires a translator. The 
translator Li functioned as a mediator who delivered messages from one side to another. 
Since translator Li did not understand the technological aspects of OPHC, she had difficulties 
translating the technical terms of OPHC. As translator Li explicitly confessed in the webinar 
she felt the technological components were too complex to translate. So, she skipped all 
technological related elements and merely talked about two use cases (Fieldnotes, 08 July 
2015). As a result, a large amount of the technological aspect of OPHC was lost in 
translation. 
 
On the Delta City side, a young engineer from SOFT introduced a smart city application that 
they are very proud of. It was an international award-winning smart street lighting solution. 
Despite the bad network connections and the strange English accent, participants in Harbour 
City grasped some of the ideas about the smart street lighting solution. It is an application 
that people can use on their smart phone to adjust street lighting and SOFT calls this system 
an operating system (OS) as well. The choice of this application is very interesting because 
they did not talk about “Future Hospital” or “intelligent transport” that they had emphasised 
in the previous webinar. The informal chat with Director Ma later revealed more about this 
choice. He had heard that there were many lampposts in the OPHC project and he thought it 
might be possible to sell SOFT’s smart street lighting system back to OPHC (Informal chat 
with Director Ma, March 2016). However, this choice reflected their misinterpretation of 
OPHC. Although OPHC has “lampposts” and “OS” in its project, both terms have different 
connections. The lampposts in OPHC are not merely to provide smart lighting. Moreover, 
they host the OPHC’s RF Mesh network. While the word “OS” in the context of OPHC 
means a network operating system that enables the reconfiguration of heterogeneous 
networks (e.g. fibre network, wireless network, and RF Mesh network). While the “OS” in 
SOFT’s idea is a system that coordinates Internet of Things devices (e.g. sensors). In other 
words, SOFT’s “OS” could be thought of as part of OPHC’s RF Mesh network concept. The 
different understanding of the use of lampposts and “OS” in smart cities made articulating 







(3) Visiting Delta City-Day1 
 
Six months later, on an early morning in March 2016, a flight arrived in Delta City airport. 
I was allowed to follow the delegation visiting Delta City. In return, as a native Chinese 
speaker, I agreed to provide some assistance to the delegation (translation). I arrived in China 
a week before the delegation visited and I took the chance to go home and fly to Delta City 
a night before the delegation visit. As part of my assistance job, I helped to pick up delegates 
at Delta City airport. It was the first time in my life I had picked up someone at an airport! 
Seeing the flight arrive at the airport reminded me of Serres’s observation,  
 
"Aircraft carry letters, telephones, agents, representatives and the like: we use 
the term communication to cover air transport as well as post. When people, 
aircraft and electronic signals are transmitted through the air, they are all 
effectively messages and messengers.” 
Serres, 1995: 8 
 
The plane landing in Delta City airport is like an angel of steel that carries angels of flesh 
and blood: Harbour City delegates. They have messages about smart cities to send to Delta 
City audiences. Amongst the delegates, there were two OPHC related delegates: Chris (The 
Chief Manager of OPHC) and Green (a representative from OPHC’s ‘City OS’ provider 
Light Speed45). Chris took responsibility for articulating the vision of OPHC, while Green 
specifically focused on promoting the SDN controller.  
 
Despite the jet-lag, the delegates started to meet people that afternoon. They were divided 
into two groups: the business group visited a local telecommunications company called 
Unicorn, while the delegates from the City Council and University went to visit the Delta 
City Municipal government. Chris and Green joined the business group and visited the 
Unicorn. The visit to Unicorn was meaningful because the company is one of three main 
telecommunication companies in China and it understands SDN. I was assisting with the 
Municipal government visit, so I did not see how Chris and Green promoted OPHC’s SDN 
solution. However, the interview afterwards showed that diffusing OPHC’s solution to 
Unicorn suffered because Unicorn already had its own vision of developing SDN and an 
SDN controller (Interview with the head engineer of OPHC, August 2016). 
 
                                                     
45 The City OS was initially developed by the NEXT Lab. Then, it created a spin-off company 




Meanwhile, I followed another delegation group to the Delta City Municipal government. 
They were surprised to find out that Delta City has 31 sister cities around the world and 
Harbour City is just one of them. Moreover, Harbour City’s neighbour, Plateau City has a 
strong connection with Delta City. Although their friendship had been slightly shorter than 
Harbour City’s friendship with Delta City, Plateau City, had already gained Delta City’s 
trust and the friendship had already brought research funding to Plateau City. In the evening, 
the delegation had dinner with people from the Municipal government. At the dinner table, 
Wan Yan, a civil servant from the Municipal government, asked me about OPHC. She said 
that she had no idea about what OPHC is and was not sure about the feasibility of the project. 
She also explained why Delta City trusted Plateau City; every year the same vice-chancellor 
of the University of Plateau would visit Delta City and each time he would bring research 
projects for Delta City to collaborate with. Their long-term commitment meant Delta City 
Municipal government trusted them and were willing to give them research funds (Research 
Diary, 17 March 2016). Plateau City’s success reflects Boschma’s (2005) argument about 
social proximity. Social proximity means social relations at a micro-level that are based on 
friendship, kinship, and experience. Boschma (2005) suggests that if there is too little social 
proximity it will be difficult for both parties to communicate with each other and exchange 
tactical knowledge because trust between actors is required before they can commit their 
resources and knowledge (Coenen et al., 2010). Clearly, Plateau City had developed close 
social proximity with Delta City and won their trust through the past 15 years’ commitment.  
 
(4) Visiting Delta City-Day2 (Morning) 
 
The next morning, delegates had a very nice southern China buffet breakfast in the Hotel. It 
was going to be a long day. In the morning, they would be attending a smart city conference 
hosted in the hotel and in the afternoon, they would have one-to-one business meetings with 
local companies. I met Green in the elevator and he told me that it was going to be a super 
busy day for him because he would be meeting 15 companies in the afternoon.  
 
The conference started at 9am. The audiences included the DCIIC and representatives from 
70 smart cities companies. After Ruby talked about smart cities projects in Harbour City, 
Chris was given 15 minutes to talk about OPHC. Before his speech, he played a video clip 
about OPHC to provide background information for people who are not familiar with 




the programmable city, the promising technology Software Defined Network (SDN), the 
importance of data and citizens in a smart city project. The visual images companies with 
sci-fi genera background music which helped to create a futuristic atmosphere. After playing 
the video, Chris introduced the OPHC vision. As on other occasions, the vision of OPHC 
was inflated in order to attract attention. For example, he talked about the ‘not-yet’ realized, 
project as if it was realized and he incorporated the rhetoric of “first” to help OPHC establish 
a salient role in the current smart cities movement (Fieldnotes, 18 March 2016). In order to 
understand the audience’s response to OPHC, I interviewed some of the participants during 
the tea break. The interviews show that there was no cognitive proximity between 
participants and OPHC. They had attended the meeting to search for components that could 
fulfil their own individual expectations. For example, some of the attendees came from a 
local bus company who wanted to learn more about smart transport management. Others 
were venture capitalists who want to find promising SMEs to invest in. Some were 
technological incubator companies who wanted to learn from successful incubators. Some 
had come from international Intellectual Property service companies wanting to become 
mediators in the global smart city business, so on. The lack of cognitive proximity made it 
difficult for them to understand the revolutionary vision that Chris described. Their private 
expectations were guiding them to look for specific technology, rather than to understand 
the vision of OPHC.  
 
On Delta City side, Director Ma introduced DCIIC’s smart city vision. As in webinar 1, he 
referred to many grand visions from the national and the municipal level before introducing 
DCIIC’s smart city vision. I present an extract of his speech below: 
 
 “2016 is the first year of the 13th Five-year plan. The state is further 
implementing strategies such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road46 , free trade zone47 , Made in China 202548 , 
National big data strategy49. They all bring huge economic benefits for Delta 
City. Within the 13th Five-year plan period, Delta city proposed several 
strategic visions. It suggested further accelerating industrial upgrading, and 
building a national shipping and logistic centre and modern financial service 
system, and building a national urban innovation centre …” 
 
Director Ma presentation at smart conference, March 2016  
                                                     
46 A strategy to facilitate the exportation of Chinese products. 
47 A testing ground for some economic and social reforms. 
48  A technology related macro agenda which focuses on upgrading its industry through intelligent 
manufacturing. 




The action of referring to the many grand visions before talking about DCIIC’s vision shows 
that two factors affected DCIIC’s decision making in developing its smart city and its 
potential buy in to the vision of OPHC. The first factor is that DCIIC is embedded in a 
hierarchical structure. Vertically, it has to follow the instruction of national government, 
such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Horizontally, DCIIC 
has to coordinate with other government bodies in Delta City. From this point of view, 
DCIIC has high organisational proximity because it has high interdependency within and 
between organisations. This is why when it communicates its vision, it often refers to the 
official documents from the Municipal government and national strategies to show that 
DCIIC is line with them. Seen from this angle, we can see that DCIIC as a local authority 
has limited agency to design its smart city, I will expand on this point later in discussion 
section.  
 
Apart from the high organisational proximity, the multiple-level of expectations in the 
Chinese context is another factor affecting DCIIC’s decision making. As we see in the 
quotation above, Director Ma mentioned a series of national and municipal strategies, such 
as “the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (B&R)”, “free 
trade zone (FTZ)”, “Made in China 2025”, “National big data strategy”. All these are macro 
agendas at levels of Chinese society reflecting China’s concerns at the moment. Rapid 
industrialisation and marketisation have brought China an economic boost in past 40 years, 
especially in the Delta City region. However, the labour-intensive factories cannot sustain 
future growth. So, upgrading the existing industry is considered as a way to break though 
the bottleneck of growth, while the experiment of the “free trade zone” and building the “silk 
road economic belt” are ways to enhance the economic connections with other countries to 
benefit the export of Chinese products. Taking this background into consideration, we find 
the emphasis of the smart city in todays’ Chinese urbanisation naturally converges with the 
idea of upgrading industry because they both emphasise the importance of technology. From 
this, we can see that different cultures have different macro expectations at different 
historical times. Particular technologies that are prominent in certain cultures reflect not just 
global trends but also connections with the culture’s deepest hopes and fears. These macro 
expectations in Chinese society affect expectations at the meso- and micro level (Van Lente, 
1993). For example, Delta City municipal has generated a series of strategies which follow 
the national government’s macro agenda, such as “accelerating industrial upgrading”, 




system”, “building a national urban innovation centre”. Both the macro level expectation 
and meso level expectations influenced the DCIIC’s smart city vision at the micro level. 
Situated in this social-cultural context, DCIIC officials inevitably paid attention to certain 
technologies than other. For instance, in the first webinar, DCIIC paid more attention to the 
robotic technology which fitted into their macro expectation of upgrading industry.  
 
(5) Visiting Delta City-Day 2 (Afternoon) 
 
In the afternoon, companies had a chance to have one-to-one meetings with Harbour City’s 
companies. Many companies signed up to meet Chris and Green. In order to understand their 
reactions to OPHC and the SDN controller, I had a series of informal interviews with 
participants after they had met Chris and Green. The interview results show that it was 
difficult for companies to buy into the vision of OPHC due to two reasons: cognitive 
proximity and people’ private expectation. The interviews evidenced that most companies 
did not share a similar knowledge background with OPHC. The cognitive distance between 
the audiences and the SDN solution made it difficult for companies to relate their business 
to OPHC. Of more interest in the interviews was that although some actors shared some 
knowledge about the network, they still do not want to buy into the vision of OPHC. A 
Chinese multinational networking and telecommunications company called Flower Action 
provides a good example. Flower Action is dedicated to developing a Software Defined 
Network and Network convergence in China, so the company shares a similar network vision 
with OPHC. A Representative from Flower Action talked to OPHC and its SDN provider 
Light Speed. The close cognitive proximity between the two parties did not however 
immediately facilitate communication; because SDN is an emerging field without unified 
standards and much in the way of Intellectual Property (IP) protection, and so both parties 
were conservative about going into detail about their technological features. As one 
participant commented: 
 
“As you can see Flower Action sent several people to the event. They [Flower   
Action] are doing network business- pulling all kinds of data together and 
organising. They are (refers to OPHC and Light Speed) competitors, so they 
(OPHC and Light Speed) do not talk further”. 
 
Interview with a senior engineer in Delta City, 18 March 2016 
 
Boschma provides some explanation of this phenomenon. He argues that cognitive proximity 




is necessary as it might give rise to novelty. However, if the cognitive distance is too close, 
it increases the risk of involuntary spill over (Boschma, 2005: 64). As see above, without a 
pre-existing relationship of trust, the similar interests between two companies actually acted 
as a barrier to communication. Both parties were concerned about their own copyright and 
were not overly open for communication.  
 
People’s private expectations was another reason that influenced the articulation of the 
vision. For example, there were some actors who had a certain degree of network knowledge 
and were not in competition with OPHC. It was also difficult for them to buy in to the vision 
of OPHC, because those participants had strong private expectations and those expectations 
set their priorities in searching for specific technological solutions for their own businesses. 
A good example of this type of actor is a local engineer, Lao Zhao. Lao Zhao knew about 
the trend of network convergence, but he was overly focused on finding a particular technical 
component for his own project, as the interview extract below reveals:  
 
“I am clear about the development direction of Operating Systems which is 
everything convergence. An operating system in his talk is actually a network 
controller system. The name confused me. I thought whether it is hardware or 
software? I asked him if it can control or define the sensors. He always talks 
about Wi-Fi. To be honest, Wi-Fi uses very little in a project. I am not very 
interested in that (…). I thought they know Li-Fi technology (...). My project 
about hospitals and prison are looking for the Li-Fi solution. In a building, 
temperature, air conditioning, light and building management all have 
individual signals. The protocols we use is hard to define. I thought they 
[OPHC]could define all signals. I asked, ‘can you define sensors?’ But he only 
talks about the operating system and Wi-Fi (…).” 
 
Interview with Lao Zhao in Delta City, 18 Mar 2016 
 
From the interview extract we can see that Lao Zhao has some shared knowledge background 
with the recent communication network development, but he was narrowly focused on 
finding solutions to define all the sensors in a building and not interested in the Wi-Fi 
network and ‘City OS’ that were promoted in the vision of OPHC. 
 
(6) Visiting Delta City Day3 
 
On the last day, delegates visited Delta City’s national supercomputer centre. After seeing 
the world’s fastest supercomputer, they had a three-hour meeting with DCIIC and some local 




similar to that which he had delivered a few days’ ago. Three Professors from two local 
Harbour City Universities also talked about their research on ‘smart cities’, including high-
performance networks, big data analysis, and driverless cars. On the Delta City side, the 
presentation themes consisted of the supercomputer, e-health, intelligent streetlighting, and 
data exchange.   
 
We can find some clues about how Delta City side reacted to the OPHC presentation in 
Director Ma’s final comments at the meeting. He clearly expressed three areas that he wanted 
to cooperate with Harbour City and OPHC. First, he still thought that SOFT’s smart street 
lighting solution was related to OPHC and would like to see future collaboration. Second, 
he thought that the Data Exchange company in Delta City could use Harbour City 
University’s expertise in data analytics. Thirdly, he expressed interest in driverless cars. 
Director Ma’s choices reflected a series of issues that I have mentioned above. Director Ma 
has little free agency to choose what technologies the DCIIC wants to incorporate in their 
smart city project as the hierarchical organisational structure he is embedded in has close 
organizational proximity. His decision making has to be in line with macro expectations in 
China. For example, the smart street lighting solution responds to the macro- expectation of 
exportation of technology products. To increase the data analytical ability of Data exchange 
companies resonated with the national “big data strategy”. The interest in driverless cars 
follows the macro expectation of “Made in China 2025”, especially the increasing interest 
in robotics.  
 
After the delegation’s visit, the Harbour City to Delta City smart city project came to an end. 
A report was written by Andy to feedback to the FCO. The delegates got together again when 
they got back to Harbour City in April 2016 to reflect on the delegation visit. They had 
complex feelings about the delegation visit. On one hand, they were impressed by Delta 
City’s development and its supercomputer facility. On the other hand, they realised that 
persuading the Delta City authority and companies to buy into the vision of OPHC was more 
difficult than they had thought. This was due to many reasons: the different understanding 
of technologies, the lack of commitment on both sides, and a series of macro expectations in 
China that have to be taken into consideration. However, the diffusion of OPHC to Delta 
City was not regarded as a failure. They certainly spread the name of OPHC and Harbour 
City to the other side of the world. Also, they did not claim the diffusion as a failure. They 








This chapter investigates the early diffusion process of OPHC. It investigates two diffusion 
directions: diffusing OPHC to general global smart cities audiences and diffusing OPHC to 
a specific city. In this section, I first summarise characteristics from two diffusion process, 
such as their purposes, methods, and results. Then, I conduct further analysis on two issues 
that appear in both diffusion directions: the contradiction between increasing global 
reputation and local hypes; and the challenges of diffusing OPHC to Delta City.  
 
7.3.1 The characteristics of the diffusion 
 
Drawing on Strategic Niche Management (SNM), I conceptualise vertical diffusion as an 
aggregation experience from a local smart city niche (OPHC) to a global smart city niche. I 
frame the horizontal diffusion as a process of spreading the vision of one local niche (OPHC) 
to another local niche. The smart city is an emerging global phenomenon without stable rules 
and standards at the global smart city niche level. At a local level, there are many local smart 
city niches. Local smart city niches like OPHC and DCIIC’s smart city project all seek to 
aggregate their best ideas to the global smart city niche. For example, OPHC want to spread 
its idea of a programmable infrastructure, citizen engagement, and ‘Fun City’ to the global 
smart city niche. DCIIC wants to promote its smart street lighting solution to the global smart 
city niche. By doing this, they each want to become a leader in the world of smart cities and 
legitimate their practices as the best practice for other cities to learn from. Alongside local 
smart cities niches aggregating their best practices to the global smart city niches, local 
niches are not passive receivers of smart cities visions from outside. Instead, they seek to 
diffuse their ideas to each other. This is evidenced in the smart cities communication between 
Harbour City and Delta City. Both parties sought to directly sell their smart city applications 
(e.g. SDN controller and the smart street lighting solution) and vision to each other (Figure 











Figure 41. The overview of both diffusion directions 
 
In both diffusion directions, OPHC’s diffusion was mainly about diffusing the vision of 
OPHC rather than a single technology product (e.g. a smart application). This was partly 
because OPHC remained at the vision stage, partly because OPHC is a system innovation 
involved in a series of inter-connected technological elements and social infrastructures. 
Although some parts of OPHC could be sold as a product (e.g. SDN controller), the overall 
project is difficult to sell as a product. The purpose of diffusing OPHC to the global smart 
city niche is to attract global attention and to help OPHC to gain potential support. The 
purpose of diffusing OPHC to Delta City was get Delta City officials and companies to buy 
into the vision of OPHC. So that they either test their products through the OPHC testbed or 
purchase the SDN solution to build their own programmable network.  
 
In both diffusion directions, the method of diffusing OPHC was articulating the vision of 
OPHC through speeches. As seen above the vision of OPHC was voiced through different 
infrastructures or channels. At a global level, the vertical diffusion team (e.g. Chris, Susan, 
Ruby) voiced the vision of OPHC through many smart cities conferences. While to Delta 
City, the horizontal diffusion team voiced the vision of OPHC through the communication 
channel of the EU-China smart city programme. The vision of OPHC was articulated 
iteratively in two webinars, on delegation visit days 2 and 5. In order to attract attention and 
establish OPHC in a leading position in the current smart cities movement, the vision of 
OPHC was often inflated. For example, they presented the vision as if it were already a 
reality. The rhetorical use of “first” was also used in almost all the OPHC related speeches.  
 
As a result, the actions of diffusing OPHC to the global smart city niche were quite 
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successful. It helped OPHC attract a lot of attention from actors at a global level. They 
regarded OPHC as inspirational for the current smart cities movement, particularly its 
elements of citizen engagement and the ‘Fun City’ idea. They also gave OPHC two 
prestigious smart cities awards. However, interestingly, while OPHC was regarded as a 
leading role model at the global smart city niche level, it generated disappointment for people 
at the local level (Harbour City). The goal of diffusing OPHC to Delta City was also 
relatively disappointing. I would like to unpack both aspects below. 
 
7.3.2 The speed of hype at different levels 
 
Diffusing OPHC to the general global level was very successful, however the growing global 
reputation of OPHC stands in contrast to the increasing disappointment experienced by local 
host partners. This contradiction is another example of the paradox of vision whereby the 
performance of its vision helped OPHC attract attention as well as create disappointment. 
Sociology of Expectation scholars (Borup et al., 2006) have studied similar phenomenon and 
call this temporal pattern of expectation/vision as the hype and disappointment cycle (Brown, 
2003). They find that expectation/vision tends to be inflated by innovators at the beginning 
of an innovation to attract attention and mobilise resources. However, if the deployment of 
a vision in reality does not meet the promise, rising expectations will turn into hype. This 
will generate disappointment and damage reputations and trust in the project. Applying the 
hype and disappointment cycle to this case, it is not difficult to understand why the local host 
partner would have been excited about OPHC at the beginning and why this turned into 
disappointment. The inflated vision of OPHC helped OPHC attract attention from local host 
partners but when OPHC did not deliver on its promises, the vision of OPHC quickly turned 
into hype. A member of a local host partner expressed this disappointment; “it [OPHC] is a 
digital fiction” (Interview with an actor from OPHC local host partner, 30 June 2016).  
  
However, the hype pattern shown in this case resonates with to Van Lente et al. ’s (2013) 
observation that hype patterns can be observed at different levels: the micro level (project 
level), meso level (field level), and macro level (social level). As we have seen above, the 
hype of OPHC turned into disappointment faster at the micro level (project level) than at the 
field level (the global smart city niche).  In addition to Van Lente’s observation, I argue that 
the speed with which vision turns into hype is different at different levels and this is due to 




OPHC was situated in a social network that had an explicit expectation about the 
materialisation of the project. The inflated vision of OPHC quickly attracted many local 
actors to buy into the vision. These actors were close to OPHC and they had explicit 
expectations of OPHC. When certain aspects of OPHC were not realised as expected, they 
turned into disappointment immediately. For example, Straw House in the Harbour City 
bought into the OPHC vision and took actions towards realising it. As time passed, and 
OPHC’s RF Mesh network did not open as planned, Straw House felt hugely disappointed 
with OPHC. At the global smart city niche level, OPHC was surrounded by smart cities 
actors who did not have explicit expectations of OPHC. The global smart cities niche is still 
at a stage of formation, so the delivery, or failure to deliver of the OPHC vision was not 
regarded as a priority. Actors at a global level did not expect to see any results from OPHC 
in that timeframe. They were more focused on finding novel examples and learning valuable 
lessons from different local smart city projects. So, it made no difference to them whether 
OPHC’s RF Mesh network opened on time or not. Thus, we can see that, the inflated vision 
of OPHC helped to grow OPHC’s global recognition. The ‘not-yet’ realised vision was 
regarded as a promising smart city vision which contributes a lot of fruitful thinking about 
how to make a city smart. Therefore, OPHC will continue to be seen as a promising smart 
city project at the global smart city niche level, until the environment at the global smart city 
niche changes and it generates more specific expectations about OPHC.  
 
7.3.3 Different proximities harming horizontal diffusion 
 
Comparing the success of diffusing OPHC to general smart city audiences, diffusing the 
vision of OPHC directly to another city (Delta City) was challenging. As shown above, 
although the vision was iteratively introduced to Delta City audiences, it was still difficult 
for the Delta City authorities and companies to buy into the vision of OPHC. I briefly applied 
Boschma’s (2005) four types of proximity to understand some of the communication 
challenges and used Van Lente’s (1993) levels of expectations to understand on Delta City’s 
many types of expectations that appear in the communication process. Below, I elaborate 
them further.  
 
Geographic distance was the first factor that made the diffusion process difficult. There are 
thousands of miles distance between the two cities. Using Boschma’s (2005) term, there is 




communication between the two parties had to rely on a technologically mediated channel 
(webinar) and the delegation visit. The timing of the delegation visit was restricted by 
practical reasons, while the webinar communication experienced many problems, such as 
technology noises in webinar 2 so that participants could not hear or see each other’s 
presentations clearly. Moreover, the technology mediated communication lacked the 
capacity for frequent interruption, that people cannot ask questions whenever they want. For 
example, as mentioned above, the audience in the Delta City side ended up with a different 
interpretation of the use of ‘lamppost’ and ‘City OS’. Both terms needed actors on both sides 
to clarify. The nature of the technology mediated communication did not offer unrivalled 
capacity for interruption, repair, feedback, and learning (Coenen et al., 2010), so during the 
Webinar, people on both sides had little chance to interrupt, ask each other questions, and 
clarify concepts. 
 
The second factor is cognitive proximity. A certain level of shared knowledge background 
was needed to make effective communication possible. The lack of cognitive proximity was 
an issue repeatedly in the communication process. First, as we saw DCIIC officials did not 
have cognitive proximity with OPHC. This was evidenced in both webinars and the 
delegation visit Day 2 and Day 5. From DCIIC’s reaction, we see that they did not properly 
understand the vision of OPHC. In their mind-set, Internet of Things (IoT) is equal to ‘smart 
cities’. It is not so farfetched to hold this belief as the idea of Internet of Things (IoT) is 
pervasive in today’s smart city making. DCIIC is just following this trend. However, this 
cognitive schema lessened their understanding of OPHC. For example, because they 
regarded OPHC as a city scale Internet of Things network, when they selected topics to talk 
to OPHC about, DCIIC highlighted SOFT’s smart street lighting application twice. DCIIC 
did not pay attention to the revolutionary programmable infrastructure at all in the entire 
communication process. Second, the translator and OPHC also did not have cognitive 
proximity. As we saw, the translator Li did not have background knowledge of SDN 
technology. So, she skipped over all the technological aspects of OPHC in her translation. 
Third, OPHC and the companies did not share cognitive proximity. As we saw in the 
interview with conference participants on visit Day 2, that they did not understand SDN and 
the idea of a programmable testbed. 
 
However, too much cognitive proximity can also affect communication. Although Flower 




easier, because Flower Action is also an SDN promoter. OPHC and Light Speed did not 
want to elaborate on technological details with competitors. In order to make parties who 
share close cognitive proximity to have deeper communication, social proximity or trust is 
necessary. Moreover, good cognitive proximity between two parties also does not guarantee 
successful communication. This is because people’s actions are driven by their private 
expectations as in the example of engineer Lao Zhao. Although he understood a bit about 
SDN and network OS, he was simply not interested in it because he overly was focused on 
finding solutions (e.g. Li-Fi) for his own business.  
 
The third factor that effected the articulation of OPHC’s vision to the Delta City actors, 
especially the DCIIC officials, was organisational proximity. According to Boschma (2005), 
organisational proximity means a set of interdependencies within and between 
organisations. Organisational proximity influences the degree of control and autonomy 
under which knowledge is exchanged and processed. Too much organisational proximity 
has the problem of lacking the flexibility to adopt new ideas because new ideas are not 
rewarded in a bureaucratic system and it is difficult to have interactive learning Intra- and 
Inter- organisations. One example of high organisational proximity is a hierarchically 
organised firm and network. While too little organisational proximity may increase the 
danger of opportunism. An example of loose organisational proximity is the joint venture 
form of firm and network. I argue that DCIIC and OPHC do not share similar organisational 
proximity. DCIIC is a government organisation in Delta City with a strict hierarchical 
structure, and situated in a bureaucratic system. On the contrary, OPHC is a joint venture 
between the University of Harbour City and Harbour City Council. It is a loosely coupled 
network in a local context. The interaction between OPHC and DCIIC could be regarded as 
an interaction between two different types of organisational proximity: the loose 
organisational proximity and the high organisation proximity. Since DCIIC has a high 
organisational proximity, it has less flexibility to choose the innovation pathway it wants. 
So, when the vision of OPHC was presented in front of DCIIC, DCIIC officers would have 
had difficulty buying into the vision of OPHC according to their own free will. 
 
The fourth reason effecting the articulation of the OPHC vision is social proximity. Social 
proximity is the social relations between agents at the micro-level based on friendship, 
kinship and experience. Boschma (2005) argues that too much social proximity creates a 




of doing things and have adverse impacts on their own innovative and learning capabilities. 
On the contrary, too little social proximity make it difficult for both parties to communicate 
with each other and exchange tactical knowledge because trust between actors is required 
before they will commit their resources and knowledge (Coenen et al., 2010). I had 
mentioned that the lack of social proximity between Flower Action and OPHC made it 
difficult for the two parties to have an open conversation. The lack of social proximity was 
also an issue between OPHC and DCIIC officials. Although Delta City and Harbour City 
have 15 years friendship, these interactions were mainly at a senior level and not between 
two smart city niches (OPHC and DCIIC) at a local level. Moreover, the mayors in the two 
cities changed many times, so the personal connection was lost when the original people left. 
However, it takes time between two parties in an international cooperation, to build a 
relationship of trust before they commit resources. Plateau City provides a counter example; 
Plateau City is also a sister city of Delta City, and due to its long-term commitment to Delta 
City, it successfully built social proximity with Delta City. As a result, it has successfully 
tapped a lot of research funding from Delta City.  
 
In addition to Boschma’s conceptual tool proximity, I argue that there is another proximity 
that influences the diffusion process which is the proximity of expectation. As we saw above, 
OPHC encountered expectations in another cultural context in the diffusion process. Using 
Van Lente’s (1993) classification, we can sort these expectations into different levels (micro-
, meso-, macro-), OPHC directly encountered many micro level expectations in Delta City, 
including companies’ micro expectations (e.g. Lao Zhao’s expectation of finding a Li-fi 
solution) and DCIIC’s smart city expectation (e.g. smart street lighting). OPHC also in-
directly encountered many meso-level and macro-level expectations in China. For example, 
Delta City municipal government’s expectations and the macro expectations in China (e.g. 
Made in China 2025). Expectations at the micro level guide innovators and firms to search 
for specific technology. So, the proximity between OPHC and those micro levels of 
expectation in Delta City would have a direct effect on the diffusion of OPHC. Expectation 
at the macro level will also have in-direct impacts on the diffusion process of OPHC. Its 
impacts mainly manifest through influencing the choice of technology at the meso and micro 
levels. As we saw above, certain technologies highlighted in the Chinese context connected 
with the culture’s deepest hopes and fears. For example, robotic technology was prioritised 
by the Chinese government at that time, because it was assumed it could help China to 




“Made in China 2025”. The macro expectations in China also influenced local government 
and civil servants in choosing technologies. For example, in webinar 1, after listening to the 
OPHC niche actors talking about the vision of OPHC, DCIIC picked up on the Robotic lab 
rather than the programmable infrastructure of OPHC. Another example happened in Day 5 
of delegation visit. After Chris talked about OPHC vision, the responses from DCIIC were 
not about the programmable infrastructure, but a suggestion of cooperation around driverless 
cars. In both cases, the macro expectation of upgrading industry legitimated robotic 
technology as a promising technology for the future China. Macro expectations effect the 
choice of technology at meso and micro levels. So, in order to successfully diffuse OPHC, 
there also needed to be a proximity between the expectations of OPHC and the macro 
expectations in China. The closer OPHC related to those macro expectations, the more likely 





This Chapter investigated the phenomena of diffusion in the innovation process of OPHC. 
On one hand, OPHC innovators sought to spread OPHC to general global smart city 
audiences and become a leader for others to learn from. On the other hand, it wanted to 
mobilise OPHC to another local smart city niche in China. Both diffusion directions relied 
on the performance of the vision to spread OPHC. From the results, we can see that the 
vertical diffusion was quite successful because the emerging smart city field welcomed the 
new ideas from a local smart cities niche. The vision of OPHC brought fresh food for thought 
for the emerging global smart city niche. However, at the local level, the same performance 
of vision had already past the phase of excitement and turn into hype. This was mainly due 
to the different speed of hype at different levels. It turns into hype faster at the local level 
where people had brought into OPHC vision and had expected it to be realised sooner. In 
terms of the latter diffusion, although key OPHC actors iteratively introduced the vision of 
OPHC to Delta City companies and officials, it was difficult for them to buy into the vision. 
As analysed above the geographical-, cognitive-, organisation-, social- proximities all cause 
problems to the diffusion process and I also argue that a new form of proximity (expectation 













This research provided a detailed study of the making of a smart city OPHC, in terms of its 
emergence, implementation, and diffusion processes. Due to the time restriction of this 
research, it can only capture the very early stage of this smart city innovation. The moment 
when I left the field, OPHC was at its lowest point. This was partly due to it not delivering 
things it had promised and losing the trust of its local host partners. It was also partly due to 
external political turbulence in 2016 (e.g. Brexit and the local mayoral election) which 
brought some negative impacts to OPHC. For example, many of the innovators that we 
encountered in the stories had left OPHC by the end of 2016. New teams were being recruited 
around OPHC which had the ambition to restructure the project. However, some of these 
newly recruited actors were themselves replaced by others later on. It worth pointing out, 
the overarching vision of the Open Programmable Harbour City has been sustained even 
when innovators have left, specific elements of this idea in practice have not yet been 
achieved or were found to be undesirable. The story of OPHC continues and its future 
innovation directions depend on ongoing dynamic negotiations.  
 
Looking back over the whole innovation process, it is hard to conclude the messy and fluid 
innovation process in one sentence. Nevertheless, there are still two overarching points that 
I could like to highlight. First of all, a smart city innovation is not just about the 
implementation of technology, instead, it is a type of configuration which continually 






(e.g. attracting attention, coordinating actions, providing protection). The evolutionary 
results will likely differ from the original promise of the project. As we have seen with 
OPHC, many technological investments took longer than expected or were not realised; 
citizen engagement was limited in the innovation process; and the platform had not yet been 
sold to other cities. However, the story of this smart city innovation is more interesting that 
this would suggest. The innovation process generated other effects beyond its original plan. 
For example, at local level, the innovation process of OPHC has produced many artefacts 
(e.g. high-speed broadband, a newly upgrade 3D dome, and the Toad) and generated 
employment opportunities. It has also successfully mobilised some actors to take action (e.g. 
Straw House). At a global level, OPHC boosted the city’s international reputation and 
established it as in a leading position in the smart city world.  
 
Following this dynamic result, the second point becomes more understandable; that it is 
difficult to evaluate a smart city innovation. For a system innovation like a smart city, it is 
difficult to judge whether the difficulties are just temporary or a sign of hype. As we have 
seen above, although OPHC failed in its original promise, it produced other results. The 
negative results at the project level and the replacement of innovators will not challenge the 
whole assumption of the project. Innovators in OPHC can apply interpretation flexibilities 
to explain the negative results and the vision of OPHC will continue to provide protection 
for future experiments. They will create new agendas, conduct new experiments, and this 
likely will generate new problems. If the results are negative again, innovators can again 
apply interpretation flexibilities. This cycle will continue and repeat many times. If it 
produces something significant in the end, the vision of the smart city project will become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Otherwise, this cycle will stop when the vision is no longer 
promising, or the smart city is replaced by some new concept at global level. At that moment, 
the previous negative results will be re-interpreted as a failure.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
In the following sections, I start by drawing together my observations in the preceding 
chapters to addresses the three core research questions. This will include: shedding light on 
the innovation process itself; discussing the dynamic and paradoxical roles that the vision of 
OPHC has played in the innovation process; and reflecting on how citizens were imagined, 
involved and excluded in the process. Then, I will discuss some of the limitations of the 
research and point out the potential future directions for both empirical exploration and 




technological innovation and highlights the contributions of this research.  
 
8.2 Addressing the research questions 
 
8.2.1 RQ1: What are the innovation processes of a smart city project? 
 
This research shows that the birth of OPHC differed from smart cities projects that we often 
read about in academic and popular literatures. Smart cities projects are usually either created 
in a top-down manner by technology corporations and authorities (e.g. Songdo, Rio de 
Janeiro), or simply re-labelled existing initiatives in a city in response to the trend of ‘smart 
cities’ (e.g. Turin). The birth of OPHC shows a much complex picture. OPHC was born in 
a local context which provided many pre-conditions for its emergence, including human 
actors (e.g. a network of innovators, and many institutions), technologies (SDN, 
supercomputer, dome), and many existing expectations (e.g. connecting the dome to the 
supercomputer; building up an experimental testbed). A network of local innovators 
constantly created configurations based on these pre-conditions in response to external 
innovation opportunities (e.g. the digital infrastructure competition). However, innovators’ 
agency was both restricted and enabled by the broader structure those configurations were 
embedded in (e.g. the laws and regulations and the network industry). OPHC was a 
configuration of people, artefacts, expectations that survived in the selection environment at 
the local niche level. This OPHC configuration was then creatively linked to the global smart 
city trend. OPHC innovators enriched the configuration as a smart city project through the 
alignment of technologies, applications, local host partners, big corporations, and created a 
prospective structure (vision of OPHC) to envision it as a smart city project.  
 
Following the unique birth process, OPHC proposed an open innovation model. This model 
aimed to provide a city-scale programmable infrastructure to enable an ecosystem of users 
(academic, business, local partners, citizens, and other cities) to experiment with smart 
solutions for urban problems. This model was partly informed by criticisms of other smart 
city projects that are thought to benefit only big corporations and authorities and leave little 
space for local people (Townsend, 2013; Holland, 2014). The OPHC innovators wanted to 
build a different kind of smart city project. A smart city with benefits for everyone. It was 
partly influenced by the characters of Harbour City; the city with an entrepreneurial spirit 




movements (e.g. Straw House). So, innovators of OPHC saw the potential that this open 
model might work in Harbour City.  
 
The materialisation process of the OPHC happened at two levels. At the local level (Harbour 
City), three sub-niches were created by different innovation teams (OPHC engineering team, 
the OPHC business team, the Data Dome team, and the Citizen Sensing team). Each sub-
niche relates to a different aspect of OPHC, such the programmable testbed, the first 
application in the Data Dome, and the Citizen Sensing application. Under the guidance of 
OPHC vision, innovators sought to create a network of actors within each niche through the 
articulation of expectation, building social networking, and learning. In the end, although 
each site produced some outcomes, none of them fully realised their roles as scripted in the 
vision of OPHC. Beyond Harbour City, innovators of OPHC sought to diffuse the ‘not-yet’ 
realised vision of OPHC to the world try and win global attention and support. Performing 
the vision was the main way used to diffuse the vision and this produced dynamic results. In 
the vertical diffusion direction, the performance of the vision helped OPHC establish a 
leading position in the global smart city niche. While, in the horizontal diffusion direction, 
the diffusion suffered due to the lack of many types of proximity (geographical, cognitive-, 
organizational-, social-, and expectation-). It is also worth noting that when OPHC became 
a global smart city success story, people in Harbour City had gone through the cycle of 
excitement, actions, and disappointments.  
 
Overall, the assumption of building an infrastructure around which an ecosystem of actors 
would then form naturally was shattered in the real innovation process. This is primarily 
associated with two reasons: lack of mutual shared interest, and a lack of clear coordination. 
For the former, as have seen above that people, organisations, and culture have their own 
expectations. Where they could not find shared interest with OPHC, they tended to not take 
up the roles that the vision of OPHC had allocated for them. This was true of the SMEs in 
Delta City who did not want to experiment with OPHC and build applications for the Dome. 
This was also evidenced in companies and officials in Delta City not wanting to buy into the 
OPHC vision. For those who buy into OPHC vision, the second reason became obvious. As 
we can saw in Chapter 6, when people have taken up the roles that the vision of OPHC 
assigned to them, they have tended to translate OPHC according to their expectations. For 
example, the OPHC engineering team focused overly on keeping the infrastructure state-of-




actors, such as Straw House, who were driven by the goal of citizen engagement. In the case 
of the Data Dome, there were a number of competing interests - the Science Museum’s desire 
to upgrade its facilities; the local authorities desire to generate jobs and see financial benefit. 
So, although different types of actors bought into the OPHC vision, OPHC had neither the 
authority nor the capacity to impose a clear coordinated plan and structure to the overall 
project. The whole project becomes characterised by a lack of communication between 
different niche developments, which went on at different speeds. 
 
8.2.2 RQ2: How does the vision contribute to the innovation processes of a 
smart city?  
 
Vision is an element which is often neglected in current smart cities research. There is often 
a dualist treatment of the vision that regard vision as something static and independent from 
smart city innovation processes. As a result, much smart city research either focuses on 
critiquing main stream smart cities visions (Holland, 2008; Vanolo, 2013), or exploring 
citizens’ expectations of smart cities (Thomas et al., 2016). This research is based on a non-
dualist attitude to vision and the innovation process. The ethnographic research provides me 
with a specific vantage point to look at what vision actually does in a smart city innovation 
process.  
 
There are many expectations and visions that can be identified in the innovation process. For 
example, there were a series of expectations (e.g. Gigabit Harbour City, the experimental 
testbed, connecting the dome to supercomputer) that pre-dated the OPHC vision. There were 
OPHC related expectations, such as the expectation of building a programmable 
infrastructure, Data Dome, and commons approach to Citizen Sensing. There were also 
many co-existing expectations and visions, ranging from local developers’ expectations of 
developing a system for the Data Dome, to macro expectation of “upgrading industry” in 
China. Amongst those visions and expectations, the overarching OPHC vision is the main 
vision in the innovation process. Based on the analysis above, I argue that OPHC vision 
plays a dynamic and sometimes paradoxical role in the emergence, implementation, and 
diffusion process of OPHC. 
 
First, the OPHC vision contributed to a tidying up of the past as well as envision a future. In 




birth process of the project. It pulled together various expectations, actors, and technologies 
into a coherent story. It simplified the emergence process of OPHC and bundled together 
highly disparate interests into one seemingly coherent initiative. The vision of OPHC not 
only described what was already in the OPHC project, it also scripted roles for many groups 
(e.g. SMEs, citizens, other cities, etc.) and future artefacts (e.g. Data Dome, RF Mesh 
network, ‘City OS’, ‘Network Emulator’). This script made up a prospective structure which 
projected to the future and sought to mobilise certain future arrangements to the present.  
 
The second function of the OPHC vision was that it helped to mobilise some actors, but it 
failed to mobilise others. These scripted roles in the prospective structure appealed to some 
actors and successfully mobilised them to take actions. Many examples can be found in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, such as Straw House, who took up the role to co-produce a Citizen 
Sensing application; and several engineers and corporations (e.g. JEP) found ways to use 
OPHC. However, the vision of OPHC failed to mobilise other actors. it failed because some 
actors (e.g. citizens) were not interested in the role assigned to them; It failed because the 
vision mis-interpreted actors’ true needs (e.g. in case of SMEs); it failed because others did 
not understand the vision and they had competing ideas of what a smart city is and its 
purposes (e.g. the case of Delta City). It also failed to mobilise some non-human actors, for 
example, the layout of the Data Dome restricted the materialisation of the vision.  
 
Third, the OPHC vision coordinated actions of the innovation team at each site, but it did 
not coordinate innovation activities between sites. As we can see in Chapter 6, the innovation 
activities in relation to OPHC mainly happened in three parallel sites: an infrastructure and 
two applications. The vision of OPHC contributed to coordinating innovation within each 
site through creating task divisions. Innovation teams in each site took the tasks that were 
assigned to them, built individual agendas, and took real actions accordingly. However, the 
vision of OPHC did not generate coordination between the innovation teams in the different 
sites. As seen above, the OPHC engineering team, the OPHC business team, the Data Dome 
team, and the Citizen Sensing team conducted broadly independent innovation journeys and 
there were no mutual agendas between them. As a result of the lack of coordination between 
innovation teams, negative influences impacted the realisation of the vision, such as the 
continued alignment of user cause frustrations for the OPHC engineering team; OPHC’s 
business agenda affecting the articulation of expectation in Data Dome site; the application 




developing faster than the OPHC infrastructure.  
 
Fourth, OPHC vision nurtured innovation through providing a protected space but over 
protection also impeded innovation. The vision provided ongoing protections for the niche 
experimentation. It created a protected space through providing funding and ongoing 
narratives to allow actors, even when experiment results were negative, to continue arguing 
that the vision was being built. The setbacks were interpreted as a temporary failure on the 
road to future success. However, too much protection inhibits innovators to falsify their 
initial assumptions, open for negations, and to see what actually works in reality. As we can 
see in the case of Data Dome, the experiments had already suggested that it was a challenge 
for the dome to become an interactive data visualisation device. In reality, what worked best 
was using the upgraded dome for other purposes which has nothing to do with OPHC. 
However, the vision of OPHC still protected the insufficient idea and the poor design. In this 
case, the protection of the niche needed to be broken up and failure acknowledged for future 
success. 
 
Fifth, the vision of OPHC contributed to attracting attention as well as causing 
disappointment. The vision of OPHC was voiced on many occasions and on different scales. 
In order to attract attention, sometimes, it was even inflated. As a result, the vision of OPHC 
success attracted attention from both local and global communities. For example, some 
people and organisations in Harbour City felt motivated to take part (e.g. developers and 
Straw House). It also attracted attention from the business and international smart city 
community. This is evidenced in the ongoing alignment of business partners and the 
awarding of two prestigious global awards. However, the vision also turned into hype and 
generated disappointment. It caused disappointment when it did not achieve what it 
promised. Straw House (Chapter 7), was excited enough by the vision to take action at the 
beginning, but, it became a disappointed when the RF Mesh network did not open as 
promised. Disappointment occurred when the saying and readable action did not match up. 
For instance, in the case of the Data Dome (Chapter 6). The performance of the vision was 
used to motivate many developers to participate, however the real actions (e.g. copyright 
arrangements and the demand for £1000 per hour development fees) contradicted the saying 
of the vision and put off many potential developers.  
 




theorising smart city innovation. Vision clearly plays many dynamic and sometime 
paradoxical roles in the earlier stages of smart city innovation where nothing is solid. In the 
case of OPHC, it both nurtured and impeded innovation. Innovators should be more aware 
of the power of vision and take it into account when managing smart city innovation, such 
as utilising vision wisely to foster innovation rather than impede it. It is worth noting, this 
research mainly focused on studying the vision of OPHC’s role in the innovation process. 
There were other visions and expectations that can be identified in the process which would 
be worth future investigation.  
 
8.2.3 (RQ3) How are citizens imagined and enrolled in the processes? 
 
Many smart city initiatives circulated in publicity tend to emphasise what technology can do 
for future cities. Citizens are often treated as users in those proposed visions, rather than 
active agents. Research had already pointed out the absence of citizens in many smart cities 
initiatives (Hemment and Townsend, 2013; Townsend, 2013). Cowley et al. (2017) 
distinguish four modalities of publicness across six UK cities. However, we still lack a detail 
understanding about citizen engagement in an actual smart city innovation process. This 
research contributes to addressing this gap. It has analysed what kinds of roles were allocated 
to citizens in the OPHC smart city project, and to what extent citizens actually participate to 
enact those roles. The key finding is that citizens had limited roles in the OPHC innovation 
process and more intentional efforts would have been required to make citizens truly a part 
of the smart city project. 
 
OPHC is an especially interesting case for the purpose of investigating the issue of citizen 
participation. This is because OPHC clearly positioned itself as different to technology-
centric smart city initiatives and claimed citizen participation as a core principle. The vision 
of OPHC scripted roles for citizens in three places. The first is the programmable 
infrastructure. The vision of OPHC envisioned that everyone (including ordinary citizens) 
could experiment with the programmable infrastructure. Second, it suggested its first 
application, Data Dome, could be a space for citizens to engage with urban data, and for 
local developers to produce creative content. Third, it partnered with a local community 
organization, Straw House, to engage excluded communities. These three places reflected 
three roles for citizens. The first role is similar to what Cowley et al. (2017) calls the 




through their creative use of digital infrastructure. Here citizens mainly refers to SMEs and 
developers who have certain technological know-how skills. There are two roles for ordinary 
citizens. One is aligning a mediator organization, Straw House, to co-produce applications 
with them. This is similar to what Cowley et al. (2017) call ‘civic publicness’. This means 
activities that take place beyond state institutions. The other role is as interactive audiences. 
This idea was demonstrated in the case of Data Dome. This role is similar to Andrew Barry 
(2001)’s discussion about citizens in technological society. 
 
Chapter 6 provided a detailed picture about how the three roles played out in reality. In 
general, the three roles assigned to citizens were not fulfilled. The first role was challenged 
at the sites of the programmable infrastructure and Data Dome. It was challenged due to the 
lack of ‘middleware’ that was necessary for SMEs and developers to access the testbed. It 
was challenged because not everyone was ready to participate in the experiment. For 
example, SMEs in BOX did not have technologies that are ready to test through OPHC; 
independent developers could not afford to spend time conducting experiments for the dome. 
It was challenged because the proposed idea proved to be unsuitable due to physical and 
financial barriers (e.g. the Data Dome). The second role was challenged because of the lack 
of coordination between infrastructure development and application development. As we 
have seen with the case of Citizen Sensing, the wireless infrastructure was not developed in 
time for the sensing application Toad to use. The third role was also difficult to realise. This 
is partly because it did not coordinate with OPHC infrastructure at all and partly because 
innovators realised that it did not make much difference to citizens to view urban data.  
 
Overall, we can see that citizens played a limited role in the OPHC innovation process. 
Although the project stressed the importance of citizen engagement, citizen participation 
remained a rhetorical device, paying lip service only. In order to make a smart city innovation 
truly inclusive for citizens, efforts would need to be made to actually configure citizens in 
the innovation process. For instance, fundamental engineering decisions would need to be 
changed for this to be achieved. Co-creating should not merely for the purpose of exploring 
methodology, and more coordinated approach would need to be adopted. 
 
8.3 Future research directions 
 




could be improved. First of all, the goal of one researcher to conduct an ethnographic 
research about a smart city was too ambitious. OPHC is a system innovation happened in 
multiple directions. Although, I tried my best to follow the innovation process, there was 
some data I wanted to collect but was not able to. If I were designing it now, I would 
acknowledge the limitations of one researcher to do this research and seeking collaborations 
with other researchers for studying a big project like OPHC. Second, this research lacks a 
comparative angle. Although this is not the purpose of this research, it would be interesting 
to conduct comparative research with others smart cities innovation within UK and beyond. 
For example, I could to compare the case of OPHC with the smart city project Barcelona, 
because they both have some shared characteristics (e.g. open innovation) or with other UK 
smart cities’ smart city making processes. I would also be interested to do comparative 
research between UK and China smart city making. Third, this research applied the socio-
technical perspective of Transition Studies to understand the innovation process. As a 
researcher, I kept a distance from the innovation process, however, another approach could 
be to apply the Transition Management approach and work more closely with OPHC 
innovators to become part of the smart city innovation. Nevertheless, within this research, I 
have already opened many topics which are worth for investigation. I will specifically 
address the future theoretical and empirical directions below.  
 
8.3.1 Future theoretical research 
 
‘Smart city’ is an emerging research field which lacks robust theoretical frameworks. In 
order to find suitable theoretical frameworks for this research, I went through an iterative-
inductive process of selecting, testing, modifying and assembling conceptual tools. An initial 
theoretical framework was pulled together from Actor-Network Theory (ANT), Andrew 
Barry’s concepts, and the Sociology of Expectation, the Sociology of the Future. The 
approaches responded to key concerns of the research: process, vision, and citizens. 
However, the ongoing empirical work revealed the drawbacks of this initial theoretical 
configuration. For example, ANT is useful to spot the alignment mechanism in the 
innovation process, but it not so useful in addressing other elements, such as the structure 
limitation that OPHC faced, the diverse experiment and learning process, and the 
communication process beyond the territory. Andrew Barry’s concepts of technological zone 
and citizens in technological society was also not suitable for the case of OPHC because 




engagement technologies. To modify the original framework and make it more suitable for 
the chosen case, I turned to the socio-technical Transition Studies. It shares some similar 
roots with STS (including ANT) and the Sociology of Expectation. I found its analytic tools, 
Multi-level perspective (MLP) and Strategic Niche Management (SNM) more useful for this 
research. I kept the Sociology of Expectation to complement Transition Studies’ 
understanding of expectation and vision. In the end, I creatively re-configured the conceptual 
tools from the socio-technical perspective of Transition Studies and the Sociology of 
Expectation to create a theoretical perspective for the research. This framework has been 
useful to make sense of the innovation process and the role of vision in the case of OPHC. 
However, the conceptual tools from both approaches were created from historical cases. 
Applying them to a real-time case has generated some fresh insights which could be further 
explored as follows: 
 
(1) Future research on the Transition Studies 
 
The empirical data of this research could contribute to Transition Studies. In this research I 
applied MLP and SNM to shed light on the empirical data. For example, I adopted MLP in 
Chapter 5 to understand the emergence of OPHC. I use SNM in Chapter 6 to understand the 
innovation process in the three sites and to understand the case of Delta City in Chapter 7. 
Although, this research only observes the early transition process which made it difficult to 
judge the whole transition process of OPHC, the empirical observation can still contribute 
to understanding micro level innovation processes and their interactions with the regime 
level. The empirical data suggests that the conceptual tools could be further developed in 
three aspects.  
 
- First, more research is required to understand the interaction between one local niche 
and multiple regimes. As above have been seen that OPHC is a local smart city niche, 
but it wants to change not only one regime, but multiple regimes, including the regime 
of urban management and the regime of the communication industry. Future research 
could look at the process of one local niche that transforms multiple regimes. The 
results of this exploration might enrich the understanding of the transition trajectory. 
 
- Second, research is needed to explore the relationship between the niche and sub-




novel innovations. I have called them sub-niches. The research indicated that a niche 
can also have a sub-structure which I called sub-niche. Therefore, future research 
could explore the structure within an innovation niche, such as the relationship 
between two sub-niches, or the relationship between niche and sub-niche. It is 
increasingly necessary to understand more about these relationships because many 
innovations nowadays are system innovations which require the coordination of 
multiple sub-innovation systems (sub-niches).  
 
- Third, more research is required to understand the proximity of expectation in spatial 
niche development. In studying niche expansion (Chapter 7), I applied Boschma’s 
proximities to understand the articulation of vision in another cultural context. 
However, Boschma’s proximities were created based on empirical data in one cultural 
context (e.g. Netherlands). The multi-cultural context of this research enriched 
Boschma’s concept proximity. It suggests that proximity of expectation is another 
factor influencing the articulation of vision. This factor could be explored further.  
 
(2) Future research on the Sociology of Expectation 
 
This research also contributes to the Sociology of Expectation research. It largely draws on 
conceptual tools from the Sociology of Expectation to understand the role of vision in the 
innovation process of OPHC. This was extremely helpful to shed light on the dynamic roles 
that vision played in the innovation process. However, applying the conceptual tools in a 
real-time case generated new insights which could be further explored.  
 
- The empirical data in this research could enrich the conceptual tool, the hype cycle. 
First of all, it provided rich data to show that hype and disappointment can operate at 
different levels. Van Lente et al. (2013) find that hype is constituted at different levels. 
Their research was based on public discourses about a certain technology over 10 
+years. This research provides a zoom-in picture of how hype can come out at 
different speeds at different levels. Due to the timeframe of the research, it not 
possible to capture what follow up on local people what happened afterward when 
local people feel disappointment. Van Lente et al. (2013) suggest that misalignment 
of disappointment at different levels might contribute to a productive reconfiguration 




that at the global level might be a good sign. It can stimulate innovators at the project 
level to conduct some productive recovery after the disappointment. Future research 
could follow this line of inquiry. Second, this research also suggested that the “precise 
expectation of a project” in an innovation environment is another factor that effects 
the hype patterns. As we can saw in Chapter 7, the specific expectations about OPHC 
at the local level was disappointing to local partners and developers. While at a global 
niche level, this specific expectation did not exist. So, global actors did not experience 
disappointment.  
 
- Different cultures have different macro agendas in relation to technologies at 
different times which influences their choices of technologies at the meso- and micro 
level. In the case of Delta City, I applied Van Lente’s (1993) levels of expectations 
to distinguish three levels (macro-, meso-, and micro-) of expectations that OPHC 
encountered in Delta City. In this case, OPHC as a micro expectation in one cultural 
interacted with level of expectations in another culture context. The research argued 
that the lack of proximity of expectation was another reason effecting the diffusion 
of the vision of OPHC to Delta City. Further research is required to explore the levels 
of expectations in different cultural and spatial context. This would contribute to our 
understanding about diffusing one vision from one culture to another.  
  
- Further research is required to understand the immaterial or fluid aspect of a vision. 
The Sociology of Expectation looks at the present and the future in a form of past 
futures and present futures (Adam, 2005). This way of thinking about the future 
might neglect other aspects of the future such as the immaterial-, latent-, and 
immanent-, and invisible- future. Empirical data in this research shows that vision is 
fluid and can exist in an immaterial state. For example, the vision of OPHC was built 
on a series of pre-existing expectations in Harbour City. One expectation can merge 
or add to another expectation in order to survive in reality. Sometime, an expectation 
can exist in ideational space for a long time and this latent future might become 
concrete when conditions are ready. For example, the expectation of connecting the 
dome to the supercomputer had existed for a long time, but, it did not materialise 




its materialisation process could enrich the sociology of expectation’s understanding 
of the future.  
 
- Attention is required to study the negotiation process between a proposed collective 
vision and other co-existing individual/collective visions. Most sociology of 
expectation research focuses on exploring collective/shared expectations and seldom 
pays attention to the interactions between collective expectation and other co-
existing visions (Berkhout, 2006). In this research, I mainly look at the vision of 
OPHC, however, we can find many co-existing visions/expectations. For example, 
in the Data Dome site, we see that there were a lot of private expectations about how 
to utilise the newly upgraded Dome. Further research could investigate the ongoing 
negotiation process between collective/shared expectations and other visions. It is 
necessary because it will contribute to what we call a democracy of expectations.  
 
8.3.2 Future empirical research 
 
This empirical research mainly focuses on investigating the innovation process, vision, and 
citizen participation. However, in the research process, I noticed some other aspects which 
were not the main themes of this research but could be explored further. Below, I highlight 
four directions for future empirical research. 
 
First, gender in smart city innovation is an issue which could be explored further. In the 
OPHC case, we can see a clearly male dominated landscape. For example, apart from the 
Chief Technological designer Susan, two directors of Straw House, a few of the staff from 
the city council, and one business manager of OPHC, the rest of the innovators were male. 
Further empirical research could be done in terms of how gender shapes the vision of a smart 
city project or how gender influences the innovation process of a smart city. 
 
Second, this research studies non-human actors (e.g. technological artefacts) in the 
innovation process. As we have seen there are many non-human actors in the innovation 
process, including the H-Net, RF Mesh network, the dome, the supercomputer, and the Toad. 
To some extent they all have the capacity to shape the innovation process. For example, H-
Net is the foundation of the OPHC project. It is impossible to imagine OPHC without it, 




in this research, though more empirical research is required to explore how non-human actors 
react to the roles that vision assigns to them.  
 
Third, the case of OPHC provides a great opportunity to explore ‘experimental city’. 
Because the key idea underpin OPHC was to provide an experimental testbed for people to 
explore technological solutions for future cities. This idea resonates to what Evan, Karvonen, 
and Raven (2016) called experimental way of knowledge production about the city. This 
new way of knowledge production differs from traditional urban knowledge production 
because it has a strong natural sciences commitment. For example, we can see a strong 
positivist language in the idea of the experimental research testbed, such as sampling, scaling 
up, and replicating. Maarten Hajer argued that the experimental form of knowledge 
production changes the epidemiology of knowing. The epidemiology of “analysis and 
instruction” has been replaced by an approach of “variation and selection”. The deductive 
logic of applying a genetic principle at the local level has given way to a more inductive way 
of knowing (Evan et al., 2016). There is a growing literature on ‘experimental city’ and 
‘urban experimentations’ (Gross and Krohn, 2005; Gross and Hoffmann-Riem, 2005; 
Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2012; Karvonen and van Heur, 2013; Evans and Karvonen, 
2013; McLean et al., 2016). So far, there is no empirical data to shows that OPHC’s 
infrastructure produces certain knowledge about the city. However, if they do in the future, 
OPHC is a vintage point to explore the experimental way of urban knowledge production.  
 
Fourth, OPHC is a good case to explore open innovation model. As we can see from the case 
that OPHC wants to build an infrastructure platform that enables an ecosystem of users to 
benefit from it. It also pays attentions to citizens and want citizens be part of its innovation 
model. OPHC resonates to some pioneer research in the area of called open innovations. For 
example, Ojasalo J and Tähtinen (2016) explored urban innovation platform which mediated 
a city and external actors. Some research explores public, private and people (PPP) open 
innovation model (Paskaleva, 2011; Ojasalo J and Kauppinen, 2016). Hans Schaffers 
explores an open innovation model that incorporate Future Internet technologies and 
cooperation of citizens (Schaffers et al., 2011(a); Schaffers et al., 2011(b)). OPHC is a good 
case to enrich some of our understanding about this open model of innovation, in terms of 
infrastructure’s mediator role; public, private and people (PPP) partnership. As we can see 
from above analysis, the most difficult part of OPHC’s open model is that it lacks 




become part of the ecosystem did not buy into the vision. Further research required, such as 
what kind of innovation management or co-envisioning activities could make the open 
innovation model work in reality. 
 
8.4 Concluding Thoughts 
 
My interest in studying the relationship between technology and society motivated me to do 
this research. On reflection, conducting this study has not only fulfilled this initial goal, but 
also shaped some of my understanding of technological innovation. I have realised that the 
technological innovation process is much more complex than perceived and is unlikely to 
happen in a linear fashion. Therefore, we should not panic when we hear a promising 
technology in the media that claim you will be excluded from the future if you do not follow 
it. As this research suggests, a promising technology will not necessarily bring immediate 
social change. Instead, the implementation of a technology is a configuration that continually 
co-evolves with many elements. Social change is a result of the configuration that matures 
enough to replace the existing configuration at regime level. This also suggests that a vision 
has dynamic and paradoxical roles in the innovation process. The future is not determined, 
we still have the power to translate visions and negotiate with them. Moreover, as a Chinese 
person studying a UK smart city innovation with a special link to a Chinese city (Delta City), 
I am in the advantageous position of having a comparative understanding of smart city 
innovation in two cultural contexts. I have realised that both innovation models have their 
trade-offs, which suggests a different way of looking at failure. For example, network driven 
smart cities model in Harbour City (UK) did not appear to deliver many things, but did 
enable a wide range of actors in the city to discuss and negotiate their own interests. It is 
possible that nothing significant happen and resources are wasted, but it may forestall other 
blind alleys that may generate more problems in the future. A technological solution in Delta 
City may be implemented very quickly and sometimes even deliver exactly what is 
promised. A drawback of the model is that it might provide limited space for wider civic 
discussions, and there is considerable risk if anything goes wrong. 
 
Aside from self-reflection, I would also like to reflect on the overall contributions that the 
research has made in terms of knowledge and practices. This research creatively deploys an 
ethnographic approach and assembles conceptual tools from Transition Studies and the 




knowledge gap in terms of the understanding of the innovation process and citizen 
participation in “smart cities”, but also demonstrates the dynamic and sometimes paradoxical 
roles that vision plays in the innovation process. The rich empirical data and detailed analysis 
contribute to our understanding of the “smart cities” phenomenon and allow for reader 
interpretation. This research also provides much practical guidance for smart city innovators, 
such as the issue of coordination, the power of vision, and citizens’ participation. The 
detailed presentation of how this research has been carried out could be a “guidebook” for 
those who want to use the ethnographical approach to their research. This research not only 
illustrates the samplings and creative analysis process, but also provides an example of how 
researchers make choices and deal with dilemmas in the research process, such as the 
relationship between ethics and research; the balance between science and art. Moreover, 
this research opens doors for future empirical and theoretical inquiry, such as the role of 
vision in Transition Studies, the geographical dimensions of niche development, hype 
patterns, the cultural dimensions of expectations, the open innovation model, and 











Appendix 1. The full list of key fieldwork 
 
OPHC infrastructure                 Data Dome    Citizen Sensing     History of OPHC      
                                                        
 Performative role of vision   Diffusion OPHC to Delta City  
 
No. Names of the Fieldworks Data Collection method Time Theme 
1 
Meeting the Chief Designer of 
OPHC (Susan) 
Informal Interview 08-May-15 
OPHC 
infrastructure 
2 Data Dome Workshop 1 Participant Observation 22-May-15 Data Dome 
3 Urban Research Meeting  Participant Observation 04-Jun-15  
4 
Local technological innovation 
exhibition 
Participant Observation 09-Jun-15  
5 
Harbour City to Delta City 
Webinar 1 
Participant Observation 02-Jul-15 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
6 
Harbour City Internet of Thing 
event 
Participant Observation 06-Jul-15 
Performative 
role of vision 
7 
Software Defined Network 
workshop 




Harbour City to Delta City 
meeting 
Participant Observation 10-Jul-15 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
9 
Informal interview with an 
Engineer(Pink) from the Next 
Lab 
Informal Interview 14-Jul-15 
OPHC 
infrastructure 
10 My society meet up Participant Observation 23-Jul-15  
11 Data Dome Workshop 2  
Participant Observation, 
Informal interview 
29-Jul-15 Data Dome 
12 
Vising the Next Lab, Informal 
interview with one Engineer, 








Harbour City to Delta City 
Webinar 2 
Participant Observation 07-Aug-15 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
14 
Formal Interview with an 
Engineer from the NEXT Lab 




Harbour City to Delta City 
Webinar 3 
Participant Observation 24-Sep-15 
Diffusing OPHC 







Chinese Delegation visiting 
(including visiting the Dome, 
Tele-health house) 
Participant Observation 21-Oct-15 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
17 
Delta City Delegation visiting 
Harbour City 
Participant Observation 22-Oct-15 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
18 City Leadership Summit Participant Observation 23-Oct-15  
19 Future City Festival Day 1 Participant Observation 16-Nov-15  
20 Future City Festival Day 2 Participant Observation 17-Nov-15  
21 Future City Festival Day 3  Participant Observation 18-Nov-15  
22 Launch event of the Data Dome  
Participant Observation, 
Informal interview 
18-Nov-15 Data Dome 
23 Future City Festival Day 4 Participant Observation 19-Nov-15  
24 Future City Festival Day 5 Participant Observation 20-Nov-15  
25 Harbour City API Participant Observation 23-Jan-16  
26 
Citizen Sensing Networking 
Night 
Participant Observation 27-Jan-16 Citizen Sensing 
27 Delegation visiting preparation 1 Participant Observation 18-Feb-16 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
28 Gigabit Harbour City Launch Participant Observation 18-Feb-16  
29 Delegation visiting preparation 2 Participant Observation 19-Feb-16 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
30 Data and Healthcare Participant Observation 22-Feb-16  
31 
Formal Interview with a member 
of Data Dome team 
Formal Interview 23-Feb-16 Data Dome 
32 Citizen Sensing workshop 1 Participant Observation 05-Mar-16 Citizen Sensing 
33 
Flying to Delta City 
(preparation) 
Participant Observation 16-Mar-16 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
34 
Harbour City delegation visit 





to Delta City 
35 
Harbour City delegation visit 





to Delta City 
36 
Harbour City delegation visit 





to Delta City 
37 
Harbour City delegation visit 





to Delta City 
38 
Harbour City delegation visit 





to Delta City 
39 Post-visiting de-brief  Participant Observation 08-Apr-16 
Diffusing OPHC 
to Delta City 
40 VR conference  Participant Observation 12-Apr-16  
41 Citizen Sensing workshop 2 
Participant Observation, 
informal interview 
16-Apr-16 Citizen Sensing 
42 Maker Chinese delegation  Participant Observation 19-Apr-16  
43 
Formal interview with a broad 
member of OPHC (Brown) 
Formal Interview 10-May-16 
Performative 
role of vision 
44 
May Digital week -Data Dome 
re-launch  
Participant Observation 13-May-16 Data Dome 
45 
Informal Interview with a game 
designer  
Informal Interview 13-May-16 Data Dome 




servant from Harbour City 
council  
OPHC 
47 Open Data Challenge  Participant Observation 21-May-16  
48 
OPHC tech meet up 




Formal Interview with a 
computer scientist  
Formal Interview 06-Jun-16 Data Dome 
50 
Formal Interview with the 
Director of Dock 




Formal Interview with a civil 
servant from Harbour City 
Council 




 Informal Interview with a staff 
from the Light speed 




Formal Interview with a co-
director from Straw House  
Formal Interview 29-Jun-16 Citizen Sensing 
63 
Formal Interview with the Chief 
Manager of OPHC  





role of vision 
64 
Informal group interview with 
engineers from the MiniCat  
Informal Interview 30-Jun-16 Data Dome 
65 
Formal Interview with a co-
director from Straw House 
Formal Interview 30-Jun-16 Citizen Sensing 
66 Citizen Sensing data workshop Participant observation  09-Jul-16 Citizen Sensing 
67 
Informal Interview with a project 
manager of the Citizen Sensing 
Informal Interview  09-Jul-16 Citizen Sensing 
68 Informal Interview with Michael  Informal Interview  09-Jul-16 Citizen Sensing 
69 
Informal Interview with the 
designer of the Toad 
Informal Interview 09-Jul-16 Citizen Sensing 
70 
Formal interview with the Chief 








Formal Interview a project 
manager of OPHC  
Formal Interview 25-Jul-16 OPHC 
infrastructure 
72 
Formal Interview with a 
researcher from the Next Lab 
Formal Interview 04-Aug-16 OPHC 
infrastructure 
73 
Formal Interview a researcher 
from the Next Lab  
Formal Interview 08-Aug-16 OPHC 
infrastructure 
74 
Informal Interview with the 
designer of the Toad 
Informal Interview 10-Aug-16 Data Dome 
75 
Formal Interview the director of 
the BOX 
Formal Interview 15-Aug-16 History of 
OPHC 
76 
Formal Interview the business 
manager of OPHC  
Formal Interview 23-Aug-16 OPHC 
infrastructure 
77 
Formal Interview a researcher 
from the Next Lab  
Formal Interview 05-Sep-16 OPHC 
infrastructure 
78 Toad Talk in the DOCK 
Participant Observation  02-Sep-16 
Citizen Sensing 
79 
Straw House take over the Data 
Dome  




80 Interview the manager of OPHC  Formal Interview 
21-Sep-16 History of 
OPHC 




Formal Interview the Designer of 








Formal Interview the head of 
OPHC engineering team (1) 
Formal Interview 14-Sep-16 OPHC 
infrastructure 
85 
Formal interview the head of 
OPHC engineering team (2) 
Formal Interview 16-Sep-16 OPHC 
infrastructure 
86 
Exploring the Brain in the Data 
Dome 
Participant Observation  
29-Sep-16 
Data Dome 
87 Formal interview an owner of 
SME  
Formal Interview 
03-Oct-16 Data Dome 
 Citizen Sensing 
88 
Formal interview a member of 
the Data Dome team 
Formal Interview 05-Oct-16 
Data Dome 
89 
Harbour City Open Data 
Challenge  
Participant Observation  08-Oct-16  
90 
Informal interview with an 
engineer from MiniCat  
Informal Interview  08-Oct-16 
Data Dome 
91 
Tech Meet up for LoRa WAN 
(2) 
Participant Observation  17-Oct-16 
Citizen Sensing 
92 
Formal interview a member of 
the Data Dome team 























Appendix 2. The colour coding system of the observation notes  
 
I applied a colour coding system to take observation notes. The photograph above is the first page of 
my observation notebook which companied with different colour pens and stickers. The Chinese 
characters on the upper right side describe the purpose of this notebook. The different colour assigned 
to different colour pen and stickers. For example, I use a black colour fountain pen to scribbles notes 
and use a pencil to write down my initial thoughts/analysis. I also use different colour stickers to 
highlight different stages and things in the fieldwork. The white sticker represents “pre-field 
preparation”. In this section, I often write down the time and place of the event. If the event had 
schedule provided, I often conduct some initial analysis of the schedule and write down what I want 
to find out from the event? The black sticker indicates “a space for taking notes in the field”. The 
blue sticker used to highlight “references” that people mentioned in the field that I need to look up 
after the fieldwork. The red sticker emphasis “interesting point” for further analysis. The yellow 
stickers remind me what kind of “objects/documents” that I collect from the field. It is worth noting; 
this colour organising system is useful at the beginning of the research. It helps me to form a good 
habit of data collection and made me more aware of what kind of data I can collect from the field.  
But, I must admit that taking notes in the field is much messy than this. Especially in the late stage 
of research, where I am more and more clear about what I want to find in the field. So, I am less 





Appendix 3. Several examples of sketches of settings 
 













Appendix 4. An example of the interview checklist 
 
 
                                  Interview a board member of OPHC  
 
 




Data purpose: to understand more about OPHC’s history. The network formation in the earlier stage,  
                        the result of the diffusion of the vision.  
Methodology purpose: snowball method to find out who to interview next. 
Procedure: 
Introducing the purpose of this research to the interviewee. 
Allowing enough time for the interviewee to read the information sheet and sign the consent form. 
Negotiate the use of data. (...) 
Asking questions: 
 
Semi-structured interview questions: 
(1) What is the vision of OPHC?                                      
(2) Where does the vision come from? 
(3) Who shapes the idea? Are there are people who have been important at different times? 
(4) Compare with the normal smart city, what is the most innovative aspect of OPHC? 
(5) How did different parts of OPHC come together? Were there any difficulties in create shared  
      visions? 
(6) Were there any moments of disagreement or difficulty? What happened? And were those  
      questions negotiated? 
(7) How did the network form around OPHC? Why are these institutions involved? Why not  
     others? Was there any disagreement about it?  
(8) Have there been any particular turning points or key moments in OPHC’s history? What are  
      these? Why so important? 
(9) Who else should I talk to in order to understand more about how OPHC has developed and  
      how partnerships have been developed?  
(10) Do you have any materials/documents that I can have a look at about OPHC’s history? 
 




Appendix 5 An example of the research diary 
 
 
Time: 05/08/15                                Location: The Next Lab                       Guide/Contactor: Ian 
 
I had an appointment with Ian this afternoon. He agreed to give me a guided tour in the Next Lab. 
Around 3 pm, I bought two ice latte to visit him in the lab. It is the first time for me to visit the Lab. I 
felt a bit nervous. The lab located on the Ground Floor of a building. Luckily, I met a friend at the 
corridor, and he let me get through the two-locked door to enter the Lab. The Lab has a very big 
office area. It seems that there are many different types of research groups there. Very few familiar 
faces. Iran’s desk placed at the back of the office, which has an excellent view of the whole office. 
He noticed that I arrive. After greeting, I sit down and introduce the aim of this study. I tell him that 
I had already contact Susan a few months ago, but until recently I sort out the ethical forms for this 
research and be able to come to collect data. In order to give an inform consent about my research, 
I gave him the information sheet and the consent form. Then I explained what I want from today’s 
tour. For example, I want to understand the infrastructure of the OPHC, how many people in the 
Lab involved in, and what is the future agenda? If I want to conduct the ethnographic research in 
the Lab what is the possibility and how to negotiate access?  
 
Then he brought me to the Lab. The Lab located at the end the office, behind a locked door. When I 
get into the lab, the first feeling is a bit little chilly because of the equipment of need low temperature. 
On the right side, there are two big blocks of servers which haven’t fully installed yet. He starts to 
give me a tour. I guess he has his order, which he introduced this to many visitors. He introduced 
that there are seven layers of the infrastructure, that OPHC only deals with three layers of the 




For the programmability, he introduced me the FPGA; it is a bit like the Raspberry Pi or Arduino 
Board (picture D and picture E are FPGA and their location). It is the first time for me to see the 
real fibre (picture F). It is so thin. Unbelievable! It like the white hair. It connected the Lab to the 
three main nodes, I always read so, but do not know how it actually works. The Fibre connect to the 
other part of the world, the one in the UK called Ja.net. The one to the world called GEANT. I still 
vividly remember last time Susan told me so. The fibre not only connects to the other part of the 




(picture G, the point connecting to the supercomputer). I wonder, how they put the fibre, Ian told me 
they do not need to do the ducting. There are ducting people to do it, and they only need to know 
where the two ends are. 
 
 
I learn the new concept today, which the 'active node'. There are there other ‘active nodes’ distribute 
in DOCK, Science Museum and BOX. Then, he introduced me the wireless and sensor layers. 
Regarding the wireless, he mainly highlights four types of technologies, 4G, LET-A, Wi-Fi, 
802.11AC, Blue Arrow’ Wig Gig. 4G we all know is the four generation of mobile network, 802.11 
AC he shows me the retour (the picture I). Blue Arrow’s backhaul not only allows users to access 
but also it can talk to another Wig Gig. The reason why chooses Blue Arrow. According to Ian, it is 




At the end of the Lab tour, I asked him how many people involve in the OPHC from the Lab now; he 
said only four: himself, David, a marketing person, and an HP who consultant contact. I mentioned 
that I am going to study the innovation process. He then introduces me to David, who just come to 
OPHC for a week and trying to set a deadline for OPHC. I had a very short chat with him to 
understand OPHC’s calendar; he will be trying to figure it out in the next week, I thanked him and 
sent him an email afterwards. 
 
I say goodbye to Ian and make sure he signs the consent form. He sends me outside the Lab. I left the 





























Appendix 6 Examples of using drawing to assist analysis 
 

















My name is Yin Jingwen, and I am a PhD student at the Graduate School of Education, University 
of Bristol. The PhD project titles, an ethnographic study of a smart city in the making, is going to 
study the social innovation through Open Programmable Harbour City (OPHC). I am interested in 
how different types of technologies work together to make OPHC; and what is role of vision in the 
innovation process; and what opportunities there for citizen participation. 
 
The outcomes of this study will contribute to understand better the role of high technology innovator 
in reshaping the future city landscape. Vision’s role in a socio-technical innovation process. It will 
also help us understand better how citizens may be involved in a high technology city innovation. 
 
In order to archive the research objective, this research will deploy an ethnographic approach and 
adopt the participant observation and interview as research method. The project follows the ethical 
guidelines of the British Educational Research Association (BERA) and the Data Protection Act of 
the United Kingdom. It has already been ethically approved by the University of Bristol’s Graduate 
School of Education.  
 
This means that if you decide to take part: 
 
• The researcher will take fieldnotes and photographs during the observation. Audio-recording 
the interview for research purpose. 
 
• You are granted the right to withdraw your contribution from the project at any time. You do 
not have to state a reason for doing this.   
 
• All data will be treated confidentially and stored on devices secured by personal passwords. 
The fieldnotes and any prints will be kept in a locked filing cabinet. 
 
• Since there is only one Open Programmable Harbour City, the researcher cannot guarantee 
the participants’ fully anonymity. You should know that it is possible to be identified in my 
writing. But, I will conceal your real name. 
 
• The research is expected to be reported as research thesis, presented in conferences and 
published in academic journals. The participant will send an electronic copy of the complete 
PhD thesis if they wish. 
 
If you have any complaints about the content of the research and the researcher, the complaint 






Professor Keri Facer, Email: Keri.Facer@bristol.ac.uk 
Professor Thomas Osborne，Email:thomas.osborne@bristol.ac.uk 
 
For the purpose of transparency, you will be asked to fill a consent form. This form needs to be 






Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol 
Email: jwyin1130@gmail.com 









An Ethnographic Study of a Smart City in the Making 
 
                                                                                                       
 
 
Please tick if you agree 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet explaining  
the study and I have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
         
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw from participating at any time, without stating a reason for doing this. 
 
3. I understand that the researcher will take fieldnotes and photographers during  
her participant observation. 
     
4. I understand the researcher will make audio recordings of all interview 
 for research purposes. 
 
5. I agree to take part in this study 
 












Appendix 8 Other empirical data 
 
(1) Different people’s previous experience in relation to “experiment” 
 
Civil servant experiment with new ideas 
 
“In the late 1990s, my original job was around finding out what people and city felt about their 
priorities. We did that by using lots of questionnaires and post to people. People filled them in and 
sent it back. We very quickly said that ‘oh! why do not we use technologies (…)’. That is when we 
get involved. Very quickly, we get involved in democracy project using technology (…). Because we 
are a pioneer, the other pioneers sort of find us (…). Lots of people came to us and said ‘well, can 
you trial our products? New ideas? (…)” 
 
A senior civil servant from the Harbour City Council        
 
 
   
 
Experimenting with fibre, wireless, wearable tech 
 
“Well, I been involved in getting experiment with this high-speed network for a long time (…).  I 
persuaded the network provider to lend us the use of fibre in 1990s. We built an experimental network 
(…) One commercial organisation actually be able to make it commercially (…). And we did a lot of 
experiments, partly around this earlier network, and anticipating the arrive of this much faster 
wireless connectivity (…). We were exploring things like wearable technology (…). So, these were 
the sort of things that we experiment with. Putting interesting technology in people’s hand and 
exploring what could be done (…). We all have struggles of designing things, how do you take into 
all those factors. This is why you need those sort of experimental test-bed (…)” 
 




Experimenting in the real life 
 
“Another reason for us to involve in OPHC, probably about 2008, we joined the European network 
of the living lab (…). We set the community living lab. We are not testing things about people, but 
testing things with people (…). There was a very important phase for R&D research experimentation 
that is experiment in community with real people. But, not just they give tech, trial, and you delivered. 
We were done some of this, where people deliver technology and trial. That’s ok. It’s better, in my 
opinion, to work with people, and researchers to design a solution. So, when we first get involved, 
the first project we did in the living lab was an earlier smart metering project (…). It not a smart 
meter project for me because we are not interested in smart metering per se. We were interested in 
working with people to understand what was going on? How do we understand it? We also start to 
understand the value of data, citizen generating things (…)” 
 










(2) An imagination of a possible use case for the experimental research testbed 
In order to deliver the experimental research testbed, many ideas pop-up. One idea is to use the 
network to establish an educational project. There was an idea to link fibre to the Dome in the Science 
Museum and the supercomputer facilities in the Harbour City University. This linkage suggests to 
allows students at the ages of secondary education to access the High-Performance Computing from 
the Dome (Interview with Luke, 15 September 2016). 
  
  
(3) Emma and MiniCat’s engagement  
 
MiniCat is a U.S multinational technology company. The company has a department to co-design 
creative project free for society. One engineer Emma found the Data Dome project interesting and 
gain the company’s permission to conduct development for the Dome. Emma’s suggestion was 
approved by the company, and eight engineers were assigned to design a gesture control application 
for the Dome (Informal Interview with Emma, 08 October 2016). 
 
 
(4) The intermediary and system intermediary actors 
Several intermediary actors can be identified in the vertical diffusion process of OPHC. This includes 
smart city-related standardisation organisations and research institutions. The former mainly refers 
to a U.S based SDN standardisation organisation, a UK open data standardisation organisation, and 
a UK Internet of Things (IoT) organisation. Standardisation organisations are important for aggregate 
OPHC to the global smart cities niche because knowledge production about smart cities at a local 
level is a collective good. Standardisation organisation responsible for maintaining collective 
technical knowledge. They could help to avoid free-rider. Regarding research institutions, they often 
hired by other firms to compare smart cities experiences in different locations and draw some general 
conclusions. In the case of OPHC, a research institution O3 was hired by a Chinese multinational 
telecommunication company to produce a UK smart city index. O3 mapped the smart city 
development in the UK. OPHC was included in the report and it was regarded as a UK smart city 
leader.  
 
Three system intermediary actors aggregated experiences from OPHC to a network level and broker 
relationship between different parties. The first system intermediary actor was industry associations. 
They facilitate the circulation of knowledge, articulate problem agenda, and exchange experiences 
in nowadays’ smart cities making. There was an industry association calls Digital Forum who is a 
smart city business advocator. It hosted global scale smart cities conferences to attract smart city 
actors around the world to participate and share their experience. In the process, the association 
selected valuable local practices and distilled some important cases to circulated at a global level. 
OPHC was one of its chosen cases. The second type was the UK government agents. This includes 
the Future City Radar (FCR) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). They help to distil 
valuable local lessons to a national level. For example, in the story of Data Dome, we can see that 
FCR actively participated a series of workshops to explore the use case of Data Dome (see more in 
Chapter 6). It collected useful lessons from the Data Dome to understand the exportation possibility 
of smart technologies. In the story of the Delta City that we will read later, FCO funded a smart city 
project between Harbour City and Delta City (China). FCO aimed to collect valuable lessons from 
the communication process and spread the lesson at a national level. The third type was community 
organisations. Straw House is an example of this type of actor. As we can see in Chapter 6, Straw 
House leads the citizen sensing project. Given the Straw House is part of the international living lab 
network, the organisation shared its experience of citizen sensing in the network. For example, in 
autumn (2016), managers of Citizen Sensing project travelled to a living lab conference hosted in 
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